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Defense Policy Based on 'Reasonable Sufficiency'

LD3108102689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0835 GMT 31 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 31 Aug (TASS)—TASS diplomatic correspondent Viktor Chistyakov writes:

A sad anniversary—the 50th since the start of the most awful and destructive of wars—demands of the world public not only to again interpret the lessons of the past, but also to define guidelines for the future. New political thinking gives scope for conducting a civilized policy in the military sphere.

It is felt in Soviet military circles that in current conditions, the cornerstone of defense policy is the principle of reasonable sufficiency. The military potential of states should be reduced to such a level which guarantees their security, and at the same time does not pose a threat to the security of other countries. The realization of this requirement presupposes a reduction in the level of armed forces and weapons, giving them a nonoffensive structure, and lowering the scale of military production.

The Soviet Union is proving in deeds its readiness to help detente in the military sphere. In the next 2 years, the numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces will be reduced by 500,000 personnel, or by 12 percent, and the European part of the USSR accounts for 240,000 personnel. Fifty thousand personnel and 5,300 tanks will be withdrawn from the GDR, the CSSR, the Hungarian People's Republic, and the Polish People's Republic. The military budget will fall by 14.2 percent, and the production of weapons and military equipment by 19.5 percent.

However, it is impossible to realize the principle of reasonable sufficiency alone. This becomes possible when the other side, that is, NATO, moves toward establishing lower levels for armed forces and weapons.

Until recently, the calls from the Warsaw Pact met with a most restrained response from NATO countries. But the practical realization of large-scale reductions undertaken unilaterally by the socialist countries is gradually thawing the ice of distrust. An example of this is the discussions which have of late unfolded throughout the FRG on its contribution to the policy of security. What is characteristic is that words about the possibility of reducing the numerical strength of the Bundeswehr are heard not only from the camp of the opposition SPD [Socialist Democratic Party]. This idea is increasingly gaining ground among the politicians of the ruling coalition, diplomats, and even the military.

In this regard, the example of the FRG is quite symptomatic. In the Soviet Union, people are convinced that if such a trend is maintained and the North Atlantic bloc proves in practice its adherence to detente, then more enduring foundations for mutual relations between the East and the West will thus be laid.

Gerasimov Conducts Foreign Ministry News Briefing

LD3008145689 Moscow TASS in English 1443 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 30 TASS—The Soviet Union in every way welcomes the approach by Eligio de la Garza, chairman of the Committee on Agriculture of the U.S. House of Representatives, who advocates making trade between the Soviet Union and the United States 'a street with two-way traffic', Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's information directorate, told a briefing in Moscow today in comment on the plea addressed by the congressman, who visited the Soviet Union recently, to U.S. businessmen to give greater scope to the import of Soviet commodities in exchange for Soviet purchases of goods on the American market.

Gerasimov announced that Steve Cowper, the governor of Alaska, will tour a number of cities in the Soviet Far East on August 31- September 11 with a view to carrying on talks on the development of contacts between the two regions, and described the visit as a symbolic episode in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

He read out a statement dealing with the current situation in Panama. The country is now living through a complex stage of internal political evolution, and interference from the outside will not hasten a solution to existing problems but will only complicate it, the statement says.

Having expressed concern over threats of the use of foreign armed force against Panama, the spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry emphasised the need to refrain from steps which would entail consequences which are hard to predict.

Speaking of the understanding reached between Argentina and Britain to hold a meeting in Madrid in October to discuss the entire spectrum of bilateral diplomatic, consular, trade and economic problems as well as contacts in the fields of science, culture and sports, the spokesman pointed out that the Soviet Union welcomes the start of the dialogue to normalise relations between the two countries.

It is believed in the Soviet Union that the process of restoration of relations between Argentina and Britain will contribute not only to paving the way for their cooperation but also to the strengthening of universal peace and stability and to deepening mutual understanding and trust between peoples, he said.

Gerasimov commented on the Voice of America Tuesday [29 August] report which, with reference to 'a spokesman for Afghan resistance forces' asserted that Soviet aircraft and artillery fire from the Soviet side of the border on rebel positions in the north-eastern part of Afghanistan.

Soviet aircraft do not cross the Afghan air border to participate in military operations and Soviet artillery does not fire in the direction of the Afghan border either, the spokesman stated in this connection. Military operations in Afghanistan are being conducted by government troops which have available both artillery and aircraft.

Touching upon the deportation of Palestinians from the occupied territories by Israeli authorities, Gerasimov emphasised that by those actions Tel Aviv questions declarations about its commitment to the policy of peace and security in the Middle East.

Israel's actions undermine the current still fragile process of accumulating positive prerequisities for a settlement of Arab- Israeli conflict, Gerasimov said. He voiced an opinion that the United Nations Security Council should demand that Israel cease its unlawful actions.

Within the framework of the briefing the journalists were addressed by Arkadiy Maslennikov, head of the USSR Supreme Soviet's press centre, who described plans for its further work.

Denies Military Moves in Afghanistan

LD3008130789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1241 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 30 Aug (TASS)—Soviet aircraft are not crossing into Afghan airspace to participate in military operations in that country, nor is Soviet artillery firing at the Afghan border. This was stated here today at a briefing by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate, who was commenting on a "Voice of America" report heard yesterday. The radio station's broadcast, in particular, referring to "a representative of the Afghan resistance forces," stated that Soviet aircraft and artillery are shelling Mujahidin positions in the northeastern part of Afghanistan from the Soviet side of the border.

This report is incorrect, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said, noting that the "Voice of America" "should be more discriminating about its sources of information." Military operations in the Republic of Afghanistan are being carried out by government troops which possess both artillery and aircraft, he said.

Shuns Israel for Palestinian Deportations

LD3008133789 Moscow TASS in English 1328 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 30 TASS—Israeli authorities' deportations of Palestinians cast doubt upon Tel Aviv's avowed desire for peace and security in the Middle East, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said today.

After reminding reporters at a briefing here of worldwide efforts to make Israel rescind its deporation decisions, he noted the increasing international condemnation of Israeli actions, adding that this applies not only to the deportations.

The Israelis actions are hampering work to promote an Arab-Israeli settlement, Gerasimov said.

He suggested that the United Nations Security Council demand an end to Tel Aviv's illegitimate actions.

Condemns Outside Interference in Panama

LD3008130589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1230 GMT 30 Aug 89

["Statement by USSR Foreign Ministry Representative on Situation in Panama"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 30 Aug (TASS)—Panama is currently going through a complex stage in its domestic political evolution, and outside interference will not straighten the road to a resolution of the existing problems, but will only complicate it, says a statement which was read out at a briefing here today by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate.

International public attention, he said, is being increasingly focused on the situation in Panama in connection with the fact that the current cabinet of ministers' term of office expires on 1 September.

Moreover, an artificial escalation of tension is in evidence, which is not being brought about by objective causes.

Expressing concern in connection with the threats being heard to use foreign armed force against this country, the USSR Foreign Ministry representative stressed the need to refrain from steps that might entail consequences difficult to predict. Only the Panamanian people with a sense of responsibility can resolve its destiny, and determine without any interference from outside the form of its future administration, stated Gennadiy Gerasimov.

Says U.S. Presence Heightens Tension

LD3008140989 Moscow TASS in English 1400 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 30 TASS—Panama is now living through a complex stage of internal political evolution. Interference from the outside would not hasten a solution to existing problems but would only complicate it, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate, told a briefing here today.

The situation in Panama is attracting public attention due to the fact that the term of the incumbent Cabinet of Ministers expires on September 1, he said.

The increase in the U.S. military presence and unceasing large-scale exercises of U.S. troops in the Panama Canal zone are serving to artificially heighten tensions.

Arguments that the normal functioning of the inter-ocean waterway and its neutral status are being put in jeopardy are not convincing either.

That the situation in the country is far from simple is also illustrated by the fact that neither the Organisation of American States (OAS) nor its mediatory mission have been able so far to work out recommendations in the interests of national reconciliation.

Many Latin American countries are aware of the delicate nature of the situation in Panama and emphasise the need for a weighed approach and for the ensurance of the Panamanians' right to settle their internal affairs themselves, the spokesman said.

A statement, adopted after the Panamanian issue was discussed within the OAS framework, emphasises that a solution to the crisis should be ensured through the observance of the sovereignty and self-determination of the Panamanian people.

Threats of foreign armed intervention clearly give rise to concern in this connection. Civilised political thinking and the development of democratic principles of contacts between nations imperatively dictate the need to refrain from steps which could entail consequences that are hard to predict, Gerasimov said.

Only the Panamanian people with a sense of responsibility can decide their future and determine the form of their future government without any interference from outside. All countries should contribute to strengthening peace and security in the region.

United States & Canada

U.S. Envoy Comments on Far East Tour, Arms Talks

LD3008170289 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0955 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Khabarovsk, 30 Aug (TASS)—TASS Correspondent Yuriy Vitrishchak reports: Viktor Pasternak, first secretary of the CPSU Committee of Khabarovsk Kray, and Nikolay Danilyuk, chairman of the Executive Committee of the kray Soviet of People's Deputies, today received Jack Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, who is on a visit here. They informed the guest about topical problems of the kray. Questions of bilateral cooperation were examined.

"The basic aim of my visit to the Soviet Far East is to familiarize myself with the region and its people," Jack Matlock told a TASS correspondent. "A great impression was produced by the hospitality of the Far Easterners, the unique nature, and the raw material potential of the region. In my view, perestroyka in combination with inexhaustible natural potential provides hope for a good future for the region."

"During the visit I met with Colonel General Viktor Novozhilov, commander of the forces of the Far East Military District," the U.S. diplomat continued. "The USSR and the United States have recently done a lot to establish direct contacts between the military of the two countries, and this is very important. We welcome the measures by the Soviet Union to cut its Armed Forces, announced by Mikhail Gorbachev at the United Nations last December. The talks in Vienna on cutting conventional weapons are proceeding successfully. There has been progress at the talks on a 50-percent cut in strategic weapons. We are hoping that as a result of the talks such a cut will come fairly soon."

U.S. Team Affirms Nuclear Power Controls

LD2908194789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 29 Aug 89

[Text] The fifth generating unit of the Zaporozhye nuclear electric power station with a capacity of 1 million kw, has begun working on the country's unified energy system. Today, the deed of its acceptance for industrial operation was signed. This will allow a considerable reduction in the shortage of electrical power which exists in the Ukraine and other regions of the country.

From the inception of building the energy generating unit, everything has been subordinate to guaranteeing its reliable and safe work. The tuning of all the equipment has been carried out strictly in accordance with the safety regulations at an AES [nuclear electric power station] which are in force in the USSR. Installed on the energy generating unit are the latest systems to reliably guarantee its steady work. This was affirmed also by a group of inspectors of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, who worked here for over a month.

The state of the environment is constantly monitored at the station.

U.S. Pressure on Dublin After KAL Affair Cited

LD3008214389 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Facts have surfaced in Dublin pointing to cases of tough political pressure exerted on the Irish Government by the previous Ronald Reagan administration of the United States. It has become known that at the peak of the 1983 anti-Soviet controversy around the downing of the South Korean Boeing 747 aircraft, the U.S. Administration attempted political blackmail against sovereign Ireland, urging its government to close Shannon International Airport to Soviet airliners. In exchange for that measure, Washington promised to support Ireland at its talks with Britain on Ulster. Besides speculating on Dublin's interest in the early resolution of the northern Irish problem, the United States pressed for a return favor which would allow the Americans to set up a naval base in one of the ports in Ireland's south, although this would undermine that country's status as a neutral state.

Northeast Asia

USSR-Japanese Trade Union Symposium Ends

LD3008201289 Moscow TASS in English 1904 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Tokyo August 30 TASS—The participants at the Soviet-Japanese Trade Union Symposium, which concluded in Tokyo on Wednesday, spoke out in support of a vigorous dialogue between the Soviet Union and Japan at all levels and an expansion of relations between working people of the two countries in the interests of good-neighbourliness, peace and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region.

The forum, organized on the initiative of the Soviet All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions and the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), heard speakers who were unanimous in noting that positive changes are now taking place in the world under the influence of Soviet perestroika.

"The philosophy of new thinking has brought about a cardinal turn in international relations, setting the beginning to a transition from confrontation to dialogue and constructive cooperation. The warming up of the international climate, including in the Far East, opens up new perspectives for deepening Soviet-Japanese contacts in different fields," chairman of the all-Hokkaido Trade Union Council Noboru Mori stated.

Stressing the desire of the Hokkaido residents to establish durable good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union, the trade union leader criticized the stance of Tokyo officials.

The Japanese Government, while being vocal about its desire to develop Soviet-Japanese ties, hampers in practice the establishment of wider mutually-beneficial exchanges, including joint economic activity in the border areas, Mori pointed out.

The considerable potential for cooperation of the Soviet and Japanese public and the trade unions of the two countries in matters relating to strengthening international security and promoting the process of easing tension in the Asian-Pacific region was pointed out by corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Akhmed Iskanderov.

The task of developing Soviet-Japanese relations is great in scope and very complicated, it was noted at the symposium. However, it can be successfully coped with, if a responsible approach, meeting the prospective interests of the two nations, is identified through joint effort.

Soviet Scholar Outlines North-South Trade

SK2908021689 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 29 Aug 89 p 2

[Summary of paper by Georgiy D. Toloraya of the Soviet Academy of Sciences presented to the International Symposium on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation, held 28-29 August in Seoul]

[Text] The very nature of economic cooperation between the two parts of divided Korea is highly politicized, since both in the North and in the South it is identified with the problem of national reunification and national reconciliation.

Therefore purely economic criteria are not quite sufficient for prognosing the likely directions and magnitude of this cooperation. However, for the purposes of this paper we wouldn't discuss political considerations.

Even mechanical comparison shows a certain commodity trade potential as one of the chief directions of North-South exchanges.

It can be accomplished in two ways: One is reallocating streams of commodities from other markets into the channels of inter-Korean trade, the second is setting up special production base for this purpose.

There were certain overexpectations concerning the present possibilities of inter-Korean trade among South Korean businessmen and politicians, and now that there is little progress here, some are readily looking for political reasons, not taking into consideration purely economic limitations.

I would like to name some of them.

1. North Korean economy, mostly oriented onto internal market, has only limited export capabilities both from the point of view of range of commodities and volume of export.

Without a special program of export branches development (maybe with South Korean participation), there are not so many possibilities for Northern exports to the South. My estimate is that in coming decade or so its maximum volume couldn't exceed $300 million.

2. The difference in technology poses severe problems and restraints on exchange of technical goods.

Although some south Korean industrial equipment (for textile, footwear, foodstuffs industries, electronics) could be used in DPR Korea, the problem of its compatibility and adjustment may arise.

3. Most of the goods that are the core of South Korean exports—I mean the consumer goods, tailored to the demand of a Western consumer (automobiles, classy electronics, fashion clothing and footwear) can hardly find a ready market in the North due to different life styles and more production-oriented national priorities in the North.

4. That means that even this not very considerable amount of currency, that the North could accumulate from exports to the South, would be probably spent elsewhere, thus posing problems for trade balancing.

Without a special program of export branches development (maybe with South Korean participation), there are not so many possibilities for Northern exports to the South. My estimate is that in coming decade or so its maximum volume couldn't exceed $300 million.

5. Trade operations between the North and the South could also experience some difficulties due to differences in trading technique of the partners.

I support the idea of a special bodies on both sides dealing with inter-Korean trade at least at the initial stage.

6. I set aside such practical questions as mode of payment, insurance, transportation, quality control, claims settlement etc. although without creating (and the only way is setting up a mutually obligatory legislative base) a smoothly running mechanism any direct transactions are impossible.

As to economic cooperation (especially in the form of joint ventures—JV) the prospects here are more promising, although rather vague. Of course, JV cannot be started overnight—the need to build up mutual understanding and trust is as important, as economic considerations (although it might be easier for the people of the same blood).

The probable areas of economic co-operation at the first stage may include:

1. Joint development of natural resources (mostly in the rich Northern areas) with subsequent delivery of processed products not only to the South (or vice versa) but also to foreign markets (probable minerals may include coal, iron ore, nonferrous ores, magnesite, nephelynes,

grafite etc. as well as reprocessing of waste in non-ferrous metallurgy and other branches).

South Korean side may invest with both domestically produced and imported equipment, while Northern side could bear the burden of construction, geological and related research, supplying some domestic equipment as well as workforce.

2. Procurement and processing of fish and sea products, including mariculture. Such JV [joint venture] could operate both in North and South economic zones, using the ships of both sides, although processing equipment and technology would be preferable of Southern or imported origin.

3. JV in agriculture in the South, using Northern traditional agrotechniques and laborforce, brought on seasonal basis, thus drastically reducing labor costs and producing agricultural products, which possibly would be able to compete even with imported commodities in the probable absence of import restrictions.

4. Tourist industry, where a JV could organize tours (for Westerners mostly) including both South and North. Such JV could operate a chain of hotels in either side of 38 (in the North—specially built for this purpose), a number of vehicles (tourist buses), shipping and recreational facilities in the North.

5. Transport and related services, where a JV could operate in two fields: a) delivery of merchandise of inter-Korean trade; b) delivery of export-import goods: that of North Korea—mostly to Western markets, that of South Korea—to socialist countries.

It could jointly operate a number of trucks, railroad cars and sea-gong vessles. A jointly operated passenger airline via North Korean airspace to China, USSR and Europe is also not impossible.

6. A joint trading house marketing North Koreans goods in Western markets, as well as some South Korean goods in the socialist countries.

This is a broad framework, that can have several outlets—for example, a JV with North Korea participation in a free export zone in the South, which process semi-finished goods of North Korean origin and/or export them.

7. As to JV's in manufacturing, they would take some more time to spread up. There could be two principal directions of creating such JV in the North.

First is producing some goods (mostly consumer goods, like textiles, footwear, processed food and beverage, electronics) for North Korea's internal market, although limited at the moment, but with much space to spread.

Second is relocation of declining labor-intensive South Korean industries for costs reasons with the aim of continuing exports to the previously exploited markets. However, technology computability as well as quality problems may arise.

8. At the initial stage of cooperation the North-South joint ventures in the third countries could be very efficient for acquiring experience of working together and smoothing out psychological and political differences.

The area for such JV's could include Middle East projects, construction of, say, hotels and other objects in Soviet Far East or China.

It is possible to use North Korean workers for implementing Southern engineering projects with eventual profit sharing.

Some more general considerations on economic cooperation:

—Prerequsite for organizing a JV is a free access to the partner' [as published] side economic information and vital regulations, concerning economic activities.

—It may be useful to start cooperation with North Korea through newly appearing "second economy," which comprises mostly JV companies with Chochongnyon [General Association of Korean Residents in Japan] firms of Japanese Koreans as well as using non-traditional methods of planning North Korean conglomerate companies, p.e. "Taesong."

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Cambodia Conference Ends Without Settlement

LD3108080689 Moscow TASS in English 0711 GMT 31 Aug 89

[Text] Paris August 31 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Viktor Khrekov:

It has not so far been possible to reach a global Cambodian settlement, the concluding statement of the second session of the international conference on Cambodia, which ended here on Wednesday [30 August] said. The conference therefore decided to suspend its work.

The conference was attended by foreign ministers and senior diplomatic officials from 19 countries and also a representative of the United Nations secretary general. The Soviet delegation was led by Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev.

The conference made some progress in working out various elements essential to attain a global settlement of the tragic Cambodian conflict, the statement stresses. The conference called upon all parties concerned to increase their efforts to achieve a global Cambodian settlement.

The foreign ministers of France and Indonesia, the conference co-chairmen, will start consultations within six months with participants in the conference with a view to resuming its work. The French Government is ready to host the international conference on Cambodia in Paris again.

The conference has done a significant volume of work, co-chairman Roland Dumas, French foreign minister, stressed at the concluding news conference. The sides were near to agreement, but at the present stage it proved impossible to reach it because of a number of contradictions between the Cambodian sides. National reconciliation problems have not been solved and there has been no progress in the question of the formation of a transitional government for a period between the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and nationwide elections under international control.

One witnesses different approaches to the formation of an international control mechanism. There are differences of opinion over the use of the term of "genocide" in the conference documents and also on the question of Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia.

It is now necessary to advance further towards a political settlement, a national reconciliation spirit should prevail over confrontation, it is necessary to prevent new sufferings of the Khmer people, Dumas said. It is now necessary to continue the settlement process which should go on at three levels, Dumas said. The Cambodian sides should find ways to bring their positions closer, the countries of the region should help in attaining a final settlement, and the great powers should also contribute by promoting the search for a political settlement.

The conference co-chairmen will use all the means at their disposal and the powers vested in them by the forum to prevent the state of affairs in Cambodia from worsening, since the Khmer sides, should they fail to reach a political settlement, might look for an answer in the battlefield, the French foreign minister said.

Conference Co-chairman Ali Alatas, Indonesia's foreign minister, stressed it was very important that the conflicting Cambodian sides had met for negotiations. So many difficult problems cannot be solved in such a brief period of time, but a reliable foundation is being created.

The conference at its present stage failed to reach agreement on a political settlement, but this does not mean that the forum was a failure, Hun Sen, prime and foreign minister of Cambodia, said. All outstanding differences should be negotiated, since the Cambodian problem can be solved only through political means.

The lack of progress is due to the stand of the Khmer Rouge which tried in every way to torpedo the conference. They are trying to solve questions through the force of arms, Hun Sen said. He also accused Prince Norodom Sihanouk of planning war after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops.

Hun Sen pointed out that the lack of agreement on a global solution had also prevented agreements on problems on which there are similarities of views.

However, he added, Cambodia will fulfill its obligations assumed before the international community. The final stage of the Vietnamese troop withdrawal will begin on September 21 and end on September 26.

Now that the creation of an international verification mechanism has proven impossible, Cambodia is inviting the co-chairmen of the international conference on Cambodia, the chairman of the Non-aligned Movement, the U.N. secretary general, representatives of all countries, international and national public organisations and reporters, who show interest in the Cambodian problem, to watch the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers, Hun Sen said.

He urged all countries involved in the conflict to stop military aid to the Cambodian sides afer the Vietnamese troop withdrawal, not to fan the flames of civil war and not to interfere in case it breaks out.

Cambodia is ready to continue dialogue and enter into negotiations with sides wishing to sign a ceasefire agreement, the Cambodian leader said.

The head of the Soviet delegation, L.A. Rogachev, told TASS that the second session of the foreign ministers' conference had done much work and laid a good foundation for a whole number of agreements.

"One should not dramatise the lack of global agreements now, as the 30 days of the conference were just not enough for the negotiating sides," he said.

"It is important that the conference now is only suspending its work, while the political settlement process will continue."

Rogachev said that the Soviet stand is that the Cambodian problem can be solved, above all, by the Khmer sides, who should have their authoritative say.

"The opposition coalition should take into account realities of the present-day situation in Indochina and South East Asia. Now, however, one has to say that the Khmer Rouge have done everything to thwart the conference," he pointed out.

The Soviet representative emphasised that the Soviet Union will continue making maximum efforts, included consultations with interested sides, to promote a political settlement of the Cambodian problem.

USSR-Indonesia Trade Commission Session Ends

LD2908173789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1115 GMT 29 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 29 Aug. (TASS)—The first session of the Mixed Commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation in the history of trade relations between the USSR and Indonesia ended here today. The delegations of the two countries were headed, on the Soviet side, by Vladimir Mordvinov, deputy minister of foreign economic relations, and on the Indonesian side by Sudrajat Jiwandono, junior minister of trade.

The USSR and Indonesia discussed measures aimed at expanding bilateral trade and at eliminating the obstacles arising on this road; they came to agreement on stepping up efforts for inducing a broader circle of Soviet organizations and Indonesian firms to participate in bilateral trade and economic cooperation. The possible directions include the conclusion of deals on a tied and payback basis, expansion of joint entrepreneurship, and joint commercial activity in the markets of third countries.

During the commission session the Soviet side confirmed its readiness to give Indonesia technical assistance in the field of the peat industry and the organization of coal extraction. The USSR proposed use of the experience of Soviet organizations in the construction in Indonesia of power plants and enterprises of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, in particular an aluminum works, a copper plant, a works for processing spent tin ores by means of fuming. The Indonesian side raised the question of purchasing from the USSR port equipment to unload scrap metal for the Krakatoa steel metallurgical combine.

The sides intend to step up cooperation in the sphere of joint production and marketing of tea and palm oil. They discussed the possibility of such cooperation in growing coffee. An accord was reached on cooperation in the sphere of processing timber products. It is intended in the very near future to examine the prospects for the development of bilateral links in fisheries.

The heads of the delegations initialled documents on the further development of Soviet-Indonesian cooperation. In accordance with which the USSR will supply Indonesia with goods in the agro-industrial range: fertilizers and biostimulators.

The second session of the mixed Soviet-Indonesian commission for trade and economic cooperation will take place in 1991 in Jakarta.

Near East & South Asia

'Senior' Soviet Official Cited on Lebanon

JN3008153089 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Aug 89 p 18

[Text] Moscow—AL-QABAS—In a statement to AL-QABAS, a senior Soviet official has explained the Soviet position on the Lebanese crisis, means to resolve it, and the effect of its continuation on the overall situation in the region. The Soviet official rejected the accusation that Moscow is not moving fast enough to end the crisis.

Vyacheslav Matisov, counselor to the chief of the Near Eastern and North African Administration at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs [name and title as published], asserted the need for all parties to exercise self-restraint, for a halt to the shelling of residential districts, and for arms shipments to the rival factions to be placed under control.

He warned against the consequences of continued fighting in Lebanon, saying that it may lead to foreign powers' armed intervention in Lebanese internal affairs. He also warned against the armament race in Lebanon and described it as a "lethal course."

In his statement to AL-QABAS, Matisov said that the "escalation of fighting leads Lebanon further and further into a dead end."

He added that "the experience of the 15-year-old crisis indicates that any attempt to pile up more arms and hardware leads only to a further escalation of tension."

The Soviet official said that continuing "the war of attrition will certainly lead to an indirect, or even direct, intervention by foreign powers in Lebanese affairs through supporting rival factions. This intervention may even be military."

He said that the rival factions' armament race "has no positive elements or results. All parties to the military dispute must abandon this deadly course."

Matisov implicitly criticized French naval moves in the region. He said that "it seems useless now to intensify the atmosphere of military confrontation around Lebanon by increasing the number of military naval units off the Lebanese coast, as this constitutes a foreign attempt to intervene in the Lebanese affairs."

The Soviet official reiterated Moscow's support and backing for the tripartite Arab committee and its efforts to end the Lebanese crisis.

He said "the Soviet Union believes that it is important in the current circumstances to intensify Arab political efforts as the Arabs can be effective mediators in finding an acceptable way out of the current impasse. The Soviet Union affirms that the resources of the tripartite Arab committee have not been exhausted yet and that the international community must extend every possible help to these efforts. This, for example, has been demonstrated by the statement of the current UN Security Council president."

The Soviet official noted that the USSR is holding contacts with all the parties to the conflict and working with determination to convince these parties "of the need to abandon the confrontation and follow the course of political solution." He said that Moscow has held intensive contacts with the United States, France, and representatives of Arab countries, hoping that these contacts will expedite a settlement in Lebanon.

The Soviet official affirmed his country's support for safeguarding Lebanon as an independent Arab state and preserving its unity in terms of territory, people, and institutions. He said that "any attempt to divide this country must be considered an attempt to maintain the state of war in it forever."

The Soviet official stressed that the Israeli forces must withdraw from southern Lebanon. He said: "We believe

that in order to end the crisis in Lebanon the main obstacle to peace—that is, the continuation of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon—must be removed first."

He said that the Lebanese crisis plays an important role in developing the overall situation in the Middle East. He said that "the developments in Lebanon can help as well as obstruct the settlement process in the Middle East." He added that "within this framework, a solution to the Lebanese crisis must be viewed as an important precondition for resolving the Middle East problem as a whole."

Matisov asserted the USSR's rejection of putting pressure on other countries to resolve a problem. He said: "Many voices were heard recently in the Arab world accusing the USSR, which has advanced relations with Syria, of not making enough efforts to end the crisis in Lebanon. And the response to this is the following: We had and still have strong relations with Syria, which follows an independent policy on the regional and international levels. The USSR did not put pressure on Syria or any other partner at all. This is in addition to the fact that such a policy [of putting pressure on others] is not in harmony at all with the new political course followed by the Soviet leadership—the course that categorically rejects the policy of putting pressure on other countries. We always communicate our assessment of the situation in Lebanon to the Lebanese parties and the Arab leaders. And this assessment has no covert or unclear elements."

The Soviet official said: "All the Lebanese parties should demonstrate self-control. The shelling of residentials areas must stop. And the entry of weapons to Lebanon—which triggered the recent violence—must also be monitored."

Concluding his statement, the Soviet official added: "With the help of the United Nations and the entire international community, the Arab countries can help the Lebanese find a compromise to the crisis based on the balance of interests of all parties and on marching toward peace."

Soviet Move To Solve Mideast Crisis Discussed

JN3008182089 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Aug 89 p 18

[By the political editor]

[Text] Gennadiy Tarasov's mission to the countries involved in Lebanon is aimed at more than just stopping the Lebanese war but falls short of an attempt to find an overall solution to the whole Middle East crisis. Informed diplomatic sources commenting on Soviet activity and the assistant Soviet foreign minister's mission add: Tarasov will soon visit the Arab tripartite committee member countries and some influential Arab capitals. In addition, parallel preparations are underway for similar Soviet action in the EEC countries and the U.S. capital to pave the way for a new and important Soviet initiative for a comprehensive solution in the Middle East. This stems from Moscow's conviction that the Lebanon crisis cannot be solved without a formulation for peace and is based on mutual and frank recognition between Israel and its Arab neighbors and Israel and the PLO directly.

The sources say that Moscow, which is greatly concerned about preserving a firm foothold in the Middle East region and which believes that in past it has lost important positions in the region, does not wish to lose its alliance with Syria in any way. It recently decided to resume sending weapons to Syria after Moscow and Damascus reached a compromise on financial loans resulting from Syrian military purchases in the past.

The sources affirm that Moscow wants to maintain an effective presence in Syria and, at least, in those countries considered neutral in the coming stage, which it considers very sensitive in the Middle East. It is also concerned about advantages it can gain if it plays a major role in the solution—if not individually, then in cooperation with the European countries that consider the United States' attempts to seek a solution on its own a blow to their economic interests and special status in the Middle East.

The current Soviet action centers on complete cooperation with Arab countries, to whom Moscow indirectly proposed possible financial contributions in the first stage of a cease-fire in Lebanon through providing military observers who would play a major role, along with French or pro-French observers, in supervising the cease-fire and fixing a longterm truce between the semi-independent entities in Lebanon in preparation for a long and complicated dialogue between them. This would preserve Syria's security during the period of relaxation of tension in the Middle East crisis.

Moscow believes that if the Arab tripartite committee, which will resume its duties very soon with basic support from the Soviet Union and European countries represented by France, succeeds, it will be possible to entrust the committee with a continuing role in solving the Middle East crisis. This will take place through a new role for the committee after expanding it in a new Arab summit.

Analysts of the Soviet position say that Moscow's effective contribution toward a moderate solution of the Lebanese crisis provides it with freedom of movement and is in line with the moderate views of many influential countries in the Middle East. In addition, Moscow can, through its growing relations with Iran, especially the new government, serve the countries who depend heavily on security guarantees, even if they are only diplomatic. Thus, it can also prevent military confrontations and terrorist acts.

Appeal to Iranian, Pakistani Parliaments on POWs

LD3008151389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1413 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 30 Aug (TASS)—The presidium of the USSR parliamentary group has requested that its Iranian

and Pakistani colleagues help in resolving a noble, humane problem: the freeing of Soviet servicemen being held prisoner by the Afghan opposition. Such help, it is emphasized in addresses to the parliamentarians of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Iran, will without doubt positively affect the future development of goodneighborly relations and the extension of mutual understanding and cooperation between our countries and peoples.

Our government, it is noted in the addresses, is making maximum efforts to seek and return Soviet people to their homeland. The Soviet diplomatic service is making use of the resources of the United nations and of other international organizations. Soviet people's diplomacy—representatives of which have spent time in Afghanistan, the United States, and Pakitan—is functioning actively.

As a result of measures taken, some of the Soviet servicemen have been successfully released. However, there is still no news about more than 300 ordinary soldiers and officers missing in Afghanistan.

Pakistani Minister Jabbar Discusses USSR Visit

PM3008150789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 89 First Edition p 4

[TASS report, "Developing Relations"]

[Text] Islamabad, 29 Aug—"Revolutionary changes which will be of great historical importance are under way in the USSR at present," Javed Jabbar, Pakistani minister of state for information and broadcasting, said. He was speaking here at a press conference after his return home 26 August from a 5-day trip to the Soviet Union. The minister of state told journalists about the processes taking place in the USSR and expressed a high opinion of the Soviet leadership's course of perestroyka, glasnost, and the democratization of society.

He voiced a high assessment of the Soviet Union's economic aid to Pakistan. Javed Jabbar said that his country and the USSR are neighbors from the geographical, historical, and cultural viewpoints. However, he pointed out here that the current level of trade between the two states is still low. In his opinion, the prospects are good at present and it is necessary to step up bilateral cooperation, above all in the trade and economic sphere. There are definite obstacles, primarily the Afghan problem, to the development of contacts in the political sphere, the minister of state said.

Javed Jabbar stressed that this was the first trip to the USSR by a member of Pakistan's incumbent civilian government. "This visit may prove to be a positive step toward a breakthrough in bilateral relations. We must understand one another better and help one another in this," he said.

Bhutto Said To Attack Power of Military

PM3008145189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent N. Paklin dispatch: "Pakistan: Will the Admiral Retire?"]

[Text] Delhi—Pakistan's Prime Minister B. Bhutto, who is at the same time minister of defense, has announced the retirement of Admiral Ahmed Sirohey from the post of chairman of the Pakistani Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff.

She referred to the fact that his term of office expired in mid-August. But the admiral has not quit his official premises because Pakistan's president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, has said that the admiral's term of office expires in November 1991. Here both the prime minister and the president cite the Pakistani Constitution. However, each is interpreting it in their own way. Bhutto claims that the appointment of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the defense minister's prerogative. G.I. Khan reckons that this falls within his competence as president of the republic. Pakistan's supreme leaders calculate the admiral's term in office from differing points of reference. Bhutto believes that the 3-year period mentioned in law must be counted from August 1986 when A. Sirohey was appointed chief of naval staff. Khan believes that the admiral's tenure in his present post only began in November 1988, when he assumed this post after the death of his predecessor General Rehman in an air crash with former president Ziaul Haq.

But, of course, the point is not how the prime minister and the president interpret various provisions of the law. I believe that it is a question of attempts by Bhutto's government to displace the army elite from the positions it holds in the country's government. However, Pakistan's generals, who grew accustomed to power in the years of Ziaul Haq's military dictatorship, are unwilling to relinquish it in favor of the civilian government formed as a result of the 1988 parliamentary elections. Everything indicates that the president, who was renowned in the past for his closeness to Ziaul Haq, is also on their side.

Bhutto achieved her first success in the struggle to affirm the priority of civilian power over military power this May when she retired General Hamid Gul, chief of the all-powerful Pakistani intelligence service. Another 80 high-ranking intelligence officers had to retire with him. Bhutto has now decided to take the second step with the intention of conducting a reshuffle in the army elite. The point is that Admiral A. Sirohey's retirement will directly affect the position of General Mirza Aslam Beg, chief of staff of the Ground Forces. It is he, as required by law, who will take up the post of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the table of ranks of Pakistan's military hierarchy this post is considered pro forma to be superior to the post of chief of staff of the Ground Forces. But only pro forma: In effect the man who commands the land army has the real power. On being

promoted General. Beg will lose his leading role in Pakistan's combined military band. Everything indicates that this promotion is not what he intends. Moreover, no one knows who will be appointed to replace him.

To what can we attribute Bhutto's offensive on the positions of Pakistan's generals? One cannot rule out the fact that it is linked with her possible plans to hold early parliamentary elections at the end of this year. There are persistent rumors in Islamabad and Delhi about this possibility. Let me recall that Bhutto's party—the Pakistan People's Party—only won a relative majority in the National Assembly in the November 1988 elections and had to agree to form a coalition government, whose stability depends in many respects on other members of the coalition.

Implementation of Geneva Accords Urged

BK3008124589 Moscow in Urdu to Pakistan 1300 GMT 29 Aug 89

[Yuriy Yilin commentary]

[Text] Recently, the Karachi paper DAWN published an interview with the former Pakistani minister of state for foreign affairs, Zain Noorani, saying that there is no other way for Pakistan than continuing assistance to the Afghan mujahidin. This interview is flabbergasting as to whether or not it was given by the same Zain Noorani, who, on behalf of Pakistan, signed the Geneva accords on Afghanistan on 14 April 1988. But it proves to be the same person. Several questions spring up in my mind.

Speaking at Geneva in April 1988, Zain Noorani said he was signing the Geneva accords in favor of peace and tranquillity in Afghanistan, hoping that the bloodshed and military operations would end in that country. Further, he emphatically stated that when the outside intervention stops, the Afghan nation would be able to benefit from its legitimate right of self-determination. And what about today? Zain Noorani, who was in favor of stopping all kinds of outside intervention in Afghanistan, is raising his voice in favor of continuing assistance to one of the contending parties, the militant Afghan opposition. But it is tantamount to continued outside intervention in the internal affairs of a neighboring country.

And as far as the Geneva accords are concerned, which were signed by Zain Noorani, there was a categorical assurance from the parties concerned to desist from direct or indirect assistance or support to rebels or separatist elements. It is regrettable that this clause of the Geneva accords was not accomplished and that despite their assurances the United States and Pakistan have increased their assistance to rebels. Nowadays, the quantum of assistance of the U.S.-made and other weapons to the rebels has increased from the Pakistani territory. And it is to be noted that these weapons are more powerful and sophisticated than ever before. The camps and bases of the armed Afghan opposition are intact in the Pakistani territory. It is clear that all these things do not lead to peace and tranquillity in Afghanistan but to perpetuation of bloodshed there. How long will it continue? We mean, the Pakistani assistance to the rebels and its involvement in the war of the enemies of Afghanistan. Zain Noorani has given a categorical reply to all these questions. He says this process will continue until a major representative government comes to power in Kabul. The former Pakistani minister's gesture is toward the so-called interim government, which is set up in the Pakistani city Peshawar and which someone said is a major representative government. Was it elected by the people of Afghanistan? Not at all. It does not even include representatives of the entire opposition. Who are really included in it? Only the representatives of the 7-party alliance in Peshawar. In this government, which is considered by Zain Noorani as a major representative one, there is the participation of not even a military commander. The representatives of the Iran-based 8-Party alliance, the Afghans in exile settled in the West, and the representatives supporting the former King Zahir Shah also do not find a place in this government, although it is known that there are a lot of supporters of Zahir Shah. In fact, it is the self-made government in exile set up in the territory of another country which is not recognized by almost all in the world. Not even its patrons—the United States and Pakistan—dare to recognize it for, in reality, it does not represent anybody.

Recently, the chairman of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal party, Air Marshal Afghar Khan, openly wrote in the NATIONAL HERALD that it is a puppet government. And the most important thing is that the people of Afghanistan do not support this interim government in Peshawar. Even the opposition military commanders, such as Abdul Haq, have not recognized it.

Only the Afghan nation has the right to elect its government, and nobody has any right in it. Nowadays, the real power in the center as well as the provinces is with the Kabul government, which is liked by the people of Afghanistan and which enjoys the support of the people. A big, strong army is under its control. It is a member of the United Nations, and about 100 countries of the world have recognized it. In any case it does not want to monopolize power, but to end bloodshed it is ready to discuss with the opposition at any place and any time to form a coalition government. President Najibullah recently made a proposal for a cease-fire and simultaneous discussions. And once again, this as well as other peace proposals of the Kabul government was rejected.

Once more Zain Noorani's interview draws our attention. He said there is no other way before Pakistan than supporting the mujahidin. But, in our view as well as in the view of most of the people of Pakistan, there is another way—the effective implementation of the Geneva accords—that is to end outside intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and to help in the establishment of peace and tranquillity in this devastated country instead of adding fuel in the fire of bloodshed.

The leader of the Pakistan's Awami National Party, Abdul Wali Khan, said that instead of confrontation and military intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring Afghanistan, the effective implementation of Geneva accords with a faith in good spirit and understanding will be in the interest of Pakistan. Remember, these accords were signed by Zain Noorani, the former Pakistani minister of state for foreign affairs.

Commentary Sees Afghan Rebels Near 'Collapse'

TA3008184589 Moscow in Dari to Afghanistan 1500 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Unattributed commentary within "The World Today" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, reports from the city of Peshawar in Pakistan, where the den of the Afghan opposition leadership known as the 7-party alliance is situated, indicate that Golbuddin Hekmatyar, who is considered a major figure, has decided to temporarily leave the composition of the so-called provisional government. Now please pay attention to our commentary on this topic:

The unity of the opposition groups did not last long because this unity was not based on patriotic feelings, but on vain illusions, quick military victories, and the capture of Kabul. None of these illusions was transformed into reality. Their realization was promoted by neither military advisers from other countries, nor foreign weapons. During the 6 months following the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan, the rebels sustained thousands of dead and wounded, including 200 foreign advisers who were citizens of Pakistan, the United States, France, and some Arab countries. A large number of armed groups that participated in military operations in support of the opposition and the leadership of local commanders switched to the side of Kabul. According to reports, there is a growing apprehension among many Afghans, and even among those who are not particularly enthusiastic about the regime, at the possibility that the rebels might come to power.

Hekmatyar's men reportedly laid an ambush for members of a rival party, and eliminated them. This rival party—Jam'iyat-e Eslami—retaliated, resulting in the killing of 300 people. Now Golbuddin Hekmatyar has suspended his membership in the 7-party provisional government.

NEWSWEEK magazine wrote the following on the recent incidents in the rebel camps: Six months ago, upon the withdrawal of Soviet military forces, Washington and the mujahidin believed that the Kabul regime would soon collapse. The magazine pointed out that now it is the rebel side that is on the verge of collapse.

We believe that this assessment is correct and precise. But the question is: Will the rebels' current supporters, namely Islamabad and Washington, come to the same logical conclusion?

Karpov Receives Indian Defense Institute Head

LD3008183289 Moscow TASS in English 1754 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 30 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov met today Jasjit Singh, director of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. A circumstantial conversation was held dealing with a wide range of questions concerning disarmament and strengthening security in the Indian- Pacific region.

Indian General Departs After 9-Day Visit

LD3008164489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1355 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 30 Aug (TASS)—Today the official visit to the Soviet Union of Nishwa Nath Sharma, chief of army staff of the Republic of India, ended. He was in the USSR for 9 days at the invitation of Army General Valentin Varennikov, deputy defense minister of the USSR, Commander-in-Chief of ground forces.

As the USSR Defense Ministry informed a TASS correspondent, this planned visit once again demonstrated the friendly relations between the two countries and the stable and lasting ties that have formed between the two countries' armies. The Soviet side, the Defense Ministry stressed, is content with this visit.

During his stay in the USSR, Army General Sharma paid a visit to the USSR Defense Ministry to Army General Dmitriy Yazov, during which there was an exchange of opinions on a broad range of questions of mutual interest. He visited the air garrison in Kubinka near the Soviet capital where he was given the opportunity to get to know modern aviation technology on the ground and to observe its possibilities in the air.

In Kiev, the capital of the Soviet Ukraine, the esteemed Indian guest met the commander of the troops of the Kiev military district [KVO]. Apart from the demonstration of military hardware, he was acquainted with the organization of the study process and the daily life of a trainee of the Kiev higher tank engineering college, and he met with Indian servicemen studying at the college.

During his stay in Leningrad, General Sharma visited a military artillery academy and the Leningrad general troop command college.

The chief of army staff of the Republic of India invited Army General Valentin Varennikov to visit India on a return visit.

Today, General Sharma flew to Istanbul.

Licensing of Egyptian Imports Introduced

PM3008151989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] In view of the state of payments, licensing of the import of goods and services into the USSR from Egypt is being introduced for the period 1 September 1989 through the end of 1990.

Freight for the USSR from Egypt will be allowed into the country provided the purchasers (payers) have licenses issued by the appropriate USSR ministries and departments and union republic councils of ministers.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Adamishin Views Apartheid in South Africa

LD3008142289 Moscow International Service in French 1900 GMT 29 Aug 89

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin, by correspondent Igor Vishnevskiy; date, place not given—recorded; Adamishin speaks in Russian with superimposed French translation; see also item entitled "Adamishin Assesses Southern African Situation" published on page 19 of the 30 August Soviet Union DAILY REPORT]

[Text] [Vishnevskiy] The statements by the South African ruling bodies about the desire to put an end to the regime of apartheid are evaluated in various ways in the world. In your opinion, how far can one trust these statements? There are numerous people who describe them as [word indistinct] the aim of which is to deceive world public opinion.

[Adamishin] In words, at least, the Republic of South Africa [RSA] is undergoing changes that make it possible to look to the future with confidence. In the final analysis, the problem can be summed up like this: Will the apartheid regime be eradicated or not? Will the changes that are occurring really last? I must say that I tend to be skeptical about whether this will really be what happens. The problem is not just one of changing facades, or of the truly encouraging changes in South Africa's foreign policy. You cannot say that positive steps are impossible as long as the apartheid regime remains, but on the other hand, it is hard to believe that these steps will be irreversible ones.

There are many people who consider the dismantling of the apartheid regime unlikely, but everyone agrees [words indistinct] and that it is to be hoped that this will be done in a peaceful way, without violence. It is to be hoped that Pretoria will give up violence against its people.

[Vishnevskiy] Possible changes in the policy of the South African ruling bodies have been connected with Frederik de Klerk, the new leader of the Nationalist Party and now acting president of South Africa. Can one hope that after his victory, if he wins, in the presidential elections of 6 September, he will keep his promises?

[Adamishin] He has made some statements that seem encouraging, but on the other hand, one cannot have a lot of confidence in these statements by Frederik de Klerk, who has come formally to power. I imagine that the elections next 6 September will give the victory to the ruling party and strengthen the positions of Frederik de Klerk, anyway, these elections concern only the whites, while the South African majority remains outside.

It is a matter of knowing whether De Klerk and his party of whites, let us say Afrikaaners and British, will have the moral strength to put an end to racial segregation and open genuine negotiations with representatives of the majority of the South African population. I am very sceptical about this.

[Vishnevskiy] Nevertheless, can one hope for some changes in the RSA?

[Adamishin] De Klerk must be given a chance, since here we have people who claim to want to build a new society in South Africa, a society of justice and human rights. (?Let them) put an end to racism forever.

In themselves, these statements are not bad. In any case, it is better than the things that used to be said, but they must be followed by quite concrete actions. For example, one could cite the ending of the state of emergency, the legalization of anti-apartheid organizations and of the African National Congress of South Africa, which is without doubt the most influential force among the democratic organizations of South Africa. They also could be authorized to carry out legal activities so that they would give up the forms of struggle imposed on them by Pretoria. Political prisoners also must be freed. If the South African authorities really do this, if they open talks, we will see how international public opinion and (?various) countries will be able to contribute to this process.

[Vishnevskiy] What will the reaction of the Soviet Union and the United States be if the promises are not kept?

[Adamishin] If it all remains at the level of words, the Americans are promising to step up ther sanctions. As for the USSR, it has nothing to step up, since it does not have relations with South Africa, but then it would really be very difficult to hold people back, to stop them from resorting to all possible means of active struggle against the apartheid regime.

Trade Protocol Signed With Ethiopia

LD3008195489 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1750 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Addis Ababa, 30 Aug (TASS)—Today, in the Ethiopian capital, a trade protocol for a period of 1 year was signed between Ethiopia and the USSR. In acordance with it, Ethiopia will deliver to the USSR, coffee,

seeds of oil-bearing crops, and products of the textile and leather industry. In its turn, the Soviet Union will export to Ethiopia oil products, tires, and metal. The general volume of mutual delivering of industrial and agricultural goods will exceed 350 million Ethiopian dollars ($150 million).

President of Mali Pays Private Visit to USSR

AB2908220189 Bamako Domestic Service in French 2000 GMT 29 Aug 89

[Text] First of all, we inform you that, this afternoon at 1800 at the Mali Embassy in the USSR where he has been on a private visit since 18 August, General Moussa Traore, the secretary general of the Democratic Union of Malian People, UDPM, and president of the Republic received the Malian community in Moscow. The community, apart from the embassy personnel and their families, includes students and trainees. Tomorrow, accompanied by Comrade Nikolay Ivanovich Dementey, vice chairman of the Supreme Soviet and president of the Belorussian Soviet [titles as heard], President Moussa Traore will lay a wreath at the Lenin Mausoleum and at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Then at 1300 hours, the head of state wil be received for a luncheon at the Kremlin hosted by the Supreme Soviet Presidium. This will still be in the company of Nikolay Ivanovich Dementey, acting for the head of the Soviet Government in the absence of Comrade Gorbachev.

East Europe

CPCZ's Jakes Receives Vorotnikov in Prague

LD3008135189 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Prague August 30 TASS—Milos Jakes, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, received Vitaliy Vorotnikov, Politburo member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and president of the Presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, here today.

During the friendly meeting there was a detailed exchange of views on a broad spectrum of matters concerning Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation and the development of its advanced forms.

Much attention was devoted to key problems of restructuring being effected in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia with due account of specific experience and peculiarities of the two countries.

The two sides expressed a desire for more fruitful exchanges of experience in social transformations in the two countries, for deeper development of inter-party contacts, and for the strengthening of cooperation between parliaments.

Vorotnikov had a meeting with Josef Kempny, chairman of the Czech National Council. Matters pertaining to further development of cooperation between the deputies of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and the Czech National Council were discussed.

Silayev, Vodrazka Discuss Machine Building Links

PM3008150989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Deepening Ties"]

[Text] I.S. Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received L. Vodrazka, deputy premier of the CSSR Government, 29 August.

They examined questions of mutual interest regarding the further development of cooperation in the machine building sphere, including questions of coordinating plans for mutual deliveries of machine building output for 1991-1995 and broadening and deepening direct production and cooperative ties.

J. Rehorek, CSSR ambassador to the USSR, took part in the meeting.

Yazov Greets Vaclavik on Slovak Uprising Jubilee

PM3008144789 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 89 First Edition p 1

[Defense Minister D. Yazov message "To Army General Comrade Milan Vaclavik, CSSR Minister of National Defense"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Minister!

On behalf of the USSR Armed Forces and on my own behalf I send you and all Czechoslovak People's Army servicemen sincerest congratulations on the 45th anniversary of the Slovak national uprising.

The celebration of the Slovak national uprising anniversary is always a vivid demonstration of the Soviet-Czechoslovak international combat unity born in the hard years of the joint struggle against the fascist invaders. Highly assessing the fraternal relations between our peoples and armies, Soviet servicemen express the firm confidence that these relations will continue to strengthen and develop in the interests of our countries and the entire socialist community.

Soviet servicemen wish Czechoslovak People's Army servicemen new successes in mastering weapons and combat hardware and in improving their skills and professional ability.

Army General D. Yazov, USSR defense minister

CSSR Acted Lawfully in Detaining Hungarians

PM3008144589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Kormnilov dispatch under the general heading "After the Demonstration in Wenceslas Square": "Prague"]

[Text] As already reported (IZVESTIYA No 235), an unauthorized demonstration was held in Wenceslas Square on the evening of 21 August in which foreign tourists, including Hungarian citizens, took the most active part. Those detained by the Czechoslovak law-enforcement agencies were soon released with the exception of two young Hungarians—Gyorgy Kerenyi (born 1957) and Tamas Deutsch (born 1966).

The Prague No 1 District Prosecutor charged them both with breaching public order. They were taken into custody by decision of the district court and committed for trial, which began at 1030 Tuesday in a courtroom in downtown Prague. Prior to the trial Lajos Taba, Hungarian consul in Czechoslovakia, informed me that Kerenyi and Deutsch would plead not guilty to the charge. A Czechoslovak lawyer is defending them.

At the same time CETEKA reports that Hungarian Charge d'Affaires Janos Hanko was invited to the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior on Monday in connection with the Hungarian side's request that the incident be resolved with utmost speed. It was stressed during the conversation with him that Czechoslovakia is "firmly committed to further all-around development of mutual ties with Hungary, but it cannot accept the fact that, despite repeated warnings, some Hungarian citizens have inadmissibly abused our hospitality and breached our laws and legal norms."

In respect of the incident involving the two detained Hungarian citizens the appropriate Czechoslovak organs have acted and are acting in accordance with Czechoslovak laws, international commmitments, and the Treaty on Legal Assistance between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. At the same time the urgent demand has been repeated that order be instilled and calm assured in front of the Czechoslovak Embassy building in Budapest.

Hungary Protests Trials

LD2808201789 Budapest MTI in English 1940 GMT 28 Aug 89

[Text] Prague, August 28 (MTI)—The Prague City court has rejected the complaint lodged by Tamas Deutsch and Gyorgy Kerenyi against their arrest. Thus, the two Hungarian young members of the opposition have to attend the trial designated for 1030, Tuesday morning. Also on Monday the Czech Ministry of Justice rejected the appeal of the Hungarian consul to Prague who wished to participate in the trial as a member of the defence.

(Tamas Deutsch and Gyorgy Kerenyi were arrested in Wenceslas Square in Prague on August 21 on grounds of violating public order.) On the anniversary of the 1968 intervention by WT [Warsaw Treaty] member states they apologized to the Czechoslovak people on behalf of Hungarian society for Hungary's participation in the intervention.

The Democratic League of Free Trade Unions, the Hungarian Solidarity Workers Trade Union Federation and the American Federation of Teachers gave a joint statement on Monday in Budapest condemning the arrest and trial in Prague of the two Hungarian opposition members.

At its 2d parliamentary conference held in Antalya, Turkey, between August 24 and 26, the European Democratic Union condemned the arrest of the youth from Eastern and Western Europe in Prague on August 21. They demanded the release of Tamas Deutsch and Gyorgy Kerenyi. The deputies welcome governments which condemn the intervention of 1968 and at the same time express their solidarity with the young democrats, who are on a sit in with some on hunger strike before the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Budapest.

CSSR Paper Cited on Situation in Baltics

PM3008135189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 89 second edition pp 1,4

[Own correspondent V. Volkov dispatch under the general heading: "Appeal to Reason"]

[text] Prague, 29 Aug—The situation in the Soviet Baltic republics is arousing great concern, RUDE PRAVO writes in an editorial commentary. People are asking the question: What will happen next? Do all Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians really think the same as the extremists in these republics? Will the Baltic people follow the separatist and extremist slogans used by political speculators whose main program is anti-Sovietism?

We would not like to believe that nationalists will succeed in removing everything that naturally unites the Soviet republics from the consciousness of the Baltic citizens and removing the internationalism of the Soviet people. Even Western realists do not see anything but destructive intentions, which would destabilize development within the USSR to a dangerous degree along with the entire international situation, in the implementation of the idea of separating the republics from the USSR. The opinion is widespread among U.S. diplomats in Moscow that the notion of wrenching the Baltic republics away from the USSR is at the least naive.

The Baltic republics' legislative bodies have adopted acts which represent a direct violation of the Soviet constitution. The aspiration to introduce a discriminatory electoral law would sharply contravene the idea of the democratization of political life in the USSR. Various forces opposing perestroyka, fanning the wave of chauvinism, and attacking the CPSU, the Soviet Army, and security organs are making every attempt to exploit democratization in the Baltic.

National sentiments have been a weapon for extremists in a sordid game with an anti-Soviet subtext. In a situation where the Baltic was among the first to obtain the chance to develop regional economic accountability and prove its advantages, where the platform on nationalities policy which has been put forward for debate has revealed an extensive program for the practical implementation of Leninist ideas in building Soviet federalism, and where the country needs constructive work most of all, these anti-perestroyka forces are doing everything to detract from this work, heating up passions, and recalling age-old injustices.

That is why the CPSU Central Committee statement on the situation in the Baltic republics came at an important moment and constitutes an appeal to reason, civic responsibility, party conscience, and to the idea of internationalism. The actual spirit of the statement is important. It contains no threats and strong-arm pressure. It contains a frank and honest analysis of the situation and its possible consequences. The document clearly indicates that the path along which the extremists are urging the Baltic signifies the way to catastrophe, RUDE PRAVO stresses.

Commentary on Recall of U.S. Ambassador to Sofia

AU3008174389 Moscow International Service in Bulgarian 1530 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Commentary by Moscow Radio commentator Spartak Alekseyev]

[Text] As announced by the U.S. State Department, the U.S. ambassador to Sofia has been temporarily recalled to Washington. As the ASSOCIATED PRESS AGENCY points out in citing a State Department representative this action is supposed to draw the Bulgarian Government's attention to Washington's dissatisfaction with Bulgaria's attitude toward the local Muslims.

Let us hear what Spartak Alekseyev, Moscow Radio commentator, has to say about this:

This action by the U.S. Administration was adopted exactly 1 week after the Turkish authorities, in violation of an agreement reached in May 1989, closed their borders with Bulgaria on 22 August 1989, to prevent Bulgarian Muslims from entering and visiting Turkey for the purpose of emigrating to that country. This decision affects Bulgarian-Turkish relations and extremely complicates the situation of those Bulgarian Muslims who have already left their homes in order to emigrate to Turkey.

Washington's signal, which was exclusively applied to Bulgaria in this case, is amazing because it does not contribute either to improving relations between the two Balkan countries, or to implementing the rights of those Bulgarian Muslims who have decided to leave, or to settle in Turkey, or to do the opposite, namely to return to their homeland—Bulgaria.

The history of Bulgarian-Turkish relations, as well as the history of Bulgarian Muslims, dates back as far as 6 centuries. Naturally, specific traditions were established during that period and numerous difficult problems have accumulated. Both historical experience and common sense, as well as the collective agreements confirmed by the Helsinki Final Act and by the closing document of the Vienna meeting suggest that, under such circumstances, only a Bulgarian-Turkish dialogue can provide a truly democratic and just solution, which does not affect anyone's interests, is without any preliminary conditions, is without the interference of any third country whatsoever, and especially is without any kind of signal which reflects evident antipathy for one of the two sides.

Both Turkey and Bulgaria are signatory countries of the Vienna agreements, including one on the human rights issue. Both countries participated in the Belgrade meeting of foreign ministers from Balkan countries held in February 1988, at which the mechanism for the mutual settlement of problems was developed. As a result of all this, the two neighboring countries are supplied with topical and relevant international documents, with appropriate instruments, and have sufficient experience in bilateral relations in order to solve the emerging problems with success.

Considering all of this, the sudden, temporary withdrawal of the U.S. ambassador from Sofia for consultations evokes perplexity, at best.

Price Rises, Unrest in Poland Linked

18070738 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Aug 89

[Article by M. Pavlova-Silvanskaya: "Entry Into the Market"]

[Text] The market. Was it that long ago that this word was used to stigmatize the apostates from the socialist symbol of faith? Now they bow to it. Finally, a recipe has been found for economic prosperity. Since 1 August ration cards for meat and meat products have been abolished. Commodity enterprises have received the right to set prices independently based on supply and demand. Everyone who processes and sells food can now purchase it right in the village from self-employed peasants. The first result: a jump in the prices of meat by a factor of 3-4.

For Poles the news about the increase in prices sounded the alarm. Because of this, blood was spilled on the seacoast in 1970. Five years later in Radom, workers protesting price increases tore up cobblestone streets and set fire to a building of the voivod committee of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party]; defending the convicted, the opposing intelligentsia then created the Committee for the Defense of the Workers (KOR). In August 1980 prices for meat again played a role in the trigger mechanism: "Solidarity" was born out of the explosion of the workers' protest. Last year an unsuccessful operation with prices and incomes cost Z.

Messner the price of the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the autumn wave of strikes, in the final analysis, led to negotiations behind the "roundtable" and the legalization of the opposition, and to elections. And once again there is the matter of prices....

In the last 2 months the situation on the food market has worsened: lines that start at night, ration cards for meat not in supply, sugar that has disappeared, and empty shelves. Subsidies for retail prices (in the past 5 months they have cost the treasury 3 trillion zlotys) are a heavy burden on the budget. The government tried to ease the situation by importing consumer goods. But to do this, it was necessary to cut imports of raw materials and other materials (meager hard currency reserves force making a choice: either-or), as a result of which industrial production was cut. The state budget deficit reached 3.7 trillion zlotys, and almost half of the state expenditures covers the issuance of "empty" money. Inflation has climbed to three-digit figures.

Social and political disputes have intensified. In the summer of this year, the government sharply increased prices for tractors (120 percent) and fuel (80 percent). With such expenses, cattlebreeding became unprofitable. As a sign of protest, the peasants began to blockade the roads, to pour milk out onto the ground, and to refuse to sell cattle, etc. The United Peasant Party demanded an immediate introduction of a free market in foodstuffs. It was supported by the Democratic Party. The PZPR alliance policy, the stability of the parliamentary coalition, and the entire new political system were being threatened. It was impossible, of course, to remain idle in such a situation. Immediate and decisive action was required.

Professor M. Kozakiewicz, marshal of the sejm of the PPR [Polish People's Republic], compared the changes occurring in his country with the first landing of a man on the moon. Besides the reformist wing of the PZPR and the government, "Solidarity" has an interest in a transition to a market economy with a "soft landing" because a sharp increase in tensions or an explosion are capable of sweeping away the fragile results which were achieved with such difficulty at the negotiating table. The realistic forces of the National Trade Union Confederation [OPZZ], which represents the interests of millions of their members, are concerned. Supporters of perestroyka in the USSR are concerned. However even the West has also unequivocally let it be known that it is ready to assist Poland, but on condition that the strike element does not absorb the material assistance without a trace and senselessly.

In the negotiations behind the "roundtable," both the opposition and the OPZZ considered the key questions to be an agreement on the so-called indexation of wages; that is, an automatic compensation for the rise in prices with a quarterly increase in wages from the funds of enterprises. They were "apart" only on the idea of the size of compensation: The OPZZ insisted on 100 percent and "Solidarity" thought it expedient to set an 80 percent mark so the "saved" money could be used for modernizing production. The advantage of indexation: Each time the workers try to get social protection, they will not have to quit their jobs and deliver one blow after another to an already disrupted national economy. The sejm was inclined to the opposition's version.

The decision on the shift of the foodstuffs system to a market basis was adopted by the PPR Council of Ministers "at the end of the act" when, following the elections, the government was already fulfilling its duties, expecting a change. The politburo of the former staff and the commission on socioeconomic questions believed that with respect to the question of a comprehensive settlement of price relations, the last word should be given to the parliament and the new cabinet recently headed by Czeslaw Kiszczak. Now he is de facto freed of the moral responsibility for a measure undertaken by his predecessor. A very responsible step was taken in a way that "came to a stalemate," and the public is faced with an accomplished fact. Is this perhaps a successful move with the knight?

With the presentation of the opposition, the sejm formed a commission for an examination and assessment of the activity of M. Rakowski. Even if "Solidarity" does not succeed, as it is threatening to put the former premier before the state tribunal, the prestige of the new first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee (and together with him, of course, the party) will inevitably be damaged considerably.

The parties, after concluding an agreement behind the "roundtable," have entered an area of serious tests in political maturity. The last increase in prices is truly a severe examination. It is not only our perestroyka that is going through a critical moment.

Siwicki Cited on Poland's 'Time of Hope'

PM3008135589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Minister's Speech"]

[Text] Warsaw, 28 Aug—Army General F. Siwicki, Polish minister of national defense, has made a speech at an officers graduation ceremony at the Higher Officers Air Defense School in Koszalin.

Poland is going through a complex time, but simultaneously it is a time of hope, the minister said. He stressed that the Polish Army will improve its internal structures and bring them into line with the requirements of the country's defense sufficiency.

GDR Denies Intent To Curb Travel to Hungary

PM3008103989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "GDR Foreign Ministry Denial"]

[Text] Berlin, 25 Aug—There isn't a word of truth in the claims by Springer's newspapers and West German television that the GDR Intends to restrict its citizens' travel

to Hungary. Trips to Hungary, as to Bulgaria and Romania, will continue as before. An official spokesman of the GDR Foreign Ministry has stated this.

This lie has been fabricated so as to sow hostility and inflame hatred toward the GDR in the spirit of the cold war. The attempts to exercise "guardianship" over GDR citizens which are being made contrary to all the existing treaties and the Helsinki conference's Final Act and the lack of respect for GDR citizenship are aimed solely at complicating relations between the two German states, the statement notes.

The allegation that the GDR regards Hungary as a Western country is also monstrous. The GDR is linked to the Hungarian People's Republic by relations of true friendship, which are continuing to develop.

West Europe

Soviet Link to Palme Death 'Rubbish'

PM3108153589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent Dmitriy Gorokhov dispatch: "Press Comments on Conjectures"]

[Text] Stockholm, 29 Aug—"A meaningless fabrication which no one will believe." This is the thrust of the editorial comment in the Swedish press concerning allegations which have appeared in Sweden—namely, that the Soviet Union knew of the planned murder of Olof Palme.

The question of who should need to put this rubbish in the newspapers, and why, is being asked by Stockholm's AFTONBLADET.

The answer to this is suggested by widespread reports here that the Swedish security police have been tapping the conversations of one Soviet diplomat for a long time, this being the basis for the appearance of the "revelations" with which Swedes have now been acquainted. It is no secret that a number of officials in this special service are suspected of unlawful operations to tap the conversations of Swedish citizens and foreigners. Instances of such violations are even now being investigated. At the same time, Swedish legislation takes a bleak view of such crimes, and many politicians and broad public opinion react very negatively to such "misdemeanors."

Radio Broadcasts to Sweden To Be Expanded

LD3008163689 Moscow International Service in Swedish 1800 GMT 29 Aug 89

[Excerpt] I can start with a piece of news which, I think, will make many people happy. From 24 September, broadcasts to Sweden will increase by a further ½ hour. Then, in addition to the 1-hour broadcast, you will also be able to hear a 1/2-hour broadcast every day. The 1-hour broadcast, as earlier, will be transmitted between 2000 and 2100 [1900-2000 GMT], and you can hear the 1/2-hour program slightly earlier, at 1700 [1600 GMT]. Thus you will have the opportunity to hear a lot more about what is happening in the Soviet Union.

The new daily broadcast will be carried on frequencies 9.735, 9.800, 7.195 and 1.494. [passage omitted]

Finnish Border Guard Delegation Visits USSR

PM3108094789 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "On Official Friendly Visit"]

[Text] At the invitation of Army General V.A. Matrosov, chief of the USSR Border Guard Troops, a Finnish Border Guard delegation headed by Lieutenant General Matti J. Autio, chief of a Border Guard directorate, was in the Soviet Union 21 through 27 August this year on an official friendly visit.

CPSU Delegation Leaves for FRG

LD3008130589 Moscow TASS in English 1237 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 30 TASS—A CPSU delegation, led by Gennadiy Ulanov, alternate member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Kaluga Regional Committee of the CPSU, left Moscow for West Germany today.

The delegation will participate in the German Communist Party's events to be held to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War.

FRG President Cables Jaruzelski on World War II

PM3008135989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Borders Are Inviolable"]

[Text] Bonn, 29 Aug—In its political life the FRG proceeds from the premise that the principles of the postwar structure are unshakable. The federal republic states with complete responsibility that it will not—either now or in the future—make territorial claims on Poland. This is said in a message sent by FRG President Richard von Weizsaecker to Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski in connection with the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II.

World War II, which began with Germany's invasion of Poland, had a destructive effect on Europe and inflicted incalculable human suffering. Both countries' peoples mark down this day with deep mourning, the message says. Poland was the first victim of the war unleashed by Germany's Nazi leadership. This crime cannot be justified by the then existing tension between Germany and Poland or by the nonaggression treaty between Germany and the USSR. The then German leadership alone is guilty of unleashing the aggressive war with complete

disregard for the norms of international law and the principles of mutual understanding between peoples.

The dreadful wounds inflicted by the war are still making themselves felt today. It resulted in bitterness and alienation. In addition, confrontation between political systems and the "cold war" poisoned the atmosphere. However feelings of enmity and vengeance have receded into the past. That is why we must draw conclusions from the past today and make efforts to build a future based on complete trust, the document stresses.

It is the first time in postwar history that Europe has had such favorable chances. We are all answerable today for using them to build a European future to unite us. History does not usually repeat itself, R. von Weizsaecker noted in conclusion.

Berezhkov Says Reversion to Map 'Impossible'

LD3008163189 Moscow TASS in English 1539 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 30 TASS—An onward development of Europe is possible only through the observance of international accords and respect for territorial and political realities, maintains Valentin Berezhkov, a Soviet historian.

Speaking here today in the House of Friendship with the Peoples of Foreign Countries at a meeting with a delegation of the West Berlin Evangelical youth, he pointed out that it was impossible to revert to the political map of Europe which existed prior to the signing of secret protocols to the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact".

"For example, should that happen, Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, should have belonged to Poland because prior to the pact it was part of its territory, and many European borders would have to be substantially recarved," said Berezhkov who had participated as an interpreter in the talks between Molotov and Ribbentrop.

The current discussions of the causes of the Second World War have been also sharpened by the fact that the existence of secret protocols had been for long denied in the Soviet Union, the Soviet historian emphasised.

Peter Dufour-Feronce, a teacher, the leader of the West Berlin delegation, in an interview with a TASS correspondent, highly appreciated the frank nature of discussions in Moscow, Leningrad, and Volgograd which the guests visited.

"The lesser the number of blank spots in our joint history, the broader our cooperation will be", he stressed.

Trade Chief Received by Austrian Leaders

LD3008172689 Moscow TASS in English 1638 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Vienna August 30 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Vladimir Smelov:

Aspects of further development of economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Austria and its enrichment by new forms were discussed in the course of a visit to Austria of Chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry Vladislav Malkevich.

The Soviet negotiator met Austrian Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. He briefed the head of the Austrian government of the large-scale transformations in the economic field under way in the Soviet Union. The parties discussed questions of further improving the trade and economic relations of mutual interest to the two nations.

During a meeting with Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock, much attention was paid to the development of bilateral trade contacts. The Austrian foreign minister stressed that economic reforms in the Soviet Union open up new perspectives for interaction between the two countries, especially in the field of establishing joint ventures based on Soviet developments.

Talks with president of the Federal Economic Chamber Rudolf Sallinger were held in a business-like constructive manner. They centered upon the problems connected with the accelerated introduction into practice of advanced scientific and technical developments, the training of highly-qualified personnel for he Soviet economy and the establishment of direct links between enterprises and firms of the two countries with the aim, above all, of saturating the Soviet market with high-quality consumer goods. One of the principal tasks in this context is the promotion of Soviet producers onto the international market and the ensuring of their regular, uninterrupted external economic activity.

The talks, Roland Sallinger told TASS in an interview, were successful. They confirmed the desire of the two countries to deepen their existing contacts and to promote cooperation. This interaction has been on the rise lately: Suffice it to say that more than 50 joint Soviet-Austrian ventures have been set up to date. We hope for further development of mutually-beneficial ties, Sallinger said.

Latin America & Caribbean

U.S. 'Threat' of Intervention in Panama Discussed

LD3008201189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1832 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Panama, 30 Aug (TASS)—TASS correspondents Eldar Abdullayev and Aleksandr Chernov report:

In an interview with a TASS correspondent, Jorge Eduardo Ritter, Panama's foreign affairs minister, stated that the threat of U.S. armed intervention in Panama to resolve the conflict in its favor is greater than before. At the same time, the U.S. Administration, realizes that in

the present international atmosphere such an adventure would engender a sharply negative reaction and would undermine U.S. prestige.

That is why, the minister said, that such a type of "shock treatment" is not excluded—a local operation to seize and immediately send General Manuel Antonio Noriega, commander in chief of the national Defense Forces, to the United States and the creation of conditions for replacing the whole apparatus of state power in the country.

The White House is keeping the Panamanian problem "in its sights" and is creating a hullabaloo around the republic and its leaders in order to prepare Latin American and U.S. public opinion for the extreme actions of Washington against Panama, J. Ritter said.

It became known today that the United States has demanded the convocation on Thursday of a special session of the Organization of American States (OAS). This demand, in the words of the Minister, represents a very serious step by the White House, fraught with the most unpredictable consequences. The U.S. Administration intentionally and purposefully took it only a few hours before the moment when the term of office of the current government was due to end.

Thus, from Washington's point of view, the Panamanian authorities will not have time for a constitutionally based response. Under these conditions, J. Ritter considers that the continuation of the mandate of President Manuel solis Palma and his cabinet of ministers for an additional period is the least painful for the republic, and the most effective, in the context of the struggle for the country's sovereignty.

Political Analyst Comments on Panamanian Situation

PY3008153689 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 0000 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Political Analyst Nikolay Chigir commentary]

[Text] One of the main reasons for the confusing situation in Panama is the failure of the tripartite negotiations among the government, the opposition alliance, and the OAS, which is acting as a mediator to resolve the political crisis in that country. During these negotiations the Panamanian Government proposed the creation of a transitional government, but this proposal, offering the possibility for a peaceful outcome to the political crisis, was rejected by the opposition. Furthermore, the opposition put forth demands that, under the present conditions, are unrealistic.

The opposition, by rejecting the possibility for a national agreement, has willingly or unwillingly played into the hands of some U.S. circles that have been trying for a long time to destabilize the situation in Panama and remove the patriotic forces from the country's government. The canal treaty could then be reversed so that the U.S. military bases would remain in Panama forever. General Frederick Warner, commander in chief of the Southern Command, has said that the United States is very interested in maintaining a field of operations in Panama on the basis of a stable and lasting agreement.

To attain its objectives, Washington will resort to any expedient, including economic boycott, blackmail, and the threat of force, as evidenced by the provocative maneuvers by U.S. troops in the Canal Zone. Washington also tries to enlist other Latin American countries in its anti-Panama campaign, as attested by the U.S. delegation's position at the latest meeting of OAS country foreign ministers. The report from the OAS mission charged with seeking a solution for the Panamanian crisis was discussed at this meeting. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger requested at one of the sessions that a cordon be thrown around Panama because, quote, each OAS member country must isolate the current Panamanian regime, unquote.

This U.S. position, however, was not supported by the Latin American countries. They not only rejected that proposal, but also criticized the anti-Panamanian policy of the United States. As THE WASHINGTON POST noted, the mediation mission's report to the OAS exposed U.S. activities against Panama and rejected the U.S. troop maneuvers in Panamanian territory. The members of the mission criticized the United States for refusing to negotiate with the current Panamanian Government and for undermining its power through economic and other sanctions directed by Washington.

The fact that the resolution adopted by the foreign ministers of the OAS member countries stresses the OAS' promise not to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries in the region is important. The resolution also notes that Panama's internal affairs are the exclusive interest of Panamanians; any outside intervention will worsen the situation not only in Panama, but throughout the entire region.

Political & Social

Further on Lithuanian Response to CPSU Statement

Lithuanian Party Issues Statement

PM3008143989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Own information report: "Statement by Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] As IZVESTIYA has reported, a Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee plenum has been held in Vilnius to discuss the CPSU Central Committee statement on the position in the Soviet Baltic republics. The plenum adopted a Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee statement which states, in particular:

We understand the unease and concern of the CPSU Central Committee prompted in the context of the complex political situation by the ill-considered statements and actions made by certain individuals participating in social movements. This statement obliges us to look yet again at the path traveled by perestroyka and responsibly and soberly to outline further steps to regenerate society.

Lithuania has changed radically within a short period. At a time when the party has rejected the methods of administrative leadership and is taking a tolerant attitude toward criticism and self-criticism, political pluralism and glasnost have developed apace, and the first shoots of democracy have started emerging.

The document notes that M.S. Gorbachev's policy is helping Lithuania to regenerate genuine spiritual values.

There is already great potential in the republic today for improving the economic mechanism. This has made it possible to boost the population's living standard.

However, by their ill-considered actions, adventurist forces, for the sake of political prestige and personal ambition, are failing to notice the "open doors" and the existing opportunities, are essentially blocking the way for perestroyka, and are creating a negative opinion both in the country and, partly, in the world too.

It goes on to discuss whether Lithuania gains anything from attacks on the Soviet Army and people who are doing their service.

No state can tolerate direct attacks against the existing system [poryadok].

We have done a great deal to restore and provide new interpretations for historical truth. However, the truth should not be used to whip up political passions and encourage attempts to map out Lithuania's future while ignoring the 50-year path of Soviet development. Yes, the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the actions that followed them should be seen as an act of political violence. However, we should realize that the republic's legal status will not change because of this. We should soberly realize that the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic is politically and economically integrated into the USSR. It is natural that the assessment of us in the aforementioned CPSU Central Committee statement is based on that standpoint.

Whatever the extreme forces may say in justification of their actions, they are aimed against the Lithuanian Communist Party and the government, and are essentially a brake on perestroyka—which is proven by the present situation.

The statement notes that the Lithuanian Communist Party and the progressive social movements that support it are now the real political force that can lead Lithuania further down the road of perestroyka.

Lithuanian Party Official Cited

LD3008121189 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Report by news analyst Peter Vasilyev on the situation in the Baltic republics]

[Excerpts] [Vasilyev] The developments in the Baltic Republics just before the publication of the [Central Committee] statement left no doubts that steps were taken that would ultimately lead to the question of the republics' membership in the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

What's the situation in the region now, in Lithuania in particular, after the publication of the statement? The statement is addressed primarily to people. Is the document being discussed by industrial workers? Can people openly express their attitude to it and the situation as a whole? I addressed the questions over the telephone to an official from the Lithuanian Communist Party's Central Committee, Algimantas Zukas.

[Begin Zukas recording in Russian fading into English report] The general response to the statement was favorable, but options [as heard] differ as people do. We understand the interest and concern that is voiced over the developments in the Baltic republics. Debates are under way throughout Lithuania. The Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party is getting telegrams with different options. The people's deputies representing the republic publicly express their opinion. On Monday [28 August] the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Party held an urgent full-scale meeting that adopted the reply statement. [end recording]

[Vasilyev] I asked Algimantas Zukas whether he would describe the situation in the republic as tense, alarming, calm, or elseway [as heard].

[Begin Zukas recording in Russian fading into English report] He replied he would put it as somber-minded. There is no unrest. All industrial enterprises function. He went on to say that people are now carefully reading the two statements and comparing them. Algimantas

Zukas pointed out that those are mistaken who think that this is the end of perestroyka in Lithuania. It's the beginning of a certain stage of perestroyka, marked by a sufficiently constructive exchange of opinions, a search of ways for our further coexistence and development, underlined Algimantas Zukas.

No doubt that in the past such a statement would have been followed by certain sanctions, punishment of the leaders of the republic. How does Algimantas Zukas fear them now?

The days have passed where reprimands could turn the course of developments in one direction or other; that's the first point. Secondly, the Communist Party of Lithuania is regaining its authority. It has declared as its main objectives what the people are demanding. That's why the leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party enjoy great authority among Lithuanians and in the rest of the country. That's why we're not expecting any reprimands, underlined Algimantas Zukas. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Vasilyev] And finally I asked Algimantas Zukas how would he comment on President Bush's call to President Gorbachev to be as understanding to the demands of political reform in the Baltic republics as he has been in the case of Poland.

[Begin Zukas recording in Russian fading into English report] It's always pleasant when a neighbor, even one living on the other side of the Atlantic, takes interest in your affairs, said Algimantas Zukas. But we live here in the Soviet Union and I must say that it's for us to decide about these matters. [passage omitted] We believe that it is possible to be free and sovereign within a union of equal republics. This must be a union of states strengthened by legal acts and natural political, economic, and other ties. This is our stance. I think we'll settle our own problems at home, said Algimantas Zukas, a spokesman for the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party. [end recording]

'Independence Union' Protests Statement

LD3108001889 Vilnius in English to North America 2200 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] The Lithuanian Independence Union was among the first to lodge a protest concerning the statement on the situation in the Baltic states by the CPSU Central Committee.

The Lithuanian Independence Union assesses the statement as an ambitious challenge to the peaceful aspirations of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian people, and as a threat to suppress by military force these people's strive for independent statehood. The Lithuanian Independence Union begins its protest and goes on to say, quote: The statement distorts the essence of the ongoing national revival in the Baltic states.

An opinion is imposed on the Soviet people that the people of the Baltic states are the great unwashed, indifferent to the history and being instigated by irresponsible, extremist, and nationalist groups guided by their selfish interests. These groups supposedly engaged in anti-Russian, anti-Soviet, and anti-socialist campaign, provoked the people's unpremeditated moves, and pushed them toward the brink of abyss, reads the protest. The distorted facts put on a false track both the Communist and the general Soviet public. National revival in the Baltic states, notes the protest, has attained too high a level to be ascribed and credited merely to instigators. At their own initiative people unite into different organizations and take part in peaceful, non-parliamentarian acts of protest. They fully approve of the findings of the Supreme Soviet commission on the illegitimacy of Lithuania's incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940. This is best proved by a million and a half signatures under an appeal to eliminate the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, reads the protest of the Lithuanian Independence Union, and it states, quote: Nobody will succeed in suppressing the drive of the Baltic states for national independence.

The protest notes further that of late no natural calamities rocked the Baltic states, nor were there (?pre-tried) interethnic clashes or strikes demanding independence—In general, nothing that could destabilize the political situation.

On the contrary, says the protest, political forces warned the population against provocation and urged to be self-disciplined and restrained. The Baltic way action on 23 August with a million odd taking part was noted for its order and discipline, though remarks the independence union, the Central Committee asserts that the sponsors sought to whip-up nationalist hysteria. Statements of this kind are designed to misinform the Soviet people and to set the stage for more serious provocations.

The statement makes the point that the current events are irreversible, can push to a catastrophe and pose a threat to the very vitality of the Baltic states.

But why should a catastrophe occur asks the independence union if we seek independent statehood by parliamentarian and peaceful nonparliamantarian means in a stable political situation? A statement concerning disruption of economic ties with the Soviet Union and deportation of the Russian-speaking population is totally false. On the contrary notes the protest, one of the provisions of our independence forsees good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union and a right for the Russians to decide on their abode.

The Lithuanian Independence Union draws the conclusion that a threat of [as heard] national existence arises from the sole source, the CPSU Central Committee itself, or else how are we to assess the call indicated in the statement to become a true master of the situation, take urgent measures and rid the perestroyka process in the Baltic states of extremism.

The Lithuanian Independence Union is convinced that this is an instruction to ban politic:l opposition, rallies,

and demonstrations and in case of public disorders, open fire. The Baltic states say the protest will not forget the glaring injustice done to them by the country calling itself the Soviet Union and by the social system called socialism and it's precisely this way that we should evaluate what the statement demagogically called anti-Soviet ambition. The Independence Union ends its protest with a call upon the CPSU Central Committee to abstain from extreme measures in the Baltic states and not to proceed with Stalinist crimes against humanity.

It also urges to stop the false concoctions published by the press organs of the CPSU Central Committee. The issue of the Baltic states' independence should be resolved by their people themselves, ends its protest, the Lithuanian Independence Union.

The protest has been signed by the Lithuanian democrats, the Lithuanian Liberty League, the Lithuanian National Youth Union, Jaunoji Lietuva, the Lithuanian Christian Democrats' Party, the Committee for Political Prisoners' Defense, and the Lithuanian Helsinki Group.

Criticisms of CPSU Statement Noted

LD3008225189 Vilnius in English to North America 2200 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Excerpts] While the central Soviet press is going ahead with a campaign of misinformation and blackmail concerning the events in the Baltic republics the wave of protest against the CPSU Central Committee's statement has risen in Lithuania.

Perhaps the Central Soviet Television alone is demonstrating certain flexibility as last night it broadcast an emphatically calm interview with the Estonian Communist Party leader, Valno Valjas. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile Lithuania newspapers, even the official ones, have started publishing protest letters sent in by individuals and statements by individual organizations.

Among them is the brief but strong-worded statement by the Central Committee Bureau of Lithuania's Young Communist League which qualifies the Moscow statement as destablizing the situation.

The appeal to women and mothers concerning the destiny of their children, voiced in the CPSU Central Committee's statement, seems to be hinting at an impending confrontation. The question arises: Who can provoke it? The people of Lithuania do not seek it, says the statement issued by the Central Committee Bureau of Lithuania's Young Communist League.

It also pinpoints the problem that aroused the greatest wrath of Moscow. The point is that while the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was approaching, Lithuania's public had not awaited the conclusions of the commission of USSR people's deputies.

That's why the announcement of the conclusions made by the commission of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet to investigate the 1939 German-Soviet treaties and their consequences was a timely one politically.

A separate statement on the conclusions concerning the Molotov- Ribbentrop deal has been released by 25 USSR MPs [members of parliament] for Lithuania.

The statement says that the deputies approve of the conclusions made by the commission of Lithuania's Supreme Soviet and demand that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet make public the conclusions of the analogous commission of USSR people's deputies as soon as possible.

Those conclusions were approved a month ago and the delay with their publication is increasing the tension and it shows the vitality of the Stalinist policy, says the statement of Lithuanian deputies.

The absolute majority of deputies who have signed this statement won the elections to the Soviet parliament due to the support of the Lithuanian reform movement, Sajudis.

Lithuanian Central Committee Plenum Held

CPSU Statement Discussed

PM3008132189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent Leonid Kapelyushnyy "Direct Line" report under the general heading "Difficult Search for Solutions": "Vilnius"]

[Text] A Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee plenum has been held which discussed the CPSU Central Committee statement on the situation in the Soviet Baltic.

The plenum was marked by two features. By a decision of the majority of Central Committee members there will be no detailed report on it in the local press.

And second, speakers had to give not just an assessment of the situation but also express their personal attitude to the CPSU Central Committee statement. By the way, the plenum made it mandatory for all Central Committee secretaries to express their own opinion.

If you combine all the speeches at the plenum, you get the following. The CPSU Central Committee statement deserves approval. There are indeed people in the republic who profess separatist ideas and pursue a line of separating Lithuania from the USSR. These people are a minority and they are harmful to the republic's acquisition of sovereignty and economic independence. The party will explain to the masses the harm and fallaciousness of separatism. The plenum once again stressed how important interethnic peace and concord are at the present moment. It was stated unambiguously and bluntly that republic sovereignty does not mean leaving the union, it will be built upon the principles of federalism.

However, the assessments of the CPSU Central Committee statement lacked the traditional unanimous approval. Central Committee members and secretaries of rayon and city party committees expressed the opinion that it is hardly right that no members of the CPSU Central Committee working in the republic took part in drawing up this most important document. Despite common features and similarities in the processes taking place in the Baltic, they do differ nonetheless, and the identical assessments produce a whole series of questions in Communists, ordinary working people, and the party apparatus: Where are the aforementioned processes taking place and whom is the reproach addressed to? The opinion was expressed that the presence of leading CPSU Central Committee workers at Central Committee plenums would be useful in understanding the complexity of the processes taking place in Lithuania.

The plenum noted that many political realities which have no parallel in the past demand nontraditional assessments and approaches from the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

The question of the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the upcoming extraordinary plenum, which will examine the question of the republic communist party's independence, was also pointedly discussed. The idea of this independence was supported by around 70 percent of Communists taking part in the discussion.

A Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee statement urging the people of the republic to unite, to show mutual respect and understanding, and to work creatively for the sake of the future was adopted unanimously. It has been published in republic newspapers and broadcast on television.

A conversation between the communist party leadership and "Sayudis" leaders was held at the Central Committee the day before. It was not possible to achieve a common opinion with them regarding the CPSU Central Committee statement.

What stance is "Sajudis" adopting, then? V. Chepaytis, one of its leaders, told your correspondent that people in "Sayudis" are also concerned by the aggravated situation. "Sajudis," according to him, does not share ultraextremist views. As far as the CPSU Central Committee statement is concerned, it contains just criticism and it must be heeded, however, it also contains tenets which cannot be accepted. However, this does not mean that "Sajudis" intends to carry out any acts of protest, rather the Sejm Council will not adopt the statement for that reason.

28 Aug Plenum Described

LD3008111189 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1915 GMT 28 Aug 89

[Text] A minute ago my colleague returned to the studio bringing in one more news item. The 20th plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party [LCP] Central Committee took place here in Vilnius today [28 Aug]. The statement issued by the CPSU Central Committee concerning the situation in the Soviet Baltics has been discussed. An introductory speech was made by Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the LCP Central Committee.

(Kardamavicius), a member of the LCP Revision Commission, spoke on the question under discussion. Dauksa, member of the LCP Central Committee; Stankevicius, candidate member of the LCP Central Committee; Stakvilevicius, first secretary of the LCP committee of Siauliai city; Pozela, member of the LCP Central Committee bureau; Gagiliene, member of the LCP Central Committee; Kurmis, member of the LCP Central Committee also spoke. [passage omitted]

A statement on the issue under discussion has been adopted by the LCP Central Committee.

Debate on Citizenship Bill Postponed

AU3108100289 Paris AFP in English 0916 GMT 31 Aug 89

[Excerpt] Moscow, Aug 31 (AFP)—The Lithuanian parliament has indefinitely postponed a controversial citizenship law scheduled for a full debate Tuesday [29 August], as Moscow continued to blast growing Baltic nationalism.

A spokesman for the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet contacted by telephone said that "no date has been fixed" for any future session.

Unconfirmed reports in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius said local Russian-speakers were threatening to go on strike as of Monday to protest the bill. They fear that its introduction could lead to changes in electoral laws and restrict their voting rights in the republic.

The parliament in Estonia, one of the three Soviet Baltic republics with Lithuania and Latvia, managed to push through a law laying down residency requirements for voter eligibility.

Estonian Russian-speakers reacted immediately with a huge protest strike, and the parliament was given a sharp rebuke by the Presidium of the national Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

Sajudis Issues Statement Urging Legal Dialogue

LD3108000289 Vilnius in Engish to North America 2200 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Today we received a statement released by the Sajudis Seimas Council which was made public on the television program [name indistinct], The Wave of Rebirth.

The statement emphasizes that over a million and a half of Lithuania's residents have already signed the appeal demanding to eliminate the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Above a million people from

all the regions of the republic gathered in the Baltic way action and displayed their will to strive for freedom and independence.

The text, full of misinformation and intimidation allegedly written by the CPSU Central Committee, is a bad answer to those peaceful expressions of our nation's will. The charge that our nation can lose its vitality if its strives for independence is especially no credit to the authors.

We protest against the constitutional right of nations and republics to self-determination being treated in the statement issued on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee as a political crime, said the Sajudis release.

The Seimas Council of the Lithuanian reform movement is convinced that the political problems of the relations between the Soviet Union and Lithuania must be resolved by means of a legal dialogue.

Lithuanian Official Views Future of Republic

LD3008210789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Adolfas Paulyus report from Vilnius, Lithuania; from the "Vremya" newcast]

[Text] [Paulyus] I will quote the headline of the editorial from today's editions of SOVETSKAYA LITVA: "Tolerance Is a Step Toward Understanding." Perhaps for the first time in a long while people left the Sajudis meeting on 22 August, in which many thousands participated, not in an incandescent mood in their bitterness and resolute attitude against everything, but in a pensive, even appeased mood. This was because scathing slogans and passionate appeals were not heard at the meeting; there was a discussion about the honor and the right of each person to lead a worthy life in Lithuania. This first—possibly even unstable—result has been achieved in an uneasy way first and foremost through the persistent and stabilizing efforts of the Communists of Lithuania.

[V.S. Baltrunas, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania—identified by caption; video shows Baltrunas seated in study accompanied by Paulyus] The plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, which was held on Monday [28 August], expressed its understanding of the concern and anxiety of the CPSU Central Committee, which were expressed in the statement about the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics.

The plenum also expressed the thought that it was acknowledged that the only political force capable of further pursuit of perestroyka today is the communist party and all progressive public movements, which work in the style of dialogue, in the style of understanding, and in the style of mutual assistance. The Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party and its apparatus and the party aktiv are today trying to deeply study the situation and to keep—one may say—its finger on the pulse of the political life of the republic. We are continually working with and meeting with informal movements; we are meeting with the Communists. And today we are able to say the situation in the republic is calm, that industrial enterprises are working in a stable way, agricultural workers are harvesting this year's harvest, and it is clear that this is partly a result of the policy which was carried out by the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, by the republican government, by all Communists, and by all progressive forces of our society.

Turning our attention to the statement of the CPSU Central Committee to the whole party organization, we decided that the members of the Central Committee and the whole ideological aktiv on the whole should work in the primary organizations. In effect they have already departed and today a big group of our comrades, who will be working in a specific way in specific works collectives, is departing.

A question—what is the further fate, what is the future of our republic—is being put in a very acute way today. It is clear that the straightforward question—should Lithuania be or should it not be with the Soviet Union—is answered by us today in an unequivocal way: That this is a primitive way of asking this question. We think that the future federation, the future union will be filled with new political and legal content. The Soviet Socialist Lithuania itself will change immeasurably, too, and we think that the future of the federation, in the future union of free, independent republics, there will be also a worthy place for our republic.

Military Paper Assesses Mood in Lithuania

PM3008161989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Aug 89 First Edition p 1

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Captain 2d Rank A. Pilipchuk telephone report under the rubric "Our Correspondent Reports From Lithuania": "Where Is the Locomotive Going?"]

[Text] Kaunas-Vilnius-Snechkus, 26 Aug—The route from Kaliningrad to the Lithuanian settlement where a protest meeting in a military-construction unit against the adoption of the law "On Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Citizenship" should have taken place went through the entire republic. On the border of Kaliningrad Oblast and Lithuania a boundary post flashed past the car window. But at the station neither frontier guards nor customs officials entered the car: The striped post was planted in Lithuanian SSR territory as a symbol.

In Lithuania I was struck this summer by the various kinds of symbols calling for separation [razmezhevaniye] from the Soviet Union. But it is only a feeble illustration of the far from symbolic speeches delivered 23 August at a meeting in Vilnius organized by the Lithuanian Independence Union on the 50th anniversary of the Soviet-German treaty called the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

Calls to leave the "Russian empire" alternated with demands for the withdrawal of the "occupation troops."

Attacks on the USSR Armed Forces are an inevitable "spicy element" in speeches made by representatives of nationalist and antisocialist organizations such as the Lithuanian Freedom League and the Lithuanian Democrats Party. Is it a case of harmless words? But in some places they have long passed from words to deeds. You only to recall how 11 June this year a Soviet state flag and an effigy of a Soviet Army sergeant were burned at a Lithuanian Freedom League meeting. On 21 July in Kaunas a T-34 tank was torn off its base in broad daylight and sent to the scrap heap. I have in front of me a copy of a document in which B. Kuchinskas, first deputy chairman of the city soviet executive committee, reported to the manager of a specialized trust that the body paying for services rendered (read for defacing a monument to Soviet soldiers who died) is the Kaunas road and bridge construction trust. As if it is a question of paying to demolish a dilapidated building....

On 17 August the text of a speech for Lithuanian television delivered by A. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, was published in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA. I was struck by the following lines: "We must all realize that the unbridled psychological and moral pressure on all servicemen which is occurring today should be condemned, since it increases political tension in the republic and even sets them against the progressive processes taking place in our country." Has this appeal for prudence been heard in the republic?

It seems not. Here is testimony from Major V. Kazakov, assistant military commandant in Kaunas: Here on the night of 21-22 August a monument to Soviet servicemen who fell in the struggle against fascism was defaced....

"We must respond to the vandals from Kaunas." "We must stop the antisocialist campaign unleashed to discredit the USSR Armed Forces." "Equal political rights—for soldiers"—I think it is no accident that these slogans were next to each other on the parade ground of the military construction unit (under the command of Colonel N. Krivtsov) where the protest meeting took place 25 August. Insulting insinuations recently aimed at the Army are akin to some articles of the draft Law "On Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Citizenship" if not in form, then in essence. The means are different, but the aim is the same, so to speak: First to prove that Soviet soldiers are occupying forces, second—to deprive of political rights servicemen who have served in the republic's territory, that is reduce them legally to the position of "migrants."

You only have to look closely at the following provisions in the draft law (it is set out as follows): Persons who have not obtained documents confirming citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR within 2 years of the present law coming into effect are regarded as not having taken Lithuanian SSR citizenship. These persons can live in Lithuanian SSR territory and can enjoy the rights of a Lithuanian SSR citizen, with the exception of the restrictions indicated in part two, article four of this law. What do the restrictions indicated include? The loss of the right to elect or be elected to soviets and other elective state organs in the republic, to be elected judges and people's assessors in the Lithuanian SSR courts, and also the loss of the right to take part in the republic's referendums. Major A. Sharikov, Warrant Officer R. Idrisov, Sergeant B. Litvin, Junior Sergeant V. Oskorbin, Private A. Boychenko, and other members of the military collective, where representatives of 37 nationalities serve, spoke out resolutely against such discrimination at the meeting. The unit's entire personnel signed the protest meeting's resolution.

Before returning from my trip I met with V. Ivanov, a spokesman for the republic's society "Yedinstvo," who had come to the meeting in Snechkus. Valeriy Vasi lyevich said that, in his opinion, the political situation in Lithuania is approaching its Rubicon—the September session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, for whose opening a whole package of draft laws like the draft law on citizenship is being prepared.

On 23 August one more formation appeared on the republic's political map—the joint committee to defend socialism in Lithuania which embraces the "Yedinstvo" society, the joint committee of enterprise party committee secretaries, the republic committee to protect working people's political and social rights, and some other organizations which oppose "Sajudis." In short, Ivanov stressed, the train is gathering speed....

When the train was mentioned I once again pictured the symbolic border sign. What border is the locomotive from contemporary Lithuanian reality approaching?

Non-Lithuanians Petition To Leave Republic

PM3008153589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Second Edition p 3

[Open letter to the editorial office under the heading "We Ask the Motherland To Protect Us"]

[Text] A mother and her son, who is in the fifth grade at school, walked into the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA public reception center the other day and said that she had been sent to us by the Russian-speaking population of the city of Klaypeda. She had been instructed to convey a collective letter on the situation in Lithuania to the edit- ial office. She had also brought two photograph stands with the letter, which graphically demonstrated the anti-Russian, anti-Soviet campaign being actively waged in the republic. We now publish that letter and two of the photographs from the display stands so that readers can have a clearer idea of what is really happening in the Baltic republics today.

Esteemed editors!

We non-Lithuanian inhabitants of the city of Klaypeda give you our heartfelt thanks for the way in which SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA gave a rebuttal to the Estonian professor, Tiyt Made, the "expert" on the Russian soul and the history of our people. We do not feel it necessary to enter into a debate with the professor but would simply like to draw the attention of the newspaper and its readers to the processes taking place in the Baltic republics today. They are extremely dangerous and complex and, unfortunately, have not been given adequate coverage by the central press; they were not even properly criticized at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Meanwhile the situation here is more than alarming. An atmosphere of nationalist hysteria is being fueled here in Lithuania, as a result of which people do not feel confident of the future. We have been deprived of the possibility to work in peace and we fear for the lives and future of our children.

We are called occupationists in the press, on various placards posted up recently for the sea festival, and in numerous leaflets, and much is being written about atrocities supposedly committed by the Red Army in 1941 and about the "continuing occupation" of Lithuania by the Soviet Army today.

An unauthorized rally—of which the rally participants were, for some reason, informed nevertheless—was held on 6 August in Victory Square. Addressing the rally, People's Deputy Z. Shlichite called for the occupationists to be driven out and demanded that the memorial to the Soviet servicemen who liberated Klaypeda be torn down. Prepared placards depicting a boot kicking out the "occupationists" were displayed. What is more, some hefty young men put their hands over the camera lenses of people who tried to photograph this. And how did the local authorities react to all this? Imagine, they displayed no reaction whatsoever. True, the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KLAYPEDA made a few mildly disapproving noises, without actually giving the names of those who organized this vile "spectacle."

And the nationalist orgy is still continuing. It has now reached the stage of monstrous blasphemy: At the military cemetery, headstones with the names of Heroes of the Soviet Union who fell during Klaypeda's liberation from the fascist invaders have been daubed with tar. In Kaunas, someone has destroyed a memorial on whose pedestal stood a T-34 tank, the first to burst into the city during its liberation from the fascists in 1944.

At a meeting of the Klaypeda city party aktiv held on 6 August A. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, was asked the following question: Why are measures not being taken against those who defile monuments and military cemeteries? A. Brazauskas replied that this question should not be addressed to him. As the vandalism was not condemned, on the night of 10-11 August the eternal flame was extinguished at the military cemetery in our city and tar daubed over the headstones showing the names and titles of the military servicemen who paid for the liberation of Klaypeda with their lives....

As a result of the carefully planned and orchestrated nationalist campaign, we have become second-class citizens. Young people and some members of the intelligentsia are particularly aggressive in their attitudes. The opinions of the rest of the Lithuanian people are unknown to us and, we are sure, will not be taken into consideration if the question of Lithuania's secession from the Soviet Union arises. Active, vigorous preparations are now under way for Lithuania's secession from the Soviet Union (we are not talking about economic sovereignty here, but total secession!). On top of everything else, a draft law on citizenship has been submitted for discussion. But as long as Lithuania does not secede, we are all citizens of the same country, the Soviet Union. What, in that case, is the point of separate—republic—citizenship?

We non-Lithuanian inhabitants of Lithuania were mostly sent here to restore and build industrial enterprises, cities, and power plants. Our parents cleared away the debris when Klaypeda was liberated from the Hitlerites. A fine city has been built through joint efforts—a city in which we are not being allowed to live by the juvenile offspring of bourgeois stooges.

We want to live and work in peace and bring up our children in our native country—the great Soviet Union. But calls for bloodshed are being openly made here. We ask the Soviet Government to take measures against those inciting the destabilization of the situation and deliberately and maliciously stirring up interethnic discord. We also ask that assistance be given to people who want to leave for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] or other Soviet republics.

To this end, we suggest that civil and industrial construction in Lithuania be halted and Lithuanian manpower used to build schools and housing for those who want to remain citizens of the Soviet Union. We will leave our apartments here in exchange.

We cannot be reconciled any longer to these violations of our civil and political rights. We are being discriminated against on national grounds.

In view of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet's adoption of the right to "veto" union laws, we ask the USSR Supreme Soviet to draft state legislation guaranteeing us our rights as Soviet citizens, regardless of where we live.

We ask the motherland and the Soviet people to protect us.

The appeal was approved at a meeting of the collective of representatives held on 17 August 1989 at the Zapadnyy Ship Repair Plant. The letter was signed by:

T. Slinchenko, S. Dudakova, N. Vayneykite, S. Yakovlev, L. Polyakova, S. Yuzik, M. Pozhogina, Z. Zhilyavichene, V. Ignatyeva, N. Serazhidenova, L. Feodoriya, and others. (320 signatures in all).

Further on Latvian Response to CPSU Statement

Latvian Officials Comment

LD3008222589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] The statement issued by the CPSU Central Committee was at the center of attention at the plenum of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee. Over to our correspondent Ninel Meshkun.

[Meshkun] The stormy debates and emotional speeches of those taking part in the 17th plenum of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee are so understandable. Communists were making a critical assessment of their activities, acknowledging that the republic's communist party, too, bears its share of responsibility for the deformations of socialism which have given rise to a state of crisis in the national economy and the economic situation, have severely aggravated interethnic relations, and created difficult, negative phenomena in the party. Needless to say, there was heated discussion of the CPSU Central Committee's statement on the situation in the Baltic republics. I am speaking to Arnold Petrovich Klautsen, first secretary of the Riga City Party Committee.

[Klautsen] If we're talking about the city of Riga, our city, the city of Riga, then in the overwhelming majority of party organizations serious deliberation is taking place concerning the problems raised by the statement, as well as a search for ways of improving our affairs—in other words, a serious conversation prompted by the CPSU statement. I must say straight away that the assessment of that statement is not uniform throughout the republic. There are party organizations, Communists, and working people who regard it as being inopportune and as a document that does not reflect the true position in the republic. There is an attempt, in my view, to avoid seeing the content of the document—that is, to sidetrack the conversation into discussion of how it was adopted, who prepared it, and why our situation, in the republic, is not reflected separately in the document: It speaks of all three Baltic republics.

We spoke about this in the city party committee. It was discussed in the Bureau of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. In the city party committee and in the Central Committee Bureau, we concluded that it is necessary to carry out a serious analysis of the progress of perestroyka within the republic, and of the negative tendencies that are mentioned in the statement, in order to boost the activity of Communists and of party organizations directed toward improving the state of affairs and resolving the problems confronting us.

[Meshkun] Those attending the plenum also discussed the draft of a collectively formulated program of action by the Latvian Communist Party. Over to Ivar Yanovich Kezbers, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Kezbers] Ever since May, we have been working on a draft program of action by the Latvian Communist Party. Naturally, the latest statement by the CPSU Central Committee introduces substantial amendments, and those tendencies that are, in principle, reflected in the document correspond to reality. We, too, look with concern on individual manifestations in our republic. I want to say that the progress made with preparing the plenum and the program of action indicates support for the communist party and the fact that we have the situation in hand. Naturally, we see a socialist federation as being the only solution. It defined a more concrete status for the union communist party—of the republic but, naturally, together with other party organizations within the CPSU. This is a very fndamental issue, which is still, nevertheless, being discussed in our republic.

People's Front Views CPSU Statement

PM3008112189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent Irina Litvinova "Direct Line" report under the general heading "Difficult Search for Solutions": "Riga"]

[Excerpts] On Monday [28 August] the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau held a session which discussed the CPSU Central Committee Statement on the Situation in the Soviet Baltic Republics. [passage omitted]

The Latvian People's Front Duma board has given its view. Its statement says:

"The time has come for our words and assurances to be tested. The Baltic peoples' inalienable right to self-determination is under threat!

"The 26 August 1989 CPSU Central Committee statement on the situation in the Baltic republics confirmed the ruling strata's unwillingness to understand the real situations in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and their inability to resolve nationalities questions in conformity with the peoples' interests. Once again they are speaking to the numerically small peoples from a position of diktat. Once again, as 50 years ago, they are trying to settle our fate far away from the Baltic's borders. The Latvian People's Front believes that the people and the people alone have the right to decide how to live on their own land. Only the Latvian people together with the other ethnic groups have the right to decide what is desirable, useful, and acceptable to them. We categorically reject any external interference in Latvia's affairs regardless of whether the advice comes from the East or the West.

"In replying to the CPSU Central Committee's improper and high-handed statement, we will show restraint and unity and not yield to provocation. We do not have the right to betray the people's self-consciousness, strength, and sense of justice gained during their third rebirth!

"We felt the warmth of each other's hands, we sensed that we can stand shoulder to shoulder and if necessary stand up for Latvia itself. Now each of us must reconsider what Latvia's freedom means to us and why there is no other path for us than the freedom of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

"God bless Latvia!"

Newspapers, radio, and television have been publishing the opinions of party and soviet workers, representatives of social organizations, and ordinary workers.

The Saldusskiy Latvian Communist Party Rayon Committee has adopted a decision which notes that the perestroyka process in Latvia is developing normally and the republic's leaders have the situation in hand. It is for that reason that "we received with much incomprehension the CPSU Central Committee's statement, which could cause the destabilization of the perestroyka process in the republic and arouse other peoples' hostility toward the Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians. We think that each republic should resolve its internal questions by itself."

In an interview on Latvian Television, Arnold Klautsen, first secretary of Riga City Party Committee, noted among other things:

"As for the content of the CPSU Central Committee statement, it may be said that the majority of the city party organization's Communists support it. Many people regard this document as both a grave warning and an appeal to analyze the perestroyka processes in the republic and to consider what we are doing so as to ensure the success of perestroyka as a whole."

Latvia's 17th Central Committee Plenum Reported

Vagris Interviewed on Plenum

LD3008193389 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 30 Aug 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Ninel Kasyanova report]

[Text] [Kasyanova] Today the 17th Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, which was postponed for 3 weeks so the specially established commission could think through the Latvian Communist Party's program of action more thoroughly, continued its work. The turbulent debate and agitated speeches by the participants in the plenum are understandable: The Communists have assessed their activity critically, realizing that the republic's communist party also bears its share of responsibility for the deformations of socialism which gave birth to the crisis condition of the state of affairs in the economy, sharply exacerbated interethnic relations, and created complex, negative phenomena in the party.

[Begin recording] [Kasyanova] [Video shows Kasyanova in office interviewing Jan Janovich Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee] Jan Janovich, in essence the plenum has proposed a strategic program for action by the republic's Communists, and it is taking place under the motto "From the language of slogans to practical deeds." What is the most important part of this program, in your opinion?

[Vagris] As for participation in the elaboration of this document, I can say that, essentially, the whole republican party organization participated. It was discussed widely in primary organizations and at the rayon level, and all those thoughts were then passed on to us. We have tried to summarize them and to take as much account of them as possible.

What is the most important part of this program? If it is a program for the activity of the Latvian Communist Party, then I must speak primarily about the party itself, about the democratization of the party, because the democratizaton of all of society is in progress, and the party itself must, undoubtedly, provide an example. Therefore, much attention is paid in this program to the democratization of the party itself, but, of course, at the center of our program are people's everyday living and working conditions. This means the whole range of social, economic, and ecological issues here. Of course, attitudes toward the party and the authority of the party will depend to a large extent on how the party tackles these issues.

[Kasyanova] Voices are now being heard at the plenum and in society as a whole, asking whether the political platform, the policy of building a law-governed state and the existence of a colorful range of views on the progress of perestroyka will lead to the formation of new political parties. What is your view on this problem?

[Vagris] You know, I would say, if I may express my personal opinion, that, taking account of the real situation in our republic and the further development of democratization, the possibility that some kind of parties might arise is not ruled out, but it is still premature to talk about this today. There are a number of movements, it is true, but it must not be thought that a multiparty system is already appearing or coming into being here. We support dialogue with everybody and cooperation with constructive movements whose actions are aimed at renewing socialism.

[Kasyanova] There are also voices proposing that the Latvian Communist Party should leave the CPSU. What is your view of this, and is there any prospect of it?

[Vagris] Well, to be frank, there are individual calls, not only for us to leave the party, but for us to leave the Soviet Union. Personally, I believe that these statements are completely devoid of prospects. They are not supported by anything; there is no platform backing up the slogan, be it economic or anything else, regarding secession from the Soviet Union. As for leaving the CPSU, you see, leaving is not what we should be talking about.

The view that the communist party of a union republic should have a new status is right, and this discussion is

also going on in our republic. This discussion is necessary, and a new status for the communist party of a union republic is also necessary. After all, if we look now at the CPSU statute, it does not even contain a section on the communist party of a union republic, when at the same time it is recorded in the USSR Constitution and the constitution of each republic that each union republic is a sovereign, socialist state. So, in the first place, that concept has to be filled with real content, in other words, the Soviet federation has to be restructured, by filling these slogans with real content. Of course, in conformity with state reconstruction, it follows logically that the status of the communist party of a union republic—I'm not talking about just the Latvian Communist Party, but overall—should be higher, of course.

[Kasyanova] We are talking about the new status of the republican party organization. What does that mean?

[Vagris] It means that, all the same, the communist party of a union republic should have more independence in solving all issues concerning the republic—taking into account, of course, the interests of the union. But it is still the case now, unfortunately, that we have to clear every trifle we have with the CPSU—in other words, with the center—although I believe we are completely in a position and able to solve these issues here, on the spot, and should do so. It is easier for us to see, taking into account the specific conditions of each republic—I'm talking about our republic in this case—it is, undoubtedly, easier to see on the spot than at the center. [end recording]

Plenum Adopts 'Program for Action'

LD3008183789 Moscow TASS in English 1813 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Riga August 30 TASS—By TASS correspondent Lyudmila Shvarts:

A plenary session of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee today adopted a program for action by the 180,000-strong Latvian party organisation in the present conditions of transformations which concern all spheres of Soviet society's life.

The session began three weeks ago and a draft action program was suggested at that time. Then there was an interval in the plenum's work while a specially set up commission studied incoming alternative proposals, amendments and remarks about the draft program.

More than two thousand collective and individual suggestions and pieces of advice came in. The commission examined and generalised them.

The program expresses a striving to conduct ideological work in the form of dialogue with representatives of all movements and public associations brought into being by perestroika. The leading role of the communist party should be asserted through practical work, the program emphasises.

The question of a new status of the Latvian Communist Party has been brought up for a broad discussion in the republic's party organisation by a decision of the plenum.

Two variants of the party's independence within the CPSU were suggested. The plenary session adopted an address to the Communists and all working people of the republic in connection with the CPSU Central Committee's statement "on the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics".

The address says that the CPSU Central Committee's statement has been regarded in Soviet Latvia as a call to look back upon the first years of perestroika once again self-critically and to map out urgent measures to carry out economic and poltical reforms, to democratise social life and to assert openness.

The address expresses the conviction of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee that the activities of extremist groups that try to bar the way to perestroika "do not and cannot have a decisive influence on the renewal process in the republic". The document calls for maintaining tranquility and unity.

"The Communists cannot clearly be unmoved by the high social strain and complex political processes which impede perestroika in Latvia," Janis Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, said at the plenum.

"One should not irresponsibly rock the common boat. It is necessary to come to a stop and realise that we all have one destiny and one anguish—Latvia".

Status of Latvian Party Considered

PM3108105589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Aug 89 Second Edition p 2

[LATINFORM-TASS report: "Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Riga, 30 Aug—After an almost 3-week recess the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum resumed work today with the agenda: "Sociopolitical Processes in the Republic and the Latvian Communist Party's Action Program." The commission which was set up at its decision during this period has generalized more than 2,000 proposals from Communists and alternative plans. The document that has been prepared states that the "party's leading role in society cannot be predetermined by the constitution or by the law, but should be confirmed by practical work."

Communists voiced mixed assessments and opposing arguments on the question of the status of the Latvian Communist Party. The commission proposed two options for implementing autonomy [samostoyatelnost] within the CPSU. First, it envisages the Latvian Communist Party's right to adopt final decisions on the most important problems of economic, ecological, social, cultural, and nationalities policy, cadres, and the main

issues of intraparty life. Second, it proposes full autonomy for Latvia's Communists in resolving all issues connected with the work of their republic party organization based on its own program and statutes, as well as participation on an equal footing [na paritetnykh nachalakh] in the work of higher CPSU organs and regulated [reglamentirovannyy] representation for the Latvian Communist Party in the CPSU Central Committee and Central Committee Politburo. The plenum proposed both options for extensive discussion.

In the opening speech, Ya.Ya. Vagris, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, said, assessing the Latvian Communist Party's action program, that this is the first document since the start of perestroyka in Latvia which has been crystallized in the process of the party's real collective creativity, forging different approaches and priorities into a unified political action program. It represents a new quality that allows us to determine more concretely and accurately the current and future steps on the path of Latvian sovereignty.

It was noted at the plenum that the CPSU Central Committee Statement on the Position in the Soviet Baltic Republics had generated an extensive and mixed public reaction in the republic. The document appeared in a highly complex and internally contradictory situation. But one cannot fail to see, the plenum noted, that it contains profound alarm and concern about the perestroyka process in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and its constructive thrust. It was stressed that the situation requires balanced, self-critical, calm, and well-considered assessment. At the same time, it was stated at the plenum that the CPSU Central Committee statement takes insufficient account of the specific features of the development of the situation in each republic, including the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The plenum participants adopted an appeal to Communists and all the republic's working people in connection with the CPSU Central Committee Statement on the Position in the Soviet Baltic Republics. It stated in particular that the CPSU Central Committee statement is seen in Soviet Latvia as an appeal to take another self-critical look at the first years of perestroyka, to outline urgent measures to implement economic and political reforms, to democratize social life, and to assert glasnost.

Further on Estonia's Reaction to CPSU Statement

First Secretary Vyalyas Cited

LD3008121989 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 28 Aug 89

[From the "Echo of the Day" feature; address by Communist Party of Estonia First Secretary Vayno Vyalyas]

[Text] [Announcer] Good evening. The statement of CPSU Central Committee with respect to the situation in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was today also discussed by the Bureau of the Communist Party of Estonia [CPES] Central Committee. Vayno Vyalyas, first secretary of the CPES Central Committee, will now begin today's program.

[Vyalyas] Esteemed television viewers and radio listeners. I address you in the name of the CPES Central Committee, and on its instruction.

Just now a statement appeared from CPSU Central Committee about the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics. The CPES Central Committee understands the concern and anxiety expressed in this important political document and admits that in the course of fast-developing processes extremist forces who demand secession from the Soviet Union have made themselves felt here.

Analyzing once again the most recent period of the true restructuring process and its experience in Estonia, we can affirm that the activity of extremist groups is not and cannot even be the main, let alone the determining factor in our restructuring process. Moreover, groups which are attempting to destabilize the situation fall into several categories. Some of them do not recognize today's realities and demand that the bourgeois regime be restored and that we secede from the Soviet Union. Others practically reject all those changes which the restructuring process has brought for the Estonian people, and demand the restoration of what originated in the past, saying it must remain with finality.

Discussing seriously and considering the generalized assessments of the situation in the whole Baltic area in the statement of CPSU Central Committee, we also have to bear in mind the situation in each republic, including the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] with their special features and peculiarities. At the same time, we know that there is much in common in the situations of the three youngest union republics, first and foremost the distinctive features of their historical development. The 1939 Soviet-German nonaggression pact and the later course of events in Europe in relation to its secret protocol painfully affected and determined directly the fates of the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Hence, there is also a similar heightened interest in the honest admission and official reevaluation of the known facts of prewar history. A commission was set up at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies for this purpose. Included in it are several deputies elected from the Estonian SSR. In March of this year the CPES Central Committee already directly stated its stance at a session of the foreign policy commission of CPSU Central Committee.

In order to determine some fundamental truths which are of prime importance to us, and in order to end the doubts which have appeared in places regarding our aims, we unambigously announce once again: The CPES and other forces which are participating constructively in restructuring in the republic hold the position that the

Estonian SSR belongs within the composition of the Soviet Union in the capacity of a sovereign republic. The often-raised question of our opportunities for development is first and foremost a question of further democratization of the Soviet Union, of radical transformations within the Soviet federation, and of restoration of the Leninist principle of the self-determination of the peoples. All this must be ensured with democratic legal guarantees and through our Soviet laws. The republic must be conferred all the rights which are consonant with its status as a sovereign socialist state. Let it be said that those thoughts have been written down very clearly in the draft platform on the nationality policy of CPSU Central Committee.

I remind you once again: The stance of independence and of deciding for oneself, in the spirit of what was said above, has also been presented in the platform of the CPES Central Committee for the CPSU Central Committee plenum on nationality relations. The fate of the Estonian people and of all the inhabitants of Estonia depends directly on the success of the course of restructuring in the whole of the Soviet Union. In the struggle for restructuring, for the final de-Stalinization of our society, and for irreversible democratization the Estonian SSR is linked firmly to the other union republics. Upon this are founded the common aims of the peoples of our country, and they must ensure the irreversibility of our party's restructuring course.

The CPES Central Committee sees the development of the Estonian state in a democratic, truly [words indistinct] in a voluntary union with other fraternal republics, which has precisely and firmly defined the authority spheres of [words indistinct] and of the republics and mutual duties. And the union republics are fully sovereign in deciding all their internal matters and in their openness to the outside world.

Looking at the developments of the last year, we acknowledge that we have set out precisely on the path to such a state organization. But let us keep in mind that each stage in development takes its logical turn, the upsetting of which can endanger the whole development itself and [words indistinct]. We have to create a effective mechanism of legal guarantees for the purpose of consolidating what has been achieved this way at each state. Among other things, at the moment this also means elaborating the laws on citizenship, on restricting migration, and on organizing referendums. Work is in progress on this package. Those laws will have to consider the interests of all the people residing in Estonia, regardless of their nationality, and they must be completed with the joint participation of us all. The course of restructuring started by the party has opened up new opportunities for realizing Estonia's endeavors. We can take advantage of those opportunities only by progressing along the path of peaceful, parliamentarian reforms. Being the numerically smallest people in the USSR who posess their own union republic, we must be aware that Estonians have lasted as a distinct, full-blooded nation only thanks to their ability to operate in any kind of conditions, including the most difficult ones, while avoiding fatal dangers. For this reason, we now appeal to all Estonians to demonstrate again, at a complex time for our republic, the coolheadedness that is characteristic of the nation, clear thinking, and a sense of responsibility.

We say directly: Under the present conditions the demands for secession from the Soviet Union are irresponsible and would only bring harm to the present interests of the Estonian people. They sharply conflict with the international situation, whose chief characteristics are the easing of tensions, a general, humane way of thinking, and steady support for the USSR's restructuring course by the world public at large. We also appeal to the representatives of other nationalities who have chosen Estonia as their home to understand the dialectics of the development processes here. Without this, our advancement would be impossible. First and foremost, they should understand that restructuring in Estonia does not endanger the interests of any one nationality. Let us recall that the way of life of the Estonian people, their culture, and their whole intellectual life have been tolerant thoughout the years, with a deeply democratic content. There has been no place within the traditions of the Estonians for interethnic hatred, restriction of other nationalities, or violence. In spite of conflicts, tolerance, democracy, and openness also characterize the present new period of national awakening in Estonia. Thanks to restructuring, an opportunity has opened for Estonians to solve the problem of how to preserve the nation and how to resolve the problems of its development prospects, which had been taken to a critical point by the nationality policy during the periods of Stalinism and stagnation, as well as by the mistakes of the CPES both in the distant and near past. For this reason, Estonians became very enthusiastically involved in restructuring and began to energetically expand old understandings of the relationship of the union republics and the central power, by taking the initiative from below.

One has to admit that it has not been possible, nor have we known how to explain with sufficient persuasiveness to the representatives of other nationalities who reside here or elsewhere within the Soviet Union, the general human endeavors of the indigenous population. The scant, one-sided, or distorted information of what is going on in our republic, which has often been amplified impermissibly one-sidedly, has served to feed the misunderstanding of what is taking place in Estonia. That is being taken advantage of by those conservative forces for whom the fundamental restructuring of our society is not to their liking nor acceptable for a variety of reasons. There are people with such views in Estonia, and they also exist farther away.

Now that a course has in principle been worked out which would lead the republic out of the economic slump, so we will be able to realize an IME [self-managing Estonia] with very hard work and at the cost of numerous deprivations in order to ensure a better life for everybody in Estonia,

domestic quarrels of any kind and threatening confrontations between groups of nationalities would be particularly dangerous and—let us say it straight out—outright treacherous. In restructuring Estonia and making the life of its people better and more secure, we act in the interests of all inhabitants. This policy does not restrict the interests of any one ethnic group; it does not discriminate or suppress anybody. The success of our plan is necessary for all the people of our republic.

The CPES understands that non-Estonians also need social and political guarantees—that they need security with firm, legal guarantees. A series of laws to be adopted in the near future should serve to do this, including the laws already mentioned on republican citizenship and protection of the rights of ethnic groups. The CPES Central Committee holds that implementation of social and political reforms within the framework of the course of restructuring consists of a democratic consideration of different parties' interests and desires, and that it is founded upon practical activity, upon our daily work. We must not forget this.

We will continue specific changes in the republic, which means the will and ability to flexibly compromise between different social and ethnic groups. This is a direct political need but it is also a political art. Activity of any other kind, hopes of forcing one's will upon the others, regardless of which side this orginates from, will only lead us to a dead end which may paralyze real changes for a lengthy period of time, if not (?forever). This is the harsh and true logic of matters; and ignoring this is to be frowned upon.

In conclusion, let us note once again that the logical outlet for the implementation of the right to self-determination, which inalienably belongs to the Estonian people, is to hand over to the republic all the rights which are in accord with its status as a sovereign state. Implementing it is closely, inseparably linked with the democratization of the whole Soviet Union and is linked with respecting and ensuring the rights of other nationalities who reside in the Estonian SSR.

Only by proceeding from these principles will we be able to continue the course of restructuring in Estonia. And for the sake of this, for the sake of tomorrow's peaceful life and work, we are addressing you, the people of Estonia. And let it be said outright directly to all the people once again: We will keep firmly to the course which was set down at the 11th Plenum of the CPES Central Committee.

Vyalyas Appeal Published

PM3008113989 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Second Edition p3

[ETA-TASS report: "At the Center of Attention"]

[Text] Tallinn, 29 Aug—The question of the political situation in the republic is being discussed today at a conference of first secretaries of city party committees [gorkoms] and rayon party committees [raykoms]. A meeting of the party aktiv in the city of Kokhtla-Yarva has already been held and urged the city's party organizations to organize their work in line with the provisions set out in the CPSU Central Committee statement.

Party meetings are being held at enterprises, organizations, and institutions throughout the republic. And although the importance of the CPSU Central Committee statement is being stressed virtually everywhere, the attitude to it is not always unequivocal. Some are voicing the opinion that this document could exacerbate the situation and speakers are expressing concern at the excessively harsh, categorical tone of the appraisals.

Today's newspapers in the republic carry the appeal by the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, which was read yesterday [29 August] on Estonian television and radio by V. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee.

The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, it says, understands the anxiety and concern expressed in this important political document and admits that extreme forces raising the question of secession from the Soviet Union have made their presence felt during the fast-moving processes.

The Estonian Communist Party and other forces playing a constructive role in restructuring, the appeal points out, work on the basis that the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] is incorporated in the USSR as a sovereign republic and that the question of the possibilities for its development is primarily a question of further democratizing the USSR and radically reorganizing the Soviet federation.

The future of the Estonian people and all inhabitants of Estonia, the document goes on to stress, is directly linked to the success of the policy of renewal throughout the Soviet Union.

The Estonian Communist Party sees the state development of Estonia as lying in a democratic, really equal, voluntary union with other fraternal republics, where the competence of the union and the individual republics and their mutual responsibility are clearly defined.

The policy of restructuring initiated by the party has given Estonia new opportunities to fulfill its own aspirations. The cause can only succeed by following a path of peaceful parliamentary reforms. As the smallest nation in terms of population to have its own union republic in the USSR, we must remember that the Estonians have survived as a distinct, vital nation only because of their ability to act with common sense in any conditions, even the most difficult, and avoid fatal dangers. That is why we are now appealing to all Estonians to display the self-restraint, sober intellect, and responsibility characteristic of the nation at this difficult time for the republic and to refrain from extremes. In the present conditions, demands for secession from the Soviet Union are irresponsible and can only harm the

interests of the Estonian people. These demands are also in sharp conflict with the international situation, which is now characterized by a defusing of tension, a humanist world outlook, and support for the stability of the restructuring course in the Soviet Union.

We also appeal to the representatives of other peoples who have chosen the Estonian SSR as their home, the document says, to understand the dialectics of the development processes here.

Our failing is that we have not been able or have not managed to explain the common human aspirations of the indigenous people sufficiently convincingly to representatives of other peoples living here and outside the republic.

Now, when we have worked out a fundamental policy to overcome the economic crisis and when the realization of republic economic accountability must ensure all people living in Estonia a better life, any internal discord and hostility between ethnic groups is very dangerous, simply disastrous. If our great, humane plans are to succeed, the appeal says, there must be joint creative work by all people living in Estonia. The Estonian Communist Party understands that representatives of other nations also need social and political guarantees and want to feel sure. We will continue the changes in the republic provided there is a readiness for flexible compromise between ethnic and social groups. Any other activity and attempts to impose one's will by force can only lead to deadlock, which threatens to paralyze any real change for a long time to come or make that change totally impossible.

Estonian Party Assesses Statement

PM300810358 9 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 89 First Edition pp 1,3

[PRAVDA correspondent I. Teterin report under the rubric "We Discuss the Nationalities Question" and the general heading: "Affirming Common Sense"]

[Text] Tallinn—The CPSU Central Committee Statement on the Situation in the Soviet Baltic Republics is being discussed keenly in Estonia. Opinions on questions raised in the document are disparate. Some assess highly its constructive and principled character while others see it as all but a violation of national interests.

A session of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau was held 28 August in Tallinn to analyze the current situation in the republic in detail and assess the CPSU Central Committee statement. Virtually all Estonia's inhabitants were able to familiarize themselves with the Estonian Communist Party leadership's viewpoint in the evening. Vyayno Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee addressed them on television. First in Estonian and then in Russian.

"The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee," he announced, "understands the concern and anxiety expressed in this important political document and acknowledges that extremist forces raising the question of separation from the Soviet Union have made themselves felt in the course of transient processes."

Then describing the reason for the increase in tension as partially objective and linked with the specific nature of the Baltic people's historical development and also with the effect of the Soviet-German treaty of 1939 and the additional secret protocols on the subsequent fate of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the speaker stressed the following: The Estonian Communist Party and other forces that take a constructive part in perestroyka proceed on the premise that the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] forms part of the USSR as a sovereign socialist republic. The question of the opportunities for its development is above all a question of the further democratization of the entire Soviet Union and the radical restructuring of the Soviet federation and the restoration of the Leninist principles of self-determination for nations on the basis of democratic legal guarantees and firm Soviet laws. It is these ideas that are firmly enshrined in the CPSU Central Committee platform on the party's nationalities policy in contemporary conditions.

He then said: "Let me be blunt and say that under present conditions the demands to leave the Soviet Union are irresponsible and can only damage the interests of the Estonian people."

V. Vyalyas urged Estonians at this complex time for the republic to display the restraint, sober thinking, and responsibility characteristic of the people. A similar appeal was also made to the Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and representatives of other peoples—to have a correct understanding of the dialectics behind the development of the perestroyka processes in the republic. There has never been room in the traditions of the Estonian people for interethnic hostility and violence. Laws on citizenship and defense of the rights of national groups will soon be adopted. They will consider the interests of all people living in Estonia.

The speech devoted particular attention to overcoming the economic crisis using the program for republic economic accountability, which should guarantee all the republic's inhabitants a better life. That is why internal dissension and confrontation between national groups is particularly dangerous and destructive for the implementation of this program. Only readiness for compromise can guarantee a way out of the impasse today.

In conclusion it was noted once again that the Estonian Communist Party leadership sees the granting to the republic of all the rights it must have as a sovereign socialist state as fulfilling the Estonian people's inalienable right to self-determination. The implementation of this right is closely and indissolubly connected with

democratization throughout the Soviet Union and with respect and guarantees for the rights of the other peoples in the Estonian SSR.

CPSU Statement Called 'Veiled Threat'

LD3008122189 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 29 Aug 89

["Echo of the Day"]

[Text] USSR people's deputies, elected from Estonia, were together for 4 hours today [29 August] in Kadriorg [in Tallinn] at the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium. Thirty-three deputies were present, with [words indistinct]. Those present discussed how to reply to the CPSU Central Committee statement on the Baltic situation.

It was found that this document contains a veiled threat to interfere with force into (?the processes) which are taking place in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. There were also those among the people's deputies who agreed with the CPSU Central Committee address. After lengthy coordination [words indistinct] a telegram for Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, was completed. Of the 33 USSR people's deputies present, 28 signed the telegram. The text of the telegram will be published in the press in the near future.

Today's conference also formed a working group of the people's deputies which will tonight begin to elaborate on the text of another document directed outward; it is an address to the USSR peoples and democratic forces, to the world public, the USSR congress of People's Deputies, and to the USSR Government. At this point, the draft address is 7 pages long and acquaints one with the political situation in Estonia. This address will also be published in the press.

'Unfamiliar Tension' Reported in Tallinn

LD3008211989 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 30 Aug 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; Igor Kudrin report]

[Excerpts] I am conducting this reportage on the move, as it were. Just a few hours ago our film crew arrived by train from Moscow. One always travels to Tallinn with a sort of willingness and joy. The Estonian capital's beauty and order are most attractive. [passage omitted] [video shows Tallinn street scenes]

However, there is now some kind of unfamiliar tension in the air, for example, there is much talk here about the recent strikes which, as is shown by our Soviet practice, do not arise without reason. Today the republican leadership is continuing talks with the strike committee with the aim of stabilizing the political situation.

As you know, the word stabilization is not one that arises in a normal situation. The organizations of Estonians and the Russian-speaking inhabitants continue to publicly air their relations with each other. These groups, which were born of perestroyka, have done much that is good and useful. Both have many problems and both can be understood, but it seems that at times their quarrel clearly acts to the detriment of production and to the detriment of the already difficult living conditions. Moreover, both sides are excessively shrill and un-European in approach.

They have received the CPSU Central Committee statement on the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics in different ways. Some regard it as a threat, a warning shout from Moscow, almost as an infringement on national sovereignty. Other consider the document important and timely.

Many inhabitants of Tallinn say nothing special is happening in our republic. Everything is as it should be, everything is normal. I am afraid of making judgements, but as a journalist on international affairs, I ask myself the question: In that case why are the Western media, many newspaper and magazines, now devoting their front pages to the events in the Soviet Baltic republics? Moreover, these reports are being given the same columns that previously reported the events in Sumgait, Fergana, and Abkhaziya, even though there has never been any violence or vandalism in Tallinn and I hope that there never will be. So what is it, what events are being expected by Western journalists, what changes are they predicting so maliciously? This is no secret. Some people abroad dream of whipping up nationalist passions which so damage our perestroyka. They cherish their old dream of isolating the Soviet Baltic repubics from the rest of the country. The appeal of the bureau of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party says: In present conditions, demands to leave the USSR are irresponsible and can only cause harm to the interests of the Estonian people. [video shows ETA display of photographs of demonstrators with slogans condemning Molotov-Ribbentrop pact]

On the surface Tallinn is just as it was, however: neat, courteous, and lively. Adults hurry about their business. Children stroll about and prepare for the new school year. Unlike some of their parents they are quickly able to find the common language that is so necessary today to all of us.

Estonian Journalists' Board Holds News Conference

PM3008113589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by P. Gutiontov: "We Must Trust One Another More"]

[Text] Moscow—I think that the events in the Baltic area are the severest examination of all that we have learned and not learned during the four and a bit years of perestroyka. How great is our willingness to bid farewell to the tragic past, and have we selected carefully from it those things that nevertheless should be taken into the future? Is

our glasnost standing up to the difficult ordeals? Are we actually ready to learn to listen to one another or do we still prefer not to examine arguments but to silence opponents—whether in Russian or in Estonian?

On 25 August the Estonian Journalists' Union Board held a press conference in Moscow for their Moscow colleagues. M. Myuyur, chairman of the Estonian Journalists' Union Board; artist E. Pyldroos, candidate member of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau; USSR People's Deputy V. Pokhla; writer T. Kallas; A. Zaytseva, deputy chief editor of the journal RADUGA; and Ye. Golikov, chief of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Political Enlightenment Center; said that they understood the processes taking place in the republic.... Unfortunately, some of their assessments seemed to me to be somewhat one-sided, perhaps because there were no people at the press conference putting forward a different viewpoint. And the fact that people with different views are still appearing in different auditoriums seems to me to be a major obstacle to both sides.

I cannot verify the facts and figures cited by the press conference participants. They reckon that the number of participants in the strikes protesting against the adoption of the new electoral law has been highly exaggerated. According to their data, there were around 25,000 strikers and losses resulting from the strike amounted to R25 million. A considerable proportion of the Russian population did not stop work. It was pointed out that the majority of the striking enterprises were under union jurisdiction, possessing considerable privileges. The belief was expressed that the strikes were sanctioned "by Moscow," by the ministries, but no specific evidence was provided. "The strikes were effectively a response to the USSR Supreme Soviet decisions on transferring the republic to economic accountability," Estonian Journalists' Union Board member E. Khyon said, "since it is the union enterprises' interests that are badly hit by economic accountability."

The press conference participants paid a great deal of attention to explaining their stance on the question of the introduction of residential qualifications at the local soviet elections. "This need not be called a measure that discriminates against non-Estonians," Kh. Lindpere, assistant chairman of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] State Planning Committee, said. "It is only a matter of the voter's qualifications and his responsibility for the state of affairs."

"Interethnic conflict in Estonia is a myth," E. Pyldroos said. But he admitted that "we were so busy with our own affairs that we sometimes forgot that there were different people living alongside us." T. Leyto, editor of the paper RAHVA HAAL, also said that "we were unable to ensure that the Russian population felt confident about the future." It was also said that the study of Estonian by non-Estonians was encountering serious difficulties—a lack of textbooks, modern learning methods, and trained teachers.

Ye. Golikov stressed that "in Estonia today a Russian cannot consider himself a democrat without understanding and without acknowledging the Estonians' problems. In the same way, an Estonian cannot remain a democrat if all he is concerned with is his own ethnic issues." At the moment, Golikov said, there is no other reality for Estonia, of which he considers himself a patriot, than that of helping all the Russians living there to acquire a sense of homeland and security in the republic....

The traditional complaints about the central press and its assessments of events in the Baltic area, which the speakers consider biased, were also heard at the press conference. A letter was circulated from the Estonian Writers' Union Board "To the Writers of Russia," in which there is a resolute protest against the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Writers' Union Secretariat's appeal, transmitted by TASS, to all citizens of Estonia. It is regarded as insincere and unceremonious....

I repeat that I was unable to agree with everything I heard and some of the direct questions did not receive direct answers. Nevertheless, the restoration and strengthening of mutual trust among all citizens of Estonia were stressed by all our guests as a priority goal. And there are no grounds for doubting their sincerity.

Moldavian Supreme Soviet Discusses Language Laws

LD3008185289 Moscow TASS in English 1828 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Kishinev August 30 TASS—By TASS special correspondent:

The session of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic that opened on Tuesday [29 August] is in progress here. The deputies are discussing the republic's draft laws on the resumption of the use of the Latin script in the Moldavian language, on the status of the official language of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, on the use of languages in the republic's territory and the draft state comprehensive programme for the ensurance of the functioning of languages.

The question of the socio-political situation in the republic is also being discussed on deputies' demand.

Many deputies noted that the situation in the republic aggravated after these draft laws were endorsed by the Presidium of Moldavia's Supreme Soviet on August 18, 1989. The one side, whose views are expressed by Moldavian language as the official language and the language of interethnic communication be recorded more clearly in laws. The other side, whose interests are protected by Interdvizheniye "Unitatja"-"yedinstvo" and the republican striking committee, demands that the Russian language be the language of interethnic communication.

People's deputies declare that the striving to achieve any ends by power methods will not lead to a positive solution of vital problems. The experience accumulated over the years of perestroika shows that attempts to

achieve political aims by ultimatums do nothing to promote consolidation and, quite the contrary, lead to confrontation, to the destablisation of the socio-political processes, deputies say.

Deputy Semen Grossu, first secretary of the Central Committee of Moldavia's Communist Party, spoke at the session today. He conveyed to the participants in the session, to all the working people in the republic Mikhail Gorbachev's message of greetings and wishes of successful work to the deputies.

Imparting the status of official language to the Moldavian language will considerably widen its functions and enhance its social role, the speaker said. And the inclusion in Moldavia's Constitution of the provision that the republic ensures on its territory the conditions for the development and use of the Russian language of inter-ethnic communication in the USSR, and of the native languages of other peoples lifts many concerns of the non- Moldavian population, caused by decreeing the official language. Besides that, the constitution records that the republic ensures the preservation and development of the language of the Gagauz people.

Deputy Semen Grossu proposed that the draft law "on the status of the official language of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic" recognises the Russian language as the language of inter-ethnic communication in the republic.

The overwhelming majority of deputies, having objectively appraised the situation in the republic, called on the strikers to return to their workplaces and embark on a balanced dialogue in the quest for a reasonable outcome of the situation. This was reflected in the address of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet to the working people of the republic.

The session will continue on 31 August.

Moldavia Strikes Spread to Railroad Workers

LD3008110489 Moscow TASS in English 1054 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Kishinev August 30 TASS—The strike in Moldavia caused by bills which are regarded by non-native population as discriminatory are spreading to other enterprises: railwaymen in the cities of Bendery and Beltsy also joined the strike today.

The reason for work stoppages by transport workers of two large railway junctions which joined striking workers in the cities of Tiraspol, Bendery, Rybnitsa, Komrat and Kishinev is the same: Disagreement with some provisions of the language bills which are being examined by the Moldavian Supreme Soviet (Parliament) on Tuesday [29 August]

Strikers are not against the revival of the Moldavian language. But they point out that this should not be done by infringing on the rights of Ukrainian, Russian, Gagauz, Bulgarian, Jewish and other people living in Moldavia.

"Railwaymen decided to carry only perishable agricultural products and goods of processing industry enterprises," Boris Nikiforov, deputy minister of railways, who came to strikers, told TASS.

Familiarising himself with the situation, the deputy minister said that he could not agree with those who tried to describe strikes at the republican parliament as a result of "directors' plot". It is rank-and-file workers that initiated the striker of railwaymen, he said. "Regrettably, calls of station masters not to resort to this drastic measure which will paralyse not only the Moldavian railway but will disrupt the normal operation of other Soviet railways, were futile."

The work stoppage of over 1,000 railwaymen has already resulted in receiving only 19 trains, instead of 66 freight trains which are daily received by Moldavian railways.

Speaking in the parliamentary debate, deputies express diverse attitude to strikes. Some unequivocally denounce work stoppages, while others describe them as a drastic but forced measure.

Restraints on Newsmen in Moldavia Criticized

PM3008131189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Second Edition p 3

[Georgiy Ovcharenko "Rejoinder": "Pluralism Kishinev-Style"]

[Text] Kishinev, 29 Aug—I was happy yesterday for certain USSR people's deputies from Moldavia. They finally showed their true colors. For they had not revealed their stance unequivocally for a long time, merely observing the stormy development of the political situation. Like, for instance, at a rally organized last Sunday [27 August] in Kishinev by the Moldavian People's Front [MPF]. The speakers there insulted the Russian people with might and main, sowing the seeds of separatism and nationalism and threatening to chop off a chunk of territory from the fraternal Ukraine, while the people's deputies listened. Perhaps they were indicating that they favor pluralism of opinion.

But yesterday some people's deputies finally determined whose side they are on. They spoke out simultaneously in favor of—no more and no less—expelling your correspondent, that is to say me, from Moldavia. They say that pluralism exists but any opinion other than that affirmed at the rally in a central newspaper must not be expressed and upheld in a central newspaper!

Moreover, local journalists also experience pluralism Kishinev-style. Not everyone, of course, only those whose pens are not manipulated by the MPF leaders. For instance, the organizers of a MPF press conference asked

ATEM representatives to go away. What was the reason? The same one: Their view of current events which does not suit the MPF.

Say what you like, it is convenient to shut up dissenters! There is no need for disputes with anyone, no need to seek arguments, no need to take a sober view of the realities of the day. It is not only the informals who have appreciated the advantages of this "method."

For instance, MOLODEZH MOLDAVIYA only had to compose an "Open Letter to M.I. Snegur, Chairman of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, and I.T. Gutsu, Secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee and USSR People's Deputy From Moldavia, Who took Part in the 'Great National Meeting'" for menacing growls to follow from the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee and the Moldavian Leninist Communist Youth League Central Committee "in the spirit of pluralism": Must this letter be printed? MOLODEZH MOLDAVIYA printed it nonetheless but without the surnames of the responsible comrades and also after considerably amending the text.

I am sorry, I myself approved this compromise. What else could I have done in the circumstances? The deputies kicked me out of Moldavia—and I went. But my young colleagues have to live in the republic. And I know from my own experience that it is not easy living under the pressure of moral terror. I have great sympathy for journalists from VECHERNIY KISHINEV, who have found themselves in a difficult situation today.

This is the trouble. The paper decided to reprint my articles from PRAVDA about current events in Moldavia. Nothing out of the ordinary on the whole. Reprints like this did not arouse any doubts and dissatisfaction in anyone before. Especially if the articles praised the republic. But it was a different matter this time: Unpleasant words were spoken in PRAVDA about local leaders and an adverse assessment was made of the situation in the republic, which is controlled not by the Moldavian Central Committee and not by the republic's Supreme Soviet, but by the nationalist anti-Russian People's Front.

The order followed to stop printing the VECHERNIY KISHINEV print run: It was said that reprinting the PRAVDA articles would practically provoke a civil war. The machines at the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Publishing House printing plant were brought to a standstill without the knowledge of the editorial office, the newspapers that had been printed were confiscated, and journalists were ordered to immediately draw up a new newspaper. Which is what they did—what else do you do! At 1700 the new pages without articles from PRAVDA were signed to press. But....

I must apologize once again: I would like to find out who decided to take this step at a time of glasnost. I began to telephone various bodies. But I heard the people reply sincerely: "That cannot be, there is pluralism in our republic." Printing of the original version of VECHERNIY KISHINEV did indeed resume 1 and ½ hours later, once again without the knowledge of the editorial office which was sweating buckets over the new pages.

Admittedly, it proved simply impossible to find out who gave the signal for the newspaper to be confiscated. But the collective of coauthors is well known. Let me enumerate them by name: I. Gutsu, secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee; N. Tsyu, first secretary of Kishinev City Party Committee [gorkom]; V. Stratulat, gorkom secretary; N. Chobanu, staffer at the gorkom Ideological Department; B. Mikhalaki, chief engineer at the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Publishing House printing plant; and V. Lancho, director of this publishing house.

I would like to ensure that their activity in developing pluralism Kishinev-style is assessed in a fitting manner by their contemporaries. For what a splendid recipe they have invented for unpleasant situations: Don't take any notice of them—that is is all. It looks as though silence also constitutes a stance.

Armenian Official Calls for End to Confrontation

NC3108101989 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0425 GMT 31 Aug 89

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] On the paper's front page is the statement made on Armenian television on (?29) August 1989 by Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee. Arutyunyan said in particular that we are living through times that are truly overly difficult and grave. The situation in our region has become extremely heated; it has taken a lethal turn. (?For the sake of truth) we must say that the tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan has culminated in ferocity. The two peoples face each other in a confrontation fraught with dangerous consequences. Their [word indistinct] is turning into enmity [words indistinct]. We are on the brink of interethnic war. Today, I call on our people to master their [word indistinct] and moral forces. It is time to put an end to the meaningless and dangerous confrontation. Good-neighborliness is the the only path to ensure the survival of the two peoples.

[In a related report, Yerevan International Service in Armenian at 1530 GMT on 30 August reports: "Interethnic relations between the peoples of the two Transcaucasian republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan have become quite acute lately. The clashes on interethnic grounds and the blockades of roads, in particular railways, have become frequent recently resulting in the disruption of supplies and postponement of the work in restoring the earthquake zone. In view of the exacerbation of interethnic relations in the region, Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, made a statement on Armenian television yesterday. He called on the Armenian people

to maintain their patience and prudence and to master their intellectual and moral forces."]

Azerbaijani Killed in Communal Clashes

AU3108080889 Paris AFP in English 0200 GMT 31 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, Aug 31 (AFP)—Fighting between rival Azerbaijanis and Armenians in a Soviet Azerbaijan village left one dead and several wounded, a local journalist said Wednesday.

The fighting broke out at Karaholi, a village close to the disputed Armenian dominated enclave of Nagorny-Karabakh, said Navim Raguymov. The dead man was an Azeri.

"Seven Armenians were taken by the Azerbaijanis to the police after the murder", he said, adding that in neighbouring Kemenli, four houses inhabited by Azerbaijanis were set alight and an Armenian was arrested.

The incidents follow an announcement by Soviet Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin that more troops are to be sent to the troubled region following a resurgence of clashes between the communities, at loggerheads over the status of Nagorny-Karabakh.

In a separate development, the Azerbaijani Popular Front have called a demonstration on Saturday in Baku, the republic capital, to organise a general strike from Monday.

The Front is demanding the lifting of a curfew imposed in Baku last year.

Armenians in Azerbaijan Condemn 'Provocations'

NC3008215789 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1600 GMT 28 Aug 89

[Text] Armenians employed in one of the large establishments in Baku's Nizami District have issued the following appeal:

We, the Armenians of Baku, were born in the land of Azerbaijan. We have always regarded this land as our homeland and we continue to do so. We cannot remain indifferent toward what occurs in this land.

The claims that have been made by various individuals are false and aim only at provoking interethnic discord. How can the two neighboring peoples turn against each other? However, there have been many attempts to do this in the past, there are attempts to do this now, and we are certain that there will be many more attempts to do this in the future.

Look at our children. Many of [word indistinct] are representatives of various nationalities. Who can tell which of the dark-eyed and dark-haired children are Azerbaijanis and which are Armenians? Does this keep them from being friends, from playing together, studying together, and resting together?

We do not want the blood of innocent people to be shed on our peaceful and fertile land, where people used to live in friendship and security prior to the incidents in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.

Our people, together with the other peoples of the Soviet Union, bore the heavy burden of the horrible war and the destruction that resulted from that war, shared their happiness and grief, supported each other, and withheld (?nothing) from their neighbors in difficult years. We must not allow these sacred traditions to be forgotten.

We do not want individual groups of savage people to deprive us and our children from our right to live. We want to live normally, to enjoy ourselves, to work, and to raise our children. Therefore, we demand that the political and economic provocations and conspiracies hatched by Armenian extremists be halted immediately and resolute measures taken urgently to normalize the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. This is because we wholeheartedly believe that Nagorno-Karabakh should remain where it has been, within the framework of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.

Outward Calm in Baku Labeled 'Deceptive'

PM2908075389 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[Special correspondent Colonel V. Gavrilenko report: "Azerbaijan: All Enterprises Working"]

[Text] Baku greeted us with a temperature of 30 degrees and oleander in bloom. Outwardly everything in the city seemed calm and all enterprises and poublic transport are working. Only the portable metal barriers at certain road junctions remind you that a curfew is in operation.

On 24 August I talked with Azerbaijan Interior Minister A. Mamedov. He noted that the situation remains complex. The strikes that were held were short-term in nature and on the whole did not affect the republic's economic life. Ministry of Internal Affairs organs managed to prevent urban transport in Baku from coming to a halt during those days, something they had not managed to do previously. The recent events—strikes and rallies—were marked by another feature not seen before: A higher level of organization and order than in past months. They were controled by the strikers and rally participants themselves.

Interethnic conflicts continue. There have been arson attacks and clashes involving firearms. There have been casualties among both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani populations. These incidents are being investigated.

Local newspapers report that a Nagorno-Karabakh aid committee has been set up in Baku. It is part of the

movement for perestroyka aimed at stabilizing the situation in this region. The organization of material assistance to the residents of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has begun in response to an appeal from the committee. This includes the Azerbaijani section of the population, of course.

Such is the pattern of events in Baku and Azerbaijan these days. Nevertheless, the outward calm is deceptive. Whatever the Baku people do today, virtually everyone remembers and is talking about 2 September, the day on which Azerbaijan People's Front has planned a republic-wide strike.

Armenian Supreme Soviet Election Invalidated

NC3008165589 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] In (?by-elections) held on 27 August, the following were elected deputies to the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet: Levon Akopovich Ter-Akopyan, from Yerevan city, Yekhbayrutun electoral okrug No 9, born in 1945, not a party member, and senior researcher at the ancient manuscripts research institute named after Mashdots; Robert [name indistinct] Kocharyan, from Kirovakan city, Saakyan electoral okrug No 139, born in (?1958), a member of the CPSU, and secretary of the party committee at the silk combine of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast; Rafayel Avetisovich Khazaryan, from Ashtarak city, Ashtarak electoral okrug No 169, born in 1924, not a party member, and laboratory director at the Physics Research Institute of the Armenian Republic's Academy of Sciences; and Yuri Aykovich Chshmaridyan, from Stepanavanskiy rayon, Urubi electoral okrug No 332, born in 1940, a member of the CPSU, and first secretary of the Stepanavanskiy party rayon committee.

In a decree on 15 August, the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium nullified the 11 August decision by the electoral committee of electoral okrug No 194 in Charentsavan to register Manusharov as a candidate for deputy to the Armenian Supreme Soviet on the grounds that this contravened existing laws. However, the electoral committee of the okrug, disregarding the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree, included Manusharov on the ballot along with the legally registered candidates, despite the fact that he is under detention and thus barred from participating in elections according to Article 96 of the USSR Constitution. Therefore, the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium, proceeding from the USSR Constitution and its 15 August decree, has invalidated the election held in Charentsavan electoral okrug No 194 on 27 August for Armenian Supreme Soviet deputy.

Armenian Committee Formed To Combat Crime

NC2908211989 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0425 GMT 29 Aug 89

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] In compliance with the USSR Supreme Soviet decision, a provisional committee to combat crimes has been formed in Armenia under the chairmanship of Grant Voskanyan, chairman of the Presidium of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. The first session of this committee took place yesterday. It discussed the need for a new criminal code, measures for legal protection, and a more thorough safeguard of the lives and security of the [word indistinct] militia workers and those individuals who participate in the struggle against those who violate public law and order.

The paper has published an ARMENPRES report on the session entitled "Toughening the Struggle Against Crimes."

Armenian Party To Publish Book on Genocide

NC3008171189 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 29 Aug 89

[Excerpts] Yerevan, 29 Aug (ARMENPRES)—The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee recently decided to publish a reference work entitled "The Armenian Question: The Genocide of the Armenians" on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, which will take place in 1990. The work will be published in Russian. [passage omitted] It is hoped that the work will also be published in Armenian and English at a later date.

Protestors Picket Chapayevsk CW Destruction Plant

PM3008140589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by Sergey Zhigalov: "Plant Ringed By Pickets"]

[Text] Kuybyshev—"No Chapayevsk plant for the destruction of chemical weapons!" is the refrain of the wave of protest rallies in the oblast's enterprises and cities. Two protest camps have been set up outside the plant, which in the recent past was considered secret. The picket lines include students, pensioners, and working people on leave from Kuybuyshev, Chapayevsk, and other cities, not only in Kuybuyshev Oblast. I would point out that the plant leadership helped the pickets set up camp and the militia helped them organize radio communications.

There were calls for a strike at a rally in Kuybyshev city square. Sober arguments against the siting of the first plant of its kind in the world in a densely populated area on the Volga were often drowned out by absurd conjecture and political insinuations.

The two government commissions which were supposed to establish whether the plant for the destruction of chemical weapons poses a threat to the region's inhabitants basically failed to answer the question. The formula "the plant is ecologically safe on condition that there are no accidents" did not reassure any of the residents, of course.

"They want to trick us, lull our fears and then... start the plant up!..."—these were by no means the most caustic opinions of the commission.

Addressing the rally, Kuybyshev City Party Committee Second Secretary N. Averin expressed the view that the startup of the plant is impossible in such an extremely fraught situation.

A government commission, the third so far, has started work at the Chapayevsk plant.

Protests Force Closure of Plant

LD3008122289 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] This country's first factory for scrapping chemical agents, in Chapayevsk on the Volga, has been suspended from operation. Although the Defense Ministry guaranteed safety and no pollution to the environment, the local residents and authorities have opposed its commissioning. A special commission has established that a few chemical works operating in Chapayevsk have already seriously damaged the environment. The population has been demanding, with the authorities' support, that the plant be remodelled and chemical agents be scrapped in remote areas elsewhere in the country.

Further on Plant

LD3008162489

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1300 GMT on 30 August broadcasts a 3-minute video report by L. Krechetova, which is introduced by the newsreader as follows: "The construction of a works for the destruction of chemical weapons near Chapayevsk in Kuybyshev Oblast has been completed."

Krechetova says: "The works for the destruction of chemical weapons is ready to be handed over for use. Its gates swing open several times a day." People are shown visiting the works; a "danger" sign is visible in one area. Krechetova continues: "Representatives of labor collectives from nearby cities are shown this enterprise which is unprecedented, and its significance is explained."

V.K. Solovyev, indentified by screen caption as facility chief, remarks: "This is a gesture of good will which the Soviet Government has displayed. It has received real confirmation, and I think that this works, the commissioning of this works, will promote relaxation of international tension, and such an important problem as the destruction of such barbaric weapons as chemical weapons will be resolved."

Krechetova reports that local inhabitants continue to hold protest meetings and gather signatures for appeals to the government over the high levels of environmental pollution in the area and the fact that the construction was totally secret. Workers are shown holding a protest meeting bearing banners, one of which reads "Stop" in English.

Krechetova interviews writer V.N. Bondarenko, who wholeheartedly supports the destruction of weapons but only if it is safe for people living in the works vicinity. He says its locality is bad since it is too close to densely populated areas. He notes people are worried about the slightest chance of something going wrong, adding that things have gone wrong in the past.

Krechetova then interviews V.A. Leonchev, USSR people's deputy, who criticizes ministries and departments for deciding to locate many enterprises in their area, leading to "an ecologically tense" situation in the oblast. They have done so without consulting local soviets, he says. This enterprise is just a "drop", he comments and call for a more humane approach.

Krechetova concludes the report by saying: "One can understand the USSR Defense Ministry. It pays paramount attention to the international significance of the commissioning of the works; but what about the views of the compatriots?" while video shows more views of the area around the works, tents in a field, and the public visiting.

Readers Voice Concern Over CPSU's Role

18001551 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 24 Aug 89

[Report on interview with Arkadiy Lvovich Marshak, deputy director of the Party Building Department, Moscow Higher Party School, by L. Kononova, not further identified: "It Remains in the Vanguard"; date, place not specified]

[Text]**The role of the CPSU under modern conditions. The authority of the communist. The need to change the functions of the party committee. These questions are now at the center of public attention. The concern for the party's authority, the party workers' prestige, and the communist's calling rings out in the letters coming to the editors.**

We asked Arkadiy Lvovich Marshak, deputy director of the Party Building Department of the Moscow Higher Party School, to comment on these letters and answer our questions.

[Kononova] Arkadiy Lvovich, perhaps we should begin our conversation with a letter from A. Kruglov, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War from Sevastopol. He writes:

"Let us shed some light on this. Yes, the first serious attempt to change the country's own and the party's tyrannically cruel regime established by Stalin was undertaken in the late fifties by a leader of this very same party with a very few other like-minded people. But they soon yielded their position to the inert and even reactionary mass of leading party workers and rank-and-file members, whose majority was overwhelming. In the eighties, under the conditions of single rule, changes can be initiated only by the party (even though the ground has been prepared for them by farsighted, courageous minds from the intelligentsia, workers, and peasants; in a word, the finest sons and daughters of all our peoples, whose names are now known by many). Organization and experience are still preserved thanks to the party's outstanding leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev, and to the

most honest rank-and-file party members; this authority is undoubtedly making the party one of the decisive forces in perestroyka today. But to be precise, one of the forces. That is why the entire party as a monolith is not for perestroyka."

[Marshak] Yes, I agree. Today the issue of the party in society is one of the central ones. But let us not forget that it was the party itself which raised this issue. The thesis of separation of the functions of power resounded for the first time under modern circumstances at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. Today diametrically opposed positions are being expressed from unconditional recognition of the party's leading role, as fixed in Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, to the expression of doubts as to whether the party in such a form is necessary at all.

I am convinced that at the given phase, it is the party which is called upon to implement the leadership of perestroyka. We have no other organizational core or unified, precise program of action.

But, of course, if we speak of tendencies in a communist, democratic, socialist, rule-of-law state, whose creation we are proceeding toward, only the people can be the subject of power. The people delegate its power to representatives of organs, and they in turn delegate trust to the political vanguard.

However, let us look at things realistically. Has the mechanism for transferring power to the soviets been worked out today? I think that confusion on the part of the soviet organs is more likely to be observed, as well as an unwillingness to shoulder power and thus, responsibility.

Can party organs promote an acceleration of the process of power transfer? They can. If they grant the soviets complete independence in solving economic problems, if they focus their attention on the issues they should stick to working on—political issues.

[Kononova] Many letter writers are troubled by the fact that the party committees have a poor grasp of these very political methods of work. I cite a typical excerpt:

B. Yatsko, from Kiev, a CPSU member since 1960, has his mind categorically made up. "Until there is complete clarity in the matter of the mechanism for the party's realization of this role as the political leader, and most importantly, until there is 100 percent follow-through from this role to practice, it will be difficult to expect genuine perestroyka...."

[Marshak] The function of any political party is defined by the goals and tasks it sets for itself, and by the goals and tasks which society sets for itself. This is an objective process. Political leadership under the conditions of a command-administrative system is one thing, and quite another thing under the conditions of a transition to a rule-of-law state.

Of course, it's much easier to function under a command method. Persuasion is hard; orders are easy. And even the essence of those matters which the party allowed itself to decide—as it must, to my mind—the matter of cadres, for example—are in need of qualitative change. Today the party must be concerned that its candidates pass repeated examinations from below via the machine of voting in labor collectives, in elections, in competition, in this or that institution. Cadre selection work in party committees and the election process in the labor collective should not be opposed; opponents should not be viewed as those who would break the entire cadre policy, but rather the election process should be viewed as a constituent and most important part of the cadre policy.

If we speak of how the spectrum of party activity must be today, what the basic trends in its work should be, then, in my opinion, this is undoubtedly ideology—the system of political indoctrination, the development of Marxist-Leninist theory, the development of the spiritual sphere. Of course, the leadership must implement the latter on the principles declared in the article "Two Legacies" published in the magazine KOMMUNIST. We need to return to the Leninist traditions of party influence on the cultural sphere: to exclude the principle of standardization, to profess a caring attitude toward talents, diversity of schools, and confrontation of various viewpoints in the search for the truth.

I am not among the supporters of the view that the party must steer absolutely clear of resolving economic problems. If we say that politics begins where people's interests are affected, then today a multitude of purely economic issues belong in the political category. How to assist in their resolution is another matter. Adopt a resolution on narrowly specific matters, strictly regulating the ministries' activity? Or function while analyzing the derelictions in a party organ's work, which brought with it a lag in the economy? I am certain that the latter path is fruitful. But it requires great maturity of thought, a mastery of a completely different set of working tools on the part of the party committee.

[Kononova] Our readers' attention turns toward the pace and quality of the renewal of the party apparatus, sometimes in a highly categorical form. Here is the opinion of A. Tsaran from Kishinev: "People of genuine authority, devoted to the cause of perestroyka, truly bright individuals, must come into the leadership in the place of the 'heroes of stagnation'."

[Marshak] Now I will acquaint you with the data of a sociological investigation recently conducted. They are such. Almost all of those questioned (the investigation was conducted in labor collectives in the provinces) feel that perestroyka processes in their labor collective or primary party organization are lagging behind the level of these processes in the center by 20-30 percent. Without a doubt, this evaluation testifies both to the level of perestroyka thinking, of, say, the apparatus on the scene and on the level of this thinking in the primary party organizations.

I have occasion to visit party meetings in primary party organizations. What is it that attracts your attention? The very atmosphere of the meetings themselves has changed significantly. It has become more unfettered, more open, more demanding. The criticism has become sharper. The level of critical comprehension has changed. The criticism goes along the lines of the main problems. But what are the communists talking about? By and large, about economic issues. The realization of their role as a political force has not come about. And the leaders advance by economic parameters, what have you. Therefore, I also see the formation of a political culture, and I see political thinking to be a most important task of perestroyka. It was not by accident that in his last comments, Vladimir Ilich Lenin directed so much attention to indoctrination of this political culture.

And if I were to name those qualities which I consider to be paramount in a party worker at the current stage, I would first and foremost call for a high level of culture in the broadest sense of the word. I am not an advocate of strict definitions; he must be a person working in the party apparatus with a background in the humanities or technology. He must be a searching and thinking individual capable of making decisions in a rapidly changing situation.

For a long time we considered a virtue something completely opposite—stability and the capacity to carry out orders. But people with dynamic thinking and dynamic psyches are needed. I understand that what I am saying is also a subjective point of view. A serious job description for the work of the apparatus has not yet been developed. Nor has any study been made, using social research methods, of the requirements for the type of party worker we now need and what resources instrumentation he must have at his disposal. You, of course, are within your rights to ask the question, for who else if not the scientists of the Higher Party School must be concerned with this. I assure you that we are concerned with these problems, as well as with the problems of the radical restructuring of the school's activity. We are now going by the route of establishing contractual relations between the educational institution and the party committees, and we are rejecting a nomenklatura-oriented approach in the selection of students. We used to work with the material we had, with people who frequently came into the party apparatus solely on the basis of certain file characteristics.

[Kononova] You mentioned file characteristics and I immediately recalled a letter from worker V. Didyk from Lvov Oblast.

"Like the majority of my fellow citizens," he writes, "I understand perfectly well the results of implementing the radical tasks of perestroyka, the cause of the future, which only all our efforts can bring closer to us. However, it is annoying that to this day there appear such pre-perestroyka features which would not require much energy to eliminate; showing basic common sense is enough. For example, there is an instruction on the system for drawing up documents for those entering the candidacy for membership in the CPSU. At the present time, raykoms [rayon committees] and gorkoms [city committees] are guided by it. The requirement for presenting one's autobiography draws no objections. But here are some points of the autobiography: ...Parents' occupation during the Great Patriotic War? Do you have relatives living abroad? Can it be that the "purity" of the background is still in force in the file information? Have we not known cases where an individual with a 'crystal clean file' has acted to the detriment of social progress?"

I must admit that my first impulse upon reading this letter was to put it aside. We have rejected the file principle for admission to the party; why bring up old news, but here I read the speech of the secretary of the Leninskiy party raykom of the city of Moscow. As if it were a great achievement, he speaks of the proposal heard at the raykom plenum about the rejection of any regulation of acceptance into the party, at least up until the congress. Thus, was I hasty in sending this letter to the archive?

[Marshak] What can be said here. If we speak of an officially declared course, then we have rejected all quotas and limits for acceptance into the party. Has this become a reality? To judge by how hard it is to part with old habits, then, I suppose, it has not. There probably are cases where people are not admitted to the party, and an insufficiently clean file is cited, or if not openly cited, then it is what is kept in mind. But this, so to speak, is a fact of local bureaucratism, nothing more.

I am convinced that if democracy permeates all the pores of inner party life, if the party card is not shown any sort of preference for work advancement, if the careerists have nothing to gain by entering the party, then the "X-ray of the democratic approach" will show up the candidate's personal and work qualifications without any searching for "blots on the background."

But I would also like to express my disagreement with the letter's author. Yes, it is my conviction that the presence of relatives abroad and religious parents are not, so to speak, negative factors for acceptance into the party. But the communists are within their rights to ask clarifying questions on these subjects. It is another matter that the organization should not scorn these facts as compromising and use them for accusing people so they may be punished more severely.

I think that it is not at all right that our primary party organization frequently has a punitive function regarding those who belong to it. Do you know of many cases when communists have fought for their comrade or entered into a conflict with the administration or the raykom? Few? I don't know of many, either. And after all, the communist must have a sense of being supported, the perception that he is in a collective with like-thinking people. In my view, this problem will be partially solved when there exists a reliable mechanism to defend the right of the minority to advocate its opinion. For the

time being, a communist's utterance of his own viewpoint differing from the commonly accepted one is frequently grasped with excessive drama.

[Kononova] Arkadiy Lvovich, the departure of communists from the party has become a reality today, and this issue has also remained at the center of our readers' attention. Construction engineer A. Ivanov of Moscow, for example, feels that "the right to leave the party freely is one of the medicines needed for the party's recovery."

[Marshak] I categorically oppose that phrasing of the issue—free departure. The party is not a club to enter and exit at whim. In entering it, you take upon yourself certain responsibilities, and upon breaking away, you must pass through the same purgatory as during admission: a discussion at the bureau, the primary [party organization], the raykom.

[Kononova] But we're speaking of something else, that departing the party should not affect the professional career of the specialist who has made that decision. The fact that the kolkhoz [collective farm] chairman or enterprise director, were he to leave the party, would not remain in his position has brought with it many of our economic misfortunes....

[Marshak] Let's hope that these are facts from the past. We have already stated that the party card should not guarantee preference in work advancement. And I see in this one of the reasons for the current departures from the party.

Recall what Valentin Rasputin said at the congress: Now, when party membership must be proved daily through one's deeds and convictions, people are frightened of this responsibility. The party has had the strength to admit its errors courageously. In my opinion, it would be more honest to help the party overcome them.

It is also possible that the readers will not agree with me, but it seems to me that acknowledging errors and naming them is already one form of responsibility for what has been done. Although, like them, I also feel it is fair that the people upon whose shoulders are not sincere delusions but conscious deviations from the norms of socialist legality should receive a punishment befitting the crime. Living in Moscow on a personal pension is not befitting "punishment." But I would also like to express a warning. I would not like for us to acquire anew a taste for repression. It is easy to enter the orbit of persecution and punishment and hard to stop once you are there.

Nor do I agree with the phrasing of the question that simply the party or the higher echelons of its leadership are to blame for all our woes. You know, it's just like the hero of the movie "Our Armored Train", who asks: "And who was it that pulled up our hands 'unanimously' at meetings; who was it that shouted until they were blue in the face, 'Our Dear and Beloved'!" Finding the extreme, blaming the leadership for everything—will this guarantee that we avoid new errors?

I will express a thought that might seem unexpected for you. In my view, the processes which are now taking place in society with regard to the party are positive and beneficial for it. The party is being freed of inflated self-evaluation, of its unshakable authority, sometimes unconfirmed by reality, and the irreproachability of its deeds. The situation has forced the party to confirm its vanguard role on a daily basis, to fortify that role with deeds and ideas, and to prove its competitive capabilities. And this means maturation for the party and its tempering as a political organism.

Trials for Fergana Riots Begin

PM3008094989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Aug 89 Morning Edition p2

[Own correspondent A. Orlov report: "Thugs on Trial"]

[Text] Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]—Cases of murder and acts of thuggery committed here at the end of May and the beginning of June are now being heard in Fergana Oblast.

At the first trial, which is being held in the club at the Kokand Cotton Plant, the indictment has been read and the injured parties are giving evidence. In the opinion of the investigation, 20-year-old Kh. Abdurakhmanov committed crimes specified in six articles of the Uzbek SSR Criminal Code, including the theft of firearms, the attempted murder of members of internal affairs bodies, and burglary.

The accused has pleaded guilty to all charges, with the exception of the charge of organizing mass riots, claiming that on 7 June he was "forced to get into a passing truck." Thugs had set upon five members of the militia barring their way and begun to beat them up. Abdurakhmanov had seized a pistol and two cartridge clips from the holster of a militia man who had fallen to the ground after receiving a blow to the head, and tried to open fire but could not control the weapon. The accused was also among a crowd of thugs the following day....

Over the next few days another 35 people will be brought before the court—according to the investigation, they were involved in murders and acts of thuggery. Specific individuals involved in another 50 murders have already been exposed.

The investigation group, led by A. Frolov, USSR assistant general prosecutor, is continuing its intensive work. That is because thousands of people were involved in the riots, although it goes without saying that not all of them are murderers and thieves. So the evidence must be incontrovertible. The situation is made more complicated by the fueling of passions surrounding the tragedy. People are being wound up by various rumors, and leaflets are being circulated in which the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] internal forces are depicted as "occupationists" and the rebels virtually as fighters for justice.

The curfew is still in effect, although it has now been shortened. The inhabitants themselves are opposed to it being lifted totally. There have been several arson attacks and looting of houses abandoned by Meskhetian Turks in Fergana Oblast in the last month. Two young inhabitants of Margilan, M. Mamatkhanova and Yu. Kirgizova, were arrested on 18 July and charged with looting abandoned property, and G. Rakhimov, an inhabitant of Kuvasay, was arrested and charged on 7 August. A total of 6 sentences have been handed down for the theft of weapons and property, and some 10 people have been sentenced for receiving stolen goods.

A month ago in Fergana, A. Frolov told me that more than 16,000 Turks, more than 1,000 Crimean Tatars, 800 Uzbeks, and 800 Russians have left the oblast. At that time, the wait for railroad containers for transporting belongings stretched to October. Now it is through February....

"People want to be totally sure of their safety," A. Frolov said, "and if we are building a rule-of-law state, it must at any moment protect the individual against encroachment on his life, health, honor, and dignity—from whatever quarter that encroachment may come—including by force of arms, if nothing else can help. But this must be done in strict accordance with the law."

It is now extremely clear that the Fergana tragedy is a constant source of pain to Uzbekistan and the rest of the country. The court will determine the measure of guilt of everyone who has committed a crime. Just retribution is demanded in hundreds of letters published by the local press from Uzbeks, Russians, and representatives of dozens of nationalities living in the republic—in short, all the people.

Ukraine Supreme Soviet Presidium on Language Law

LD3008134389 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 0230 GMT 29 Aug 89

[Text] The latest session of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium was held yesterday. The Presidium examined the draft law of the Ukrainian SSR on languages, submitted by the Supreme Soviet's permanent commissions of legislative proposals and on patriotic and internationalist upbringing and internationality relations. It also discussed proposals and observations voiced at the session.

The Presidium approved the draft and decided to publish it in early September for a republic-wide discussion. The report on the Presidium's session will be published later.

Donestk Oblast Executive Chairman Replaced

LD3008143589 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1745 GMT 25 Aug 89

[Text] A session of the Donetsk oblast soviet was held today and discussed an organizational question. In connection with Kucherenko having become head of the planning and budget commission of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, he was released from the post of chairman of the Donetsk oblast executive committee. In his place was elected Smirnov who previously worked as second secretary of the Donetsk oblast party committee.

Uzbek Academic Discusses Nationalities Draft

PM2508151789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Aug 89 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor Narbay Khudayberganov under the rubric "Discussing the Draft CPSU Platform on the Nationalities Question": "From Diagnosis to Treatment"]

[Text] Tashkent—**I immediately felt ardent approval and moral satisfaction at many of the guidelines and aspects of our party's draft political platform on the nationalities question. First, it bluntly and frankly points out the historical, social, and economic sources of today's interethnic troubles. After all, it is naive to imagine that the misfortunes and bloody tragedies in Nagorno-Karabakh, Tbilisi, Fergana, Novyy Uzen, Abkhaziya, and other corners of our multilingual country were caused just by the activities of a handful of extremists and criminal elements, by nothing more than emotions and passions.**

Without beating about the bush, the draft directly associates such acute conflicts with the prevailing administrative edict system that recognizes nothing but unanimity in everything. Uniformity and lack of real autonomy have never given a single nation or ethnic group a real opportunity to achieve progress in all spheres of the production of material and spiritual wealth.

Second, it is well known and must be admitted that a correct and accurate diagnosis by itself does not produce a cure. Therefore, I perceive as the draft's most crucial aspect the fact that it precisely and clearly outlines the basic guidelines for radical renewal of work and the flourishing of all nations and ethnic groups in our country.

The third point that attracts me is that these guidelines are interpreted, commented upon, without going into details, and given a real meaning on the basis of the need for **radical transformations** of the Soviet Federation which is underpinned by the dialectical formula: "There cannot be strong republics without a strong union, nor can there be a strong union without strong republics." But how are radical transformations to be achieved?

It is perfectly understandable and acceptable that, when defining the powers and mutual obligations of the Union and the republics, the draft stipulates: "The union should be assigned the powers necessary for establishing the fundamentals of the political system and developing it, ensuring the country's defense and security, pursuing foreign policy, coordinating and resolving common tasks in the sphere of the economy, science and culture, and the position of the individual, utilizing integration processes efficiently, and organizing mutual assistance."

Yes, I agree that the Union needs powers for "establishing the fundamentals of the political system and developing it." At the same time, the following question arises: Are the republics indifferent about the political system's development and the consolidation of its foundations? Are they indifferent as regards questions concerning the country's defense and security? Can they not participate in the pursuit and determination of foreign policy? It is a different matter that the union must be given **priority** in the solution of these questions, but with mandatory participation by the republics which, in this case, must have constitutional rights and their autonomous voice.

And what is left for republics to do if the union coordinates and resolves, as the draft says, common tasks in the sphere of the economy, science and culture, and the position of the individual, utilizing integration processes efficiently, and organizing mutual assistance? Will they, in these circumstances, manage to feel that they are autonomous and sovereign socialist states? Of course not. And yet the draft CPSU platform contains the following, in black and white: "All rights appropriate to the status of the republics as sovereign socialist states should be transferred to them."

In my view, there is a need to render more specific and to carefully examine the chapter "On National Cultures and Languages." It reasonably says that "the question of the expediency of deeming the language of the nationality that gives its name to the union or autonomous republic to be the state language is a matter for the republics themselves." Nor are any objections caused by the following idea: "The status of state language means the expansion of its social and cultural functions, the resolution of the material and technical, cadre, pedagogical, and other questions required for this, and encouragement and assistance in the study of the local language by representatives of another nationality."

The expansion of the social and cultural functions of national languages is as essential as air and bread, but how is this to be achieved if national languages are not given the preferential priority right to develop on the territories where they are used? It is, after all, an open secret that an abnormal situation prevails in many union and autonomous republics and oblasts, with national languages kept in the background for years on end which condemned them to underdevelopment and at times even to withering away and disappearance. The granting of state language status to the indigenous nationality's language must help its rebirth without denying in this process the role and importance of the Russian language as the language of interethnic and interrepublican contacts.

One cannot fail to say that our country's multinational character is objectively promoted by the priority preferential status of the Russian language in the sense that this language is freely used not just in all national republics and autonomous oblasts and okrugs but also in what is known as world space. On the other hand, our country's national languages are restricted within a specific spatial, territorial segment and not a single one of them can claim to play the role of a language of interethnic and interrepublic contact. This is why, unless they are given their status together with a priority preferential opportunity to develop, not just a sad but also a tragical end inevitably lies in wait for them. In my view, this is what some of our leaders forget.

"The Uzbek language," the republic's Minister of Culture U. Umarbekov writes, for example, "must be a state language enjoying equal rights with the Russian language." And he goes on to use the following argument: "Very recently I read that the Russian language contains 250,000 words against 60,000 words in the Uzbek language. Therefore, one might ask, why switch only to the Uzbek language? After all, this is tantamount to self-robbery."

I must admit in all honesty that until now I had never thought that the richness and diversity of a given language can be determined by the number of words or expressions. It is incomprehensible that this is said by someone who is not only a minister but also an officially recognized literary figure who writes in the Uzbek language. Here is what puzzles me: Does he believe that the language he uses to compose his prose and write his plays is poor? I hope that writer U. Umarbekov is unlikely to reply in the affirmative. True enough, I do not know how Minister U. Umarbekov will reply. At the same time, however, neither he nor any other responsible comrade can be unaware that the published draft Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic Law on Languages only formally gives the status of state language to the Uzbek language without giving it any actual priority, something which caused and continues to cause justified protests from the republic's public.

The reference to the draft law in question and to our minister's opinion on this issue convince me yet again that **the CPSU platform on the nationalities question must not contain even the tiniest loophole for wrong, incorrect, or distorted interpretations in all its social, economic, legal, cultural, and linguistic aspects.** This is especially necessary seeing that the draft impeccably diagnoses the grave illness from which Soviet nations and ethnic groups, including of course the Russian nation, are suffering. And the time has already come to move from diagnosis to effective treatment capable of ensuring the truly revolutionary transformation of all spheres in our society.

New Association To Further Russian Culture Formed

18001552 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Aug 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "'Yedinstvo' Is Forming"]

[Text]**An initiating group to create a movement of lovers of Russian literature and fine arts has appealed to compatriots.**

The purpose of the association is to function for the unity and friendship of peoples and for strengthening the

authority of our multinational, socialist fatherland. The appeal emphasizes the following themes: development of the national languages of the peoples of Russia, a movement to cooperate in the spiritual unification of Russia, the development of cooperation with mass media, cooperation with Russian-speaking populations abroad, and extending all kinds of help in studying the history of the Russian language and literature. Plans for the association provide a significant place for the problems of youth and the growing generation.

The following association structure is proposed: the highest organ, the congress; the executive, the central Russian council to be elected by direct, secret vote at the congress, which is to be convened in the fall.

The appeal was signed by writers M. Alekseyev, V. Belov, Yu. Bondarev, S. Vikulov, S. Voronin, R. Gamzatov, S. Geychenko, S. Danilov, A. Ivanov, Ye. Isayev, F. Kuznetsov, S. Kunyayev, I. Mashbash, R. Mukhamadiyev, V. Pikul, P. Proskurin, V. Rasputin, V. Sorokin, Yu. Shestalov, and others, as well as well-known figures in the fields of science and culture.

RSFSR's Vorotnikov Interviewed on Perestroyka

AU3008192289 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 26 Aug 89 pp 8,9

[Interview with Vitaliy Vorotnikov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and chairman of the Presidium of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, by Branko Vlahovic: "We Did Not Promise Speedy Changes"; date and place of interview not given; first three paragraphs are an introduction]

[Text] Anyone who has at least superficially followed what has been reported in the last few months by foreign correspondents in Moscow and by the official Soviet agency TASS must be asking themselves what is really happening in the country of perestroyka? Will the wave of miners' strikes and the threats by railroad workers and metalworkers stop the incipient changes? Will the enraged nationalists be brought down or will certain regions be turned into real battlefields? Will all this be a good reason for "nostalgists" to say: Enough of democracy, only a firm hand can sort all this out. That this is no exaggeration and that the highest leadership of the CPSU is aware of the seriousness of the situation has been proven by the fact that Gorbachev recently said that perestroyka is going through a period of crisis. A great number of Soviet citizens have been bewildered by the chronic shortages, the increasingly felt inflation, interethnic clashes, and the increasingly frequent bloodshed, and are asking themselves what is happening in their country.

We asked Vitaliy Ivanovich Vorotnikov, to reply to the aforementioned questions, as well as to some other topical ones. The VJESNIK correspondent in Zagreb asked Vorotnikov in particular for an interview for several reasons. First, Vorotnikov is a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Second, Vorotnikov is a very experienced politician. He is neither a radical nor is he one of the old leadership. Indeed, he was one of the leaders who advocated that the USSR should extricate itself from the lethargy that was created in "the period of stagnation," that is, in the Brezhnev period. He received the epithet of "Andropov's locomotive" precisely because he sought energetic changes and stricter work and party discipline.

In the latest reshuffle of the leadership of the Russian federation he was elected chairman of the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Soviet. He has been decorated several times and has, among other things, three Orders of Lenin. This is our interview.

[Vlahovic] Thanks to perestroyka, the Soviet Union has become considerably more democratic. However, unfortunately there have not been any obvious results in the economy. To put it picturesquely, the Soviet citizen has not tasted the fruits of perestroyka on his plate. We are interested in your opinion as an experienced leader: Could there be more perceptible economic results or successes by the end of this 5-year plan?

[Vorotnikov] Even though 1 and ½ years remain until the end of this 5-year plan, I hope that there will be economic results. Perestroyka in the economy is a long-term process. We realized this even at the beginning. The country is moving on to new principles and business methods, and this creates its own kind of difficulties. However, it must be said that there have also been "unnecessary" difficulties which could have been avoided.

Mistakes and wrong calculations have undoubtedly been allowed at the center as well as in those places where the economic changes should have taken place. Many problems were caused, for example, by changing to work based on so-called agreed principles. Enterprises which should have produced the demanded and agreed quantities of goods often put up prices in order to make a profit.

There have also been difficulties with the so-called cooperatives. A knot of problems has in fact been created which can be solved only in one way—through better and more productive work.

[Vlahovic] It seems to us that the ordinary Soviet citizen is not comforted very much by the explanation that "time is necessary for changes." Can you say what the concrete steps will be? What do you think about the suggestion of some Western economists who say that it would be wise to sell a greater quantity of gold in order to buy goods and reduce dissatisfaction among the people?

[Vorotnikov] Nevertheless, changes really do need time. We did not promise and do not promise miraculous changes, and the people realize this. Another thing is that all potential must be mobilized now. We are not giving

up either our foreign currency or debt operations. We will take out only enough loans so that we do not become debt dependent.

[Vlahovic] Traveling through the USSR and reading your newspapers, I have noticed that the further you move away from Moscow, the less one can sense perestroyka. In a word, there have been few changes. How do you explain this "deafness" of the leaders in the provinces?

[Vorotnikov] I would not give such categorical assessments. Much is being done in the interior of the country, too. On the other hand, progressive concepts are not always adhered to in the centers either. After all, everything depends on people. At the recent USSR Congress of People's Deputies it was proven that geography does not define people's positions and stands.

[Vlahovic] After the miners recently vehemently criticized the local leaderships for inertia and bureaucratism, they were supported by Gorbachev. Gorbachev said at that time that the local leaderships could have done a lot. Your assessment of the work of the local leaderships does not correspond to Gorbachev's.

[Vorotnikov] I even told Gorbachev that I do not agree with the assessment that people work better in the centers than in the provinces. I support the view that the specific work of each leader should be assessed. It is true that there are some leaders who could have done more. They did not have to wait for the center to decide. However, we must be sincere and also say that for some things they really did have to wait for what the centers told them.

[Vlahovic] It was constantly repeated during the recent miners strikes that it is much more difficult to live in the provinces than in the big towns of the European part. Having stayed in Siberia and the Far East, I am convinced that their claims are correct. What do you in the Russian federation intend to do to ensure that the people in these areas live better? They really do earn more, but have nowhere to spend their money?

[Vorotnikov] There actually is a problem of where to spend money in certain rayons. In the regions that you mentioned, fewer goods are produced and the social infrastructure has developed less well. We have developed developmental programs for certain regions, taking account of their particular features and needs. Frankly speaking, in my opinion these were not formulated in the best way and we will have to supplement and correct them. The people who live in Siberia and the Far East make justified and fair criticisms.

[Vlahovic] The claim can be heard that it is a great privilege to live in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and the larger cities in the European part of the USSR. Do you agree with this?

[Vorotnikov] It is true that supplies are better in Moscow. In many towns in the interior it is more difficult even to acquire an apartment. However, it should be known that Moscow is not only Red Square and the center. People also have many problems in the workers' areas and those on the periphery. I can assure you that there are cities in the provinces where supplies are better than in Moscow.

[Vlahovic] Since the new year, some republics have changed to "khozraschet" [economic accountability] or as we say, economic independence. Does this also mean that some republics will also be working in the old way?

[Vorotnikov] All the republics are working to change to economic independence. Some have even changed to "khozraschet" sooner rather than later. But they are all going the same way. The Russian federation as a whole will change to "khozraschet" a little later. The reason is that this system should be prepared in every autonomous republic, kray, and oblast, and we have a total of 72 of these.

[Vlahovic] Can the economic and financial independence of republics which live in the same state function if price reform is not carried out in the USSR?

[Vorotnikov] The question is logical. Of course, the republics' changeover to self-financing and economic independence requires that a new mechanism be created that will take account of production, demographic, and other differences between the republics. The mechanism should ensure that relations work on the principle of equality, that an equal exchange functions, and that everybody sees this to be to their advantage. The first thing that must be done is to perfect the mechanism of setting prices so that they are realistic. Changes in prices will ensure that many regions develop more quickly.

Price reform is extremely important for Russia. At the moment our federation has a large number of producers of raw materials which are unprofitable when selling their goods at the present prices. Take as an example gold or fur. The prices of these products on the market are high, but the producers receive a small purchase price. There are many similar examples.

[Vlahovic] Social strata are increasingly emerging in the USSR. There is an increasingly visible difference between the rich and poor. We are interested in your view of how it can happen that a stratum of people is created who have "earned" thousands and even millions of rubles through speculation and various deceptions?

[Vorotnikov] There really have been people who have become rich through speculation and bribery. But we are conducting a struggle against these phenomena which are at variance with the meaning of our perestroyka. I am sure that in the process of renewal of our system we will succeed in clearing up this trash.

[Vlahovic] The Soviet leadership has succeeded in persuading the miners to go back to work. The railroad workers and metal workers have been pacified at least temporarily. Does the danger still exist nevertheless that

there will soon be another wave of strikes, again because of socioeconomic dissatisfaction? In your opinion, what are the crisis hot spots?

[Vorotnikov] Believe me, it is very difficult to foresee where the next strike will now appear! The most important thing is that as many problems as possible are resolved or begun to be resolved, and as soon as possible. There is no need to wait for a command to do something on the spot. We have said this to local leaderships. All party organizations must put on the agenda the resolution of the social and economic problems in the towns and places where they operate. It must also be explained to people what is being done. This will reduce the agitation that objectively exists because of the problems that have amassed.

[Vlahovic] Nationalist occurrences and conflicts are increasing in the USSR. No one writes or speaks any longer about the idyllic love among peoples in the Soviet Union. The announced plenum of the CPSU Central Committee is being awaited with great anticipation. Will this plenum also be a stimulus for radical changes, in the sense of giving greater freedom to the republics in relation to the central power?

[Vorotnikov] The problem is very complex and multifaceted. We must establish relations of friendship and brotherhood among the peoples in our country. Political as well as social and economic prerequisites must be provided for this.

We are not only talking about the republics getting more rights and independence, but about these rights contributing to solving the problems of the whole of our country. Therefore, the interests of the republics and also of the country as a whole must be taken into consideration.

[Vlahovic] The Central Committee plenum on national relations has been postponed several times. What stage are the preparations at now? Will it be held in the fall or will it be postponed again?

[Vorotnikov] The commission of the CPSU Central Committee, in which I also worked, prepared the platform and documents for this important plenum. The text has now been sent to the republics. The Communists there will discuss it and give their comments and suggestions. Then the commission will meet and compile the documents for the plenum on this basis. I am sure that we have set off on the right road. We care about the plenum on interethnic relations being held as soon as possible, but it must be excellently prepared. Therefore, I support the idea that the plenum should produce results. There is no point in holding a plenum solely for the sake of form.

[Vlahovic] Nationalism is most often linked with economic problems. Nationalism flares up more quickly in places where the books are not kept properly. We are interested in your opinion on whether Russia could be exposed to the temperatures of nationalism under the new economic conditions. That is to say, it traditionally sells raw materials to other Soviet republics at very low prices.

[Vorotnikov] I do not think that nationalism and nationalist feelings should be directly linked with the structure of the national economy. Concerning the possibility of nationalist feeling appearing, nothing can be stated with certainty. No guaranteed answers can be given to these questions in multinational states.

[Vlahovic] It is interesting that there is also separatist feeling among the Russian intelligentsia. These people claim that Stalin destroyed the Russian nation because he resettled it in other republics. They say that it would have been better if Russia had remained within its former borders. How real is the danger from this Russian nationalism?

[Vorotnikov] You will agree that to assume the possibility of some "separatism" in Russia which represents half the country and makes up more than three-fourths of the territory is not totally realistic. When our well-known writer Rasputin said at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies that Russia should think about leaving the Soviet Union, this was seen as a successful way of trying out his humor, and nothing else. There is the feeling among Russians that is inclined toward spreading the sovereignty of the republic and giving it greater rights, ranging from rights in economic and political life to those in cultural life. We are also working on this.

I recently spoke about this at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. This involves strengthening the political, administrative-management structure of the republic and creating our own academy of science and television channels, spreading the system of information, and so on.

[Vlahovic] One of the recent editions of the weekly OGONEK carried an interview with Andrey Sakharov who was until recently a dissident. The well-known academician proposes in that interview that the USSR be turned into a confederation. What do you think about this proposal?

[Vorotnikov] I do not read OGONEK regularly. I simply do not have time for some of our weeklies and magazines. But concerning Sakharov's proposal, I think that he is not serious, to put it mildly. If a change really were to take place and if the federation were turned into a confederation in our multinational community, then this would mean the destruction of the USSR. What reasonable person would this occur to?

[Vlahovic] As is well known, party leaders took part in the elections for USSR peoples deputies in some towns and failed to receive enough votes. What do you think about the proposal that all peoples deputies be elected in free elections? That is to say, for the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies the party and other sociopolitical organizations had their own quota of deputies who immediately received the status of deputy, even without

votes. Will the deputies' quotas for the party, trade union, and other organizations be scrapped at the next elections.

[Vorotnikov] Much is now being said about this issue. Differing views exist. Suggestions will be presented during the public debate. We will see what the results of this debate will be.

[Vlahovic] Former dissidents like Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, and others were elected as peoples deputies. How do you explain their popularity among the people?

[Vorotnikov] I do not like the word dissident. This word does not show the views of these people, the difficult situations in which they live, and the traits of the individuals. The word dissident does not take account of the fact that views and situations among specific people and in society can change.

[Vlahovic] Boris Yeltsin also received a large number of votes in the elections. There is the view that Yeltsin would not have been so popular had he remained at the head of the Moscow party. It is nevertheless easier to criticize than to solve problems.

[Vorotnkov] I agree.

[Vlahovic] At one of the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee this spring a commission was set up to establish whether Boris Yeltsin, at meetings before the elections, really said that a multiparty system should be allowed to be set up. Nothing else has been heard of this commission. Perhaps the highest leadership decided that this commission should not even begin work, in order not to create a new fuss about Yeltsin?

[Vorotnikov] No, the party leadership did not block the commission. There are more important things to do than to establish what Yeltsin said and where. We have set up so many different commission that we have become tangled up in them. There are commissions on the investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov, national conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and so on. All these issues are delicate and should be resolved, but we must be concerned with even more important questions in current policy.

I advocate that we deal as much as possible with solving the important problems which worry our society, although I am not excluding the possibility that a commission will one day be formed to establish what Yeltsin said.

[Vlahovic] An interregional deputies group was recently set up in Moscow. Many people called it a faction in parliament. Some of the members of this group—including Yeltsin—publicly claimed that they do not want to be an opposition. On the other hand, at meetings other members of this group publicly advocated a multiparty system. This is proposed even by members of the CPSU. What are your comments on this?

[Vorotnikov] If we really want to resolve the problems in the Supreme Soviet, then I see no reason for us to split into factions. We have set up committees and commissions, and there really are enough opportunities for personal stands and positions to be presented....

[Vlahovic] What if they are persistent in demanding the right for several parties to be set up? Could a purge be expected in the party, that is the expulsion of those CPSU members who advocate a multiparty system?

[Vorotnikov] I think that the solution of setting up several parties is not acceptable for us. We have one party which represents the interests of all strata of society. I do not see a strong reason why parties should be founded if we want to continue to build socialism. A multiparty system did exist at the beginning of Soviet power, but it was not sustained.

[Vlahovic] What do you think about those party members who advocate a multiparty system?

[Vorotnikov] This is above all a question of morality. If they are in the party, then it really is immoral for them to say one thing in committees and their basic organizations and another at a meeting. Honesty and principles are reflected in this. Concerning people leaving the party, I support the idea that all those who want to leave the CPSU should do so as soon as possible. I think that it is good for the party to rid itself of people who discredit the CPSU with their behavior.

[Vlahovic] Finally, two questions about relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Relations are really good between the two countries. We are interested in your opinion on what should be done so that cooperation will be good in the future.

[Vorotnikov] I completely agree with your assessment that our relations are good. I am glad that I can affirm that our people care about friendship with Yugoslavs. I think that good conditions exist for cooperation to continue. But what should be done today and to what should we turn our attention in particular? I will not be original. It is important that we consistently implement agreements which relate to economic, cultural, political, and inter-party links. Relations between republics, oblasts, and towns must also be nurtured. In other words, it is necessary to work specifically, that is to cooperate. In this respect, it is indisputable that the role of economic cooperation and its expansion in modern forms is growing.

[Vlahovic] The Soviet Union owes money to Yugoslavia and other socialist countries. Is there a danger of this economic problem turning into a political one? Could the economy spoil interstate relations?

[Vorotnikov] You know that this problem—I mean the debt problem—did not arise because we wanted it to. We are endeavoring to resolve it. I think that mutual understanding will not allow an economic problem to turn into a political one.

MVD Official Previews Conference on Crime

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[Text] An all-union conference of investigative officials will take place today at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]. Our correspondent Anatoliy Fedorov interviewed Ivan Fedorovich Shilov, deputy minister of internal affairs and chief of the Main Investigation Directorate.

[Begin recording] [Fedorov] Ivan Fedorovich, what issues will actually be examined at this conference?

[Shilov] As is well-known, the (?practical) situation in the country remains tense for the time being. This conference, which has been planned for today and tomorrow, sets tasks for the investigative organs that stem from the 4 August decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet on a decisive strengthening of the struggle against crime. We will examine what has been done and in what ways the investigative organs are not following through with their work.

I should say that not that long ago an order was issued to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on improving the activity of the investigative organs in the fight against crime and their material and technical provision.

[Fedorov] In concrete terms, what will the investigative organs receive in the near future?

[Shilov] Provision of motor transport and office equipment, an improvement in working conditions, and also an improvement in material issues are envisaged.

[Fedorov] But how much does a rank and file investigator receive?

[Shilov] A young lieutenant—just over R200.

[Fedorov] It is no secret that certain investigators are processing several cases each.

[Shilov] Well, we must objectively say that in certain regions there is a particularly large workload. Therefore we are now looking into the possibility of augmenting the investigative organs. In individual regions, republics, krays, and oblasts the investigative personnel has been increased.

[Fedorov] Ivan Fedorovich [illegible] not a secret, how many investigators are ther[illegible] USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs syste[illegible]

[Shilov] Thirty-six tho[illegible] thousand more are needed. [end recording]

Legislator Stresses Need for Law on Judges

18001548 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Report on interview with V. Semenko, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, Rule of Law, and Legal Order, by Yevgeniy Zhbanov: "Administration of Justice and Judges"; date and place not given]

[Text] According to the Dal [Dictionary], administration of justice means "a just sentence, a decision in keeping with conscience and the law." If we, following this line of reasoning, repeat after the French enlightener that the administration of justice is the foundation for all social virtues it becomes clear why it is exactly the image of judges that acquires the traits of special prestige in a state where the rule of law and justice are respected.

Why then?... Why was the position of a judge in our country, which commands authoritative powers, which requires not only the highest degree of professionalism, but also the best human qualities, forced into the margin of social provisions?

Without dwelling on an analysis of the "whys" we may just state: The salary in rural areas is R170, in urban areas—slightly more, and there are no preferences, even "the 13th salary" is not available; there is no housing, no referrals to sanatoriums, no slots for children in day-care centers. Here is the sad outcome—a typical petition from a judge in Krasnoyarsk: "Due to a poor financial situation (my wife is on leave to take care of the child, whereas the salary is enough for one person alone) I request to be relieved before the end of my term..." All over the country, the widespread process of refusal by judges to run in the forthcoming elections has begun (in the Ukraine, one in three judges, in Moldavia—all judges to a man): Experienced court employees leave in order to become practicing attorneys, and legal counselors go to cooperatives. In a word, the situation is such that the further "wind erosion" of our court system threatens its complete decay.

I believe this makes it easy to understand that the new law "On the Status of Judges in the USSR" which has (finally) seen the light of day has been long awaited and gained through suffering on the part of those who are sickened by arbitrariness and voluntarism. It is truly the firstling of perestroyka, which has for the first time in the history of the Soviet state extended legal protection to the employees of the most significant institution of a civilized state, the court.

Thus, its date of birth is 4 August 1989. On this day, Secretary of the Committee for Legislation, Rule of Law, and Legal Order V. Semenko addressed the deputies speaking at the session of the Supreme Soviet. "I urge you strongly to support the proposal of the committee and pass this law. Otherwise, esteemed comrades, we will lose the remnants of skilled court employees..."

Now that the law has been published in the press and, as they say, the text is right before our eyes, it is high time to ask: How will it actually help the administration of justice? The word of the law does not yet amount to action; in our memory, a good many laws have been passed which have remained a dead letter. Therefore, the opinion of a practitioner is particularly important in this sphere.

It is no accident that we have chosen V.I. Semenko: By a lucky coincidence, she is a judge, and with a tenure of 30 years at that. Those who have seen her on the TV screen during the session certainly remember a tall, elegant lady of the "English" type, with a short haircut. She speaks about herself in brief: Her husband is a military man, her son is an engineer. She comes from a tiny rayon seat in Novgorod Oblast; she graduated with a medal from high school, and then from the Law Department of the Moscow State University. Subsequently, she worked in Yuryevets, Kineshma, Vyshniy Volochek, Chita Oblast, and for the last 20 years, she has been the chairman of the Ivanovo Oblast Court. As you may surmise, she knows the life of a "provincial court" firsthand...

We met in Ivanovo as well.

[Zhbanov] Valentina Ivanovna, one might say that you ended your speech at the session by an SOS signal.

[Semenko] You know, I did not sleep the night before. I was afraid not to be on time. We need the law as at least a sign of hope. You see, in our department of justice we've had about 20 letters of resignation. At the same time, requests have come to place on the lists of candidates for the positions of judges those who have not acquitted themselves in other jobs. Can you imagine what the drift of this was? After all, [these appointments] are for 10 years...

[Zhbanov] Was the financial situation the reason for the outflow?

[Semenko] Yes, but not the only reasons. After all, they usually depict us in the movies: Three persons stand up, and one reads the sentence... However, one would do well to learn about the work of judges in more depth. Imagine a large, intricate case, dozens of volumes, a dozen of defendants, every one of whom knows his part of the case splendidly; every one of them has an attorney, and the objective of both of them is, naturally, to win something from the persecution. The question of whether they are right or wrong is still in store. The judge, on the other hand, is all alone. The judge has to keep everything in his mind: As soon as he trips and confuses one name, this is immediately felt in the dock; psychological pressure begins, and he, the chair, putting it bluntly, no longer is in control of the trial. The judge's mind is overburdened: Every episode, every word of a witness needs to be remembered. Outwardly, the judge is obligated to keep calm. In a word, nervous stress drives you into the ground. God forbid, the superior court may overturn the sentence. Who is responsible? And what if the judge is not to the liking of one of the local leaders? After all, there is no sentence or decision which suits everyone at the same time; someone is always dissatisfied and resentful.

[Zhbanov] Putting it bluntly, this is not a happy picture. However, does not the feeling of justice offer a moral reward?

[Semenko] It certainly does. This is why a judgeship is not just a title but also a vocation. It is most difficult to serve the truth and always be charitable with the person. You cannot succumb to anger by any means, or, worse yet, to hatred, because this angers the defendant. For a genuine judge, it is a joy if he learns that the human element has got the upper hand in the criminal he has sentenced, and the latter has understood: It was not the person who was on trial, but merely the criminal in him.

[Zhbanov] This is, perhaps, more of a moral creed of the judge?

[Semenko] No, this is a professional responsibility. No citizen, not even the one who has spent long years at a penal facility, should feel that he is doomed. It is altogether our duty to help him, if there is a chance for him to be rehabilitated... Just yesterday, I received a letter written by none other than Vyacheslav Petrovich Okolotin. He calls me by my maiden name, Bronzova. This is from the time I worked in Kineshma as a people's judge. Listen to that:

"You know about my youth spent in places where I was dispatched by the courts—this lasted more than a quarter of a century. In this instance, I have been released from a correctional facility. However, what does the mayor of the city of Kineshma have in store for me? There is no housing, but there is a proverb: At home, even the walls help. Where am I to live? How long do I have to look for a residence permit in order to be placed in a 100-ruble job? They do not issue permits to career criminals. As far as I am concerned, I have 'gone straight,' and I have been the citizen of this city since my birth."

Of course, I also recalled these twin brothers. I remember that they were from an affluent family, intelligent guys. It all began with pranks, then there was a robbery assault, and so on, and so forth... What now? If we shrug this off, we doom a person.

Incidentally, the rate of repeat offenses about 8 years ago came to 43 percent of the number of those released here. Why? Because we have this monstrous "pale of settlement" for former prisoners—restrictions on the issuance of residence permits in many cities and oblasts. They settle on someone else's land, with barely a shirt on their back. They sever their links with their roots, with their families. As a rule, their path ends up behind the "barbs" again. Besides, there is an article in the Penal Code which I consider frightening—article 198[2] on administrative supervision. It was forced through by Shchelokov, supposedly in order to bring repeat offenses to an end. It does the opposite. A person has to be at his place of residence from 18.00 to 6.00 hours. One cannot go out

either for a date or to see a movie. After two violations, one can be taken to court... I will definitely propose to repeal this article. Thus far, in the case of Okolotin, I am forwarding the letters to relevant organs with a request to issue a residence permit and help with job placement.

The new status of judges will impose the obligation to respond to their petitions. After all, it comes to the point when grand departmental officials do not condescend to responding to us even when we issue a citation with regard to them and fail to answer our requests for information and petitions.

[Zhbanov] They can neglect this in the future as well. The law does impose such an obligation, but without any sanctions.

[Semenko] Yes, for now. However, the strong point of the law is in the fact that it contains clear-cut legal prerequisites for an entire array of additional special acts building on it. For example, a draft law "On the Responsibility for the Contempt of Court and Interference With the Consideration of Cases," including criminal penalties, is already being prepared.

[Zhbanov] Does this mean the so-called "telephone law?"

[Semenko] Any interference is punishable, including that associated with the "telephone law." Incidentally, crude and direct interference, with calls to appear "on the carpet" and threats is a sign of not being too clever; it is rare. Frankly, it has not happened in my practice. However, there are many treacherous methods for influencing a judge indirectly, making him into a mechanism transmitting someone else's will—at times, it is even unknown whose will exactly it is.

Several years ago, we had a notorious "case of the dentists." All of them were from our Ivanovo clinic. The investigation lasted for, perhaps, a year, quietly and covertly. Apparently, nothing could be proven. One day it was stated for all to here at the party and economic aktiv: A major case is about completed. There was theft, bribery; gold bars were found—in a word, a sensation. The local radio and press immediately seized on this. The public was excited, there was no doubt at all, and everybody was waiting for the trial to begin. They were expecting retribution rather than an objective investigation. They called and wanted to know when. We did not have the foggiest notion. In a word, the case was not referred to us until half a year later. It was assigned to the very experienced and diligent Ivan Aleksandrovich Lipatov, a war veteran. He examined it, and it was full of holes. However, the atmosphere was such that a trial date had to be set. I remember that the courtroom was overflowing. The trial lasted about 3 months: There were 13 people in the dock! So, episodes began to unravel one after the other. For example, a bribe—sounds weighty, but it turned out to have been three bouquets of flowers. Or the gold bar—oh, oh! It turned out to weigh less than a gram. When the release of "bribe-takers" from confinement right in the courtroom began, someone shrieked: "The judge has sold out!"

The law "On the Status of Judges in the USSR" forbids making public evaluations which prejudge the results of court proceedings before a sentence or a decision takes effect. The ban covers the mass media too.

[Zhbanov] Excuse me, Valentina Ivanovna, but I have seen the initial draft of the law. It has said concisely—"before a sentence or decision." These words "before...takes effect" essentially kill glasnost. Imagine a major case. Investigation takes a year to a year and a half, then a trial lasting, say, 3 months, and then, in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Court cases await consideration on appeal for 7 to 8 months more—they have a line all their own. Now let us imagine that the case is returned for reinvestigation. Should the press be silent? What if, say, the court finds somebody, even one person, not guilty on appeal? Why did the poor fellow have to suffer for maybe an extra year? What if the press had had exonerating evidence all along?

[Semenko] We proceeded from the strict principle of presumption of innocence. Nobody has the right to call a person a thief or a murderer before the sentence becomes legally valid. Is this not in the interest of the person? It is no sin report a fact, an event, all the more so if the facts making the legal situation of the defendant easier are at issue. What you cannot do indeed is to force your opinion on the court. I repeat: Everything proceeds from the presumption of innocence. Besides, with regard to the mass media, a press law is being prepared which will specify everything.

The main objective is to create such conditions under which the judges would serve exclusively the truth, and, as they say, would weigh all the arguments of the defense and the prosecution on the scales of Themis in all cases. After all, some employees of the law enforcement organs cannot abandon the "repressive" dogma: The court, supposedly, has a duty to combat crime on the same team as the militia and the procuracy. No! If the crime rate has jumped now, it does not at all mean that any charge is going to be taken all the way to a guilty verdict, and the penalties are going to be exclusively "to the max." This is exactly why in the recommendations of our committee we omitted from the draft one apparently harmless responsibility of judges: "to render legal help to organizations taking part in combating crime."

[Zhbanov] How would you explain then that judges have been included in provisional committees set up in order to combat crime?

[Semenko] I will be entirely frank with you. I do not know. I think there is some misunderstanding here. After all, as I have told you, our work at the session proceeded with great intensity. This is the only explanation...

[Zhbanov] Valentina Ivanovna, tell me frankly: What gives you personally, as a judge, hope in the proclaimed independence of judges? As far as we remember, the principle of independence of the court has already been proclaimed repeatedly.

[Semenko] This is exactly the point: It was proclaimed, and nothing more. The new law guarantees this, and, if you will, this is its key position. After all, the high-sounding phrases are not the issue: The new law sets forth an enumeration of constructive guarantees. Independence is ensured not only by a ban on interfering with the consideration of cases (this has been discussed), but also by the strict order of electing the judges and relieving them, personal inviolability of the judge (for example, criminal charges against him cannot be brought without the consent of the soviet of people's deputies which has elected him), and so on. However, in the recommendations of our committee we went further—we included financial and social provisions for judges, which are in line with, as it has been written, their high status, in exactly the article on the main guarantees of independence. Thus, a cohesive concept of independence was developed.

[Zhbanov] However, having underlined "correspondence with the high status," the law sort of stops at this.

[Semenko] The law establishes the principle. Housing is, perhaps, the most acute issue. Our oblast is not a good example: Surprising as it is, the housing problem here has been more or less solved. Why? Frankly, we are lucky to have such a chairman of the soviet executive committee. Our Vladislav Nikolayevich is very responsive to the needs of justice, for which he must be praised. However, we cannot hope to encounter a kind person. What about other localities? When I worked at the Chita Oblast Court, I lived 17 versts away from the city, and the three of us, my son included, slept on the same sofa, in felt boots and coats. However, even that frozen-through room was allocated to my husband; allocating housing to me was out of the question. At present, the law states categorically: The local soviet is obligated to allocate a separate apartment or a house no later than 6 months.

[Zhbanov] What about the salary?

[Semenko] As is known, it has been decided that the Council of Ministers is to consider the issue within a month. As we understand, there are many complications here. Virtually everyone is demanding wage increases. In the process, they have long regarded the administration of justice as an obvious hanger-on. This appears to be so; we live off the budget, and spend whatever is allocated. However, let us look at our notary offices. Last year alone, they generated 1.3 million rubles in revenues for the budget, while 20 times less was spent to maintain them. This is why the notary service lives in poverty, just as the courts do. What stands in the way of adding at least something from their income for maintenance? The command-administrative system, which is concerned the least about the feeling of well-being of the toiler.

Certainly, judging in keeping with the law and conscience is the holy of holies; it is not the administration of justice that demands to be paid for, but the court work, which is hard and unskilled. Could the fees be raised so that the budget would not suffer? Of course. Putting it bluntly, the issue of increasing state fees and the payment of fees for legal services to the populace has long needed to be considered. The rates of state fees in non-asset cases, 30 kopecks, were established as long ago as April 1923, and have not been revised since. Let us say, a suit is brought by a private party, a squabbler, and thus the nerve-wrecking experience begins: The case drags on for years, there are dozens of court sessions, and all of that for 30 kopecks; a jar of compote would cost you more. For some categories of cases, the state fee is not being collected at all for some reason.

Or take obtaining a copy of a court decision or sentence, even on 20 to 30 typewritten pages, which would still cost 20 kopecks. Is this in line with the contemporary standard of fees? It is just incomprehensible why no state fees are collected for appeal complaints in civil cases. After all, every complaint needs to be studied and checked out. In one year, up to 600 of them come up.

[Zhbanov] It is just that we should not be hypocritical, and some percentage, say, 15 or 20 percent of budget revenues, should be automatically transferred to the settlement account of the court. Would you agree?

[Semenko] The court does not have a settlement account. However, this is realistic if some "fixed" percentage would remain in the account of the department of justice.

[Zhbanov] Now for the currently fashionable cases of defending the honor and dignity. Why should we not introduce state fees in the amount of as much as 100 rubles! After all, at present the plaintiff loses nothing, and goes to court lightly. Say, he brings a suit against a newspaper. Otherwise, he will have to think twice, but the case will become respectable. After all, if the honor and dignity have indeed been infringed on, the court will indemnify the plaintiff for expenditures for state fees, collecting them from the press organ. Then a real opportunity would arise to collect damages from a specific person responsible for the defamatory publication through a regressive suit. What do you think?

[Semenko] In principle, this is correct. In some cases, the size of the fees should correspond not only to the volume and complexity of court work, but also the social significance of the case.

[Zhbanov] Here is something else I would like to ask. What will the qualifying panels ensure?

[Semenko] First of all, this is one of the pillars of the building of independent administration of justice. The following aspect is interesting in the matter: The panels conduct the certification of judges, a kind of examination of legal culture, and assign a category, of which there will be three. The scale of bonuses in addition to the salary will correspond to this; this is an incentive for professional development, and this is also prestige, because the category is not given for tenure, but for the degree of professional expertise.

[Zhbanov] It is good that the panels, that is, the judges themselves, will evaluate the expertise of every new candidate recommended for the position of a judge by a Ministry of Justice organ. Is the self-nomination of a lawyer as a candidate judge possible?

[Semenko] The law does not forbid this. I believe it is quite possible. However, in this case as well he will have to take a qualifying exam.

[Zhbanov] Finally, did you object to a ribbon as the symbol of judicial authority?

[Semenko] Yes. The ribbon is a sign of celebration, whereas the court is not a palace of marriage ceremonies. There is more sadness here. As far as the robes are concerned, for some reason many people imagine them being opulent, like in the time of Shakespeare. I saw it in Czechoslovakia—a black, straight-cut robe with crimson cuffs. This is severe and simple.

KGB Officials Meet With Repression Victims

PM3008101189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Aug 89 Morning Edition p2

[V. Treskov report: "The Memory and Pain of Past Ordeals"]

[Text] A meeting—the kind that still does not take place very often at present—was held the other day in Moscow between former camp inmates and exiles who served sentences for political charges brought against them in the thirties through to the fifties and senior members of the USSR KGB apparatus.

They discussed the problems of material compensation for ex-prisoners and their continued social rehabilitation. The audience was addressed by Chekists, who talked about their work in this direction and then answered numerous questions. The dialogue was frank and at times not without emotional outbursts. The past victims of Stalin's tyranny, people with their lives shattered and their health ruined, who lost the best years of their lives in camps and jails, spoke of their legal right to material and moral compensation. The questions they asked the KGB staffers were pointed and sometimes disagreeable.

The modern-day Chekists, who were not involved in the crimes of the past, answered the questions with tact, self-restraint, and sensitivity, without avoiding any sharp corners. They explained many problems and expressed their willingness to give reasonable practical assistance.

"The doors of all KGB administrations and departments are open around the clock to all innocent victims who need assistance," A. Krayushkin, a senior official of the KGB central apparatus, said.

The flood of applications from people repressed in the past is constantly growing: It has increased several times over in Moscow alone. For example, whereas in January this year only 20 applications were received, in August there were 500.... Intensive work is being done on these applications. This is no easy process: Many archives were lost during the war years and some witnesses are no longer alive....

Every request and question at this meeting expressed the pain of past ordeals. Many of those present were repressed when they were still chidren. They never saw their parents alive. One desperate cry from the audience has stayed in my mind: "I would at least like to see a photograph of my father and his handwriting in his personal file. I was only 9 months old when they came to take my father away...."

"Our association was an informal one but became a registered association in June and now has the status of an official organization with its own premises, at 6/2 Trubnaya Street," F. Puzanov, an activist from the "Moscow Association of Victims of the Unlawful Repressions," said.

The association has more than 500 members and its main aims are to ensure the de-Stalinization of society, prevent the mistakes of the past from being repeated, and give assistance and support to the victims of the unlawful repressions. It plans to issue its own bulletin and collections of memoires by members of the association in the near future.

Further on Meeting

LD3008185489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 30 Aug 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Presenter] A meeting has taken place between the Moscow association of the victims of the illegal repressions of the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's with officials of the USSR KGB.

[Correspondent M. Polikarpova, identified by caption] A few words about the association. It was set up a month ago. It now has 500 members but every new day brings new applications behind which lie terrible and bitter fates. Nikolay Vladimirovich Numerov has been elected chairman of the association. [passage omitted]

Over 20 years ago, at the 20th Party Congress, our society learned about the monstrous crimes of Stalin and those around him, about the millions of innocent victims. It learned of them—it issued certificates of rehabilitation—and of the annulment of their convictions. This did not apply to all of them, and it was soon forgotten. Only recently, during perestroyka, did it remember again, because today we are striving for the truth no matter how bitter that truth is.

And the fact that this meeting between the association of victims of illegal repressions and officials of the KGB, was possible, is one of the proofs of this. They said that cases are now being reviewed; many people have had their good name restored; documents are being sent to

the appropriate offices about compensation for confiscated property. They replied to many written notes and questions, the pain that had been suffered was everywhere. And it was quite natural that this question arose:

[Unidentified speaker] I never saw my father, and I ask to be told about my father's case—and I only want to see a photograph of him, even if only an official one, I want to see his handwriting and hear his voice of pain. I am 60 years old; for 10 years I have been a class two invalid. I have litle time left. I cannot wait for you, at your own initiative, to decide the question of opening these archives.

[A.A. Krayushkin, deputy head of a KGB department, identified by caption] I would like to reply to this question. I have said that the chairman of the committee replied to it at the session of the Supreme Soviet. He said that this is not envisaged under existing legislation, but in those cases where people particularly insist, this question can be decided in each specific case. I can tell you that, of course, there is no particular state secrets there. And, in essence, in examination of applications, in meetings with those who approach us about materials of investigations, we give practically all the material that exists there.

There is no doubt that we should meet you. And we shall try to help you as far as we can to resolve all these questions.

[Polikarpova] Justice is necessary to them and to all of us and to future generations because it is the guarantee that what happened will never happen again.

Perestroyka 'May Be Suppressed' by KGB

18001556 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 34, 26 Aug-1 Sep 89 p 4

[Reader V. Klokov's letter published: "The Assistant—the KGB"]

[Text] A phrase which has now become national property, uttered by A.N. Kosygin at the moment of the preparations for N.S. Khrushchev's removal, speaks eloquently on the KBG's role and significance in affairs of state. In response to the question on Kosygin's position, the answer rang out, "Whose corner is the KGB in?" He fully understood that the KGB's support is the chief and necessary condition for such actions.

However, in spite of glasnost and perestroyka, even up to this time, the KGB remains a prohibited area and has preserved unchanged practically all its old functions, tasks, organization, and most importantly, potentialities. And these potentialities as such have already been repeatedly demonstrated in practice; if given the appropriate team, in a short period, all the results and the achievements of the regular leader, and in this case, perestroyka, could be liquidated and the entire country put under complete control.

Previously, before perestroyka, the country's former leadership simply needed to have such an apparatus; they could not stay in power without it.

At the present time, our country is experiencing a process of revolutionary transformations, which are being met with covert and overt opposition from the numerous supporters of the command-administrative system. They are successfully blocking many of perestroyka's initiatives, failing to allow the achievement of real improvement in the economy, foodstuffs provision, etc. This is leading to economic and political instability. It is officially acknowledged that it is still too soon to speak of the irreversibility of perestroyka.

And what if in the future, some political leader decides to return to the "socialism" of Stalin or Brezhnev?

Of all the existing means by which its perestroyka may be suppressed (and its supporters liquidated), the most dangerous, effective, and fast-acting method is using the KGB's potentialities, quite unique in this regard.

Why should these potentialities (and structure) be preserved in an unchanged form up to the present time, in spite of the democratization of all aspects of the life of Soviet society?

Procuracy Said To Impede Gdlyan Commission

18001557 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 34, 26 Aug-1 Sep 89 p 8

[Response to reader's inquiry by I.V. Sorokin, interim chairman of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies Commission for Review of Material on the Activity of the USSR Procuracy's Investigative Group under T.Kh. Gdlyan]

[Text]**Rumors are circulating in Moscow that someone is creating obstacles to the work of the commission investigating the activity of the Gdlyan group. Would you describe this? T. Istomina, Moscow.**

Indeed, we do have difficulties, and more than a few of them. The thing is that certain responsible individuals from the USSR Procuracy are trying to complicate our commission's work. Up until the present, they have groundlessly denied us access to a number of materials of interest to us, or even copies of them, in particular, the criminal cases regarding A. Salimov, the former chairman of the presidium of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], N. Radzhabov, former first secretary of the Samarkand oblast committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, delegate to the 19th Party Conference, and other individuals. The matter got to the point where A. Sboyev, chief of the USSR Procuracy investigative unit began to dictate his conditions to us, binding us to his personal opinion regarding Gdlyan's investigative group. I was forced to make a written statement on this subject to A. Vasilyev, USSR first deputy procurator general.

However, even after this, without any motive, Sboyev's deputy, V. Galkin, has been refusing to release the documents demanded, even though these matters had been agreed upon with V. Kravtsev, deputy prosecutor general. The impression has been created that there is an absence of executive discipline in the USSR Procuracy.

Over 3 weeks had already passed since the time at the Supreme Soviet session that our commission expressed its opinion on the advisability of halting the criminal case being conducted within the walls of the USSR Procuracy regarding the T. Gdlyan investigative group by transferring all materials to the commission's use; that the criminal case of V. Smirnov, former sector chief of Party-Building and Cadre Work Department of the CPSU Central Committee and former second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, was halted by the USSR Procuracy without reasonable grounds; that the investigation of this case must be renewed; and that an independent jurist under the control of the USSR people's deputies must supervise the case on the corruption practiced by the T. Gdlyan group in Uzbekistan and Moscow.

However, the USSR Procuracy has not reacted to this in any way. Nor did our oft-repeated appeals produce any result. No decision was made on any of our requests, but the investigation of the T. Gdlyan group continues. Apparently, the leadership of the USSR Procuracy is still not taking the commission's opinion seriously, and is still not recognizing the higher authority of the Congress of People's Deputies in the country.

From the editors: We appealed to V.I. Kravtsev, deputy general USSR procurator to explain the causes of the USSR Procuracy's hindrance of the normal work of the congress's commission. V.I. Kravtsev refused comment on this fact, citing the confidential nature of the information, and saying that "The commission itself must sort this out."

Draft Laws on Russian Elections Defended

18001550 Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 15 Aug 89 p 1

[Report on interview with A. Lukyanchikov, department chief for work of soviets of the Moscow Soviet Executive Committee, by VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA correspondent Yu. Kazarin: "And We Will All Discuss It Together"; place, date not given; first two paragraphs are an introduction]

[Text]**As has already been reported in the press, three draft laws have been put up for public discussion—on amendments and supplements to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Constitution, on the election of RSFSR people's deputies, and local soviet deputies. They provide for changes in the republic's organs of state power, in the structure of the local soviets, and the organization and conduct of elections, beginning with the nomination of candidates for deputy.**

VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA correspondent Yu. Kazarin asked A. Lukyanchikov, department chief for the work of soviets of the Mossovet [Moscow Soviet] ispolkom [executive committee] to comment upon the basic positions of the new draft laws.

[Kazarin] The new draft laws hinge upon the new union electoral legislation introduced to the USSR Constitution late last year. But the experience of the recent elections of USSR people's deputies, the work of the first congress, and the first session of the country's Supreme Soviet were also taken into consideration....

[Lukyanchikov] That is natural. All the proposed innovations lie in the channel of the political reforms being implemented in the country. And it is very important to consider more carefully the results of the practical test of these or those ideas, the voters' opinions, all accumulated experience.

[Kazarin] So, about opinions. Quite a bit has been said about the Congress of Peoples Deputies not being at all required by the structure of the organs of state power, that the Supreme Soviet should be directly elected. But now we see: a Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies is stipulated. But there is one complication here: It is proposed that the Supreme Soviet be formed of two chambers—the Soviet of the Republics and the Soviet of Nationalities.

[Lukyanchikov] The bicameral system has its own rationale. Our federation is a multinational one; many interethnic problems have accrued, and we now know how exclusively important it is to resolve them in a timely manner.

If we speak of a congress, then in some union republics, the Baltics, for example, there is none; it does not figure in the draft laws. But on our Russian federation scale.... I think that broad discussion of the draft laws will allow everyone to be openly "for" or "against."

[Kazarin] The nomination of candidates for USSR people's deputies from public organizations drew much criticism....

[Lukyanchikov] These comments were taken into consideration in the draft of the Russian federation laws. Public organizations may nominate candidates for RSFSR people's deputies, for local soviets, but all the balloting will take place in the usual okrugs—territorial, and national-territorial. Separate elections from public organizations is not envisioned.

[Kazarin] The okrug electoral meetings drew the most criticism in the last electoral campaign. Many demand that we reject that level of selection, the selection of candidates for deputies, feeling the meeting to be a deviation from democratic principles. But it is stated in the draft laws that they may be organized in the electoral okrugs, and will not be conducted only if within the okrug up to ten candidates for RSFSR people's deputy

have been nominated for a single seat, and up to five candidates for local soviets....

[Lukyanchikov] It is my personal opinion that okrug pre-electoral meetings are not at all mandatory.

[Kazarin] Aleksandr Vasilyevich, it is stated in the draft law on changes and amendment to the RSFSR Constitution that "Any number of candidates may be included on the election ballot." How do you regard the proposal to supplement this sentence with the words, "But no fewer than two per position?" More than a few such proposals were made after the election of the USSR people's deputies.

[Lukyanchikov] To me, the formulation in the draft seems preferable. Why limit the will of the voters? Let them decide for themselves how many candidates to put on the ballot, one or 10, 20. If, in the proposed formulation they want to see a loophole for shoo-in elections to the soviet for the "necessary" people, then the experience of the recent elections showed that even the lone candidate artificially set up without competitors in the okrug frequently does not get the requisite number of votes. The voters manifest their will precisely, unambiguously.

[Kazarin] Quite recently at the Mossovet there were 1,000 deputies; now there are 800. The new draft plans to elect up to 450 deputies. There will be fewer deputies in the rayon soviets. What comment do you have on this."

[Lukyanchikov] The figures cited in the draft correspond to our idea of the necessary quantity of deputies. There should not be any deputies just calling themselves that; they must all function actively, with initiative, doing concrete things. This can only elevate the authority of the soviet.

[Kazarin] Aleksandr Vasilyevich, what will happen to the Muscovites' expressed suggestions and comments on the draft laws?

[Lukyanchikov] In accordance with the decree of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, we here at the Mossovet ispolkom must organize a generalization of the suggestions and comments made on the draft laws by people's deputies, citizens, labor collectives and social organizations, as well as those presented in the newspapers, radio, and television. Until 25 September, we will deliver the material of the generalizations to the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet once every 10 days. Then they will be examined by the Commission for Legislative suggestions of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. Then they will be considered by the commission for legislative recommendations of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and it will propose which comments and proposals should be considered during the final writing of the laws' text.

And I think that there will be more than a few corrections and comments from Muscovites.

Academicians Urge Leadership With 'Iron Hand'

18001553 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Aug 89 p 10

[Report on interview with Igor Klyamkin, doctor of philosophical sciences, associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, and Andranik Migranyan, candidate of historical sciences, associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA observer Georgiy Tselms: "Do We Need an 'Iron Hand'?"; date and place not given]

[Text] [Tselms] To judge from your statements it turns out that in front of various audiences and sometimes in the press, we have consistently advocated a strengthening of the personal power of the head of state at the moment of perestroyka. Does this mean that you are supporters of an authoritarian regime?

[Migranyan] To recognize the objective need for a strengthening of power during the transition from a totalitarian regime to a democratic one in no way signifies being in raptures about authoritarianism. But if the transition to democracy—and I am deeply convinced of this—lies only along that path...

[Klyamkin] In general we talk today about democracy but do not say a word about the ways to make the transition to it. We talk about market problems but remain silent about ways to effect the transition from a non-commodity economy to a commodity economy, from a one-dimensional society to a multidimensional one. And this transition is the problem of all problems.

This transition can be effected only on a systematic basis. No one disputes this, but the sense of system in the transition is raised in a very abstract manner. Here, they say, we have one system, one model of socialism (the Stalinist one), which is typified by the command method of economic management, a pro forma and pretend democracy and a "monolithic unity" in ideology. This system must be replaced by another in which economic and cost-accounting relations will be promoted by pluralism in politics (democratic representation of interests) and in the spiritual sphere. All of this is as undisputed as it is meaningless.

We consider the problem of everyday awareness at about the same level. For the enormous mass of the people there is no clear-cut democratic alternative. There is the unpleasantness of what exists and rejection of it. There are debates of the kind: "Things are fine in the West, we must be like the West." But the Western democracies have taken shape over the course of centuries...

[Migranyan] In France, for example, they needed two centuries and a countless number of revolutions, dictatorships, and ochlocracies, and the replacement of monarchic forms of government with republic forms, and vice versa.

It took almost 200 years to prepare the social-class structure and the national character for democracy, and to devise appropriate political standards.

[Klyamkin] At the USSR Congress of People's Deputies the "democratic minority" demanded immediate and full democracy. Well, it is understandable that the deputies were bound by their voters and by the logic of the spontaneous movement that, spurning voluntarism, is striving for the opposite. For democracy. But here, democracy was understood as some kind of negative projection of that same totalitarianism. This is what Hegel called metaphysical denial.

So it would seem that Sakharov's position is extraordinarily attractive. But this is merely some kind of moral road sign for society, its ideal. What we are talking about is ways to effect the transition.

Both the new elections and the Congress and the recent session of the new parliament have shown that very large masses in society have discarded the earlier structures but...historically they have still not grown into anything fundamentally different. No one single new structure capable of replacing the old ones has yet been born. Herein lies the sense of crisis and danger in the situation today.

[Tselms] But surely the Congress of People's Deputies is proof of the birth of such a structure?

[Migranyan] "All Power to the Soviets!" is a fine slogan. But today the Congress cannot assume all power. And not only because this is at variance with the party apparatus. In principle it cannot assume all power. The fact is that we do not have a so-called civic society. That is, a society that is separate from the state. As a result, we do have a real state.

[Tselms] ?? [as published]

[Migranyan] Well, in the sense that if there is no civic state there are no stratified groups who are the bearers of expressed interests, nor any corresponding institutionalization or channeling of those interests that would serve as a basis for a real state. And so, as Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov has said, what is happening is that we are embarking on the building of a new state from the roof down.

And Yemelyanov said that the people are above the party, the Congress of People's Deputies is above the party congress, and the Supreme Soviet is above the Central Committee, and so power must be transferred precisely thither, and all power must be transferred from party structures to state structures. But the trouble is that, as I have already said, until we have a real state, there is nowhere to transfer it to.

In the West one well-known political expert wrote that "glasnost is against perestroyka." I would put it another way: "Democracy is Against Perestroyka."

[Tselms] But surely democracy is not the the end, or the means of perestroyka?

[Migranyan] The entire path of world civilization shows that the modernization of regimes like ours has been effected asynchronously. First there was modernization in the spiritual sphere (this has already partially occurred here), then the economy was modernized, that is, the real interests of society matured and there was differentiation in forms of ownership. In this way a certain horizontal structure was formed—the "civic society." And then, and only then, there was change in the political system and the real interests being represented were strengthened within it.

[Tselms] Have not the recent tragic evens in China shown us how dangerous it is to reform the economy without altering the political system?

[Migranyan] Yes, it is dangerous to delay in the transition to the next stage. The tragedy in China illustrates this well. There they delayed in carrying through political reform....

Any analogy is arbitrary, but let me refer to the reform of Alexander II, the result of which, it seems to me, corroborates my thought. I disagree categorically with Gavriil Popov, who believes that the halfway measures and timidity of Alexander's reform were the cause of the three Russian revolutions. I think that his senseless assassination, which, as is known, led to an onslaught of reaction, ultimately did not allow conflicting interests to be included in the political sphere. But only this can help to harmonize them. So conflict after conflict started.

[Klyamkin] I totally agree with Andrian here. The transition from a pre-commodity economy to a commodity economy and to the market has never anywhere been accomplished by any people in parallel with democratization. Political changes have always been preceded by a more or less prolonged period of dominance by authoritarian regimes. This is confirmed by all world practice in the 17th century and the 20th century. Take England, France, Spain, Portugal, the countries of Latin America.... The absolutist regime has created the national market. Here, the most acute contradictions have always arisen, along with gigantic centrifugal forces.

If the regime has been unable to cope with them a new Bonapartist-type regime has come along to replace them, and has solved those same tasks. But now already more harshly. Napoleon was not only a dictator but there was also the "Napoleonic Code" (the legal reform), consolidation of the rights of ownership, and development of the market. That is, he created the conditions for agreement and harmonization with an iron hand.

[Migranyan] Our society should somehow be considered an industrial society. But because of the one-dimensional nature of our economy we are closer, I think, to the so-called traditional societies. We must therefore look about at other corresponding countries. At their transition. Nowhere, not in any country, has there ever been a transition from a totalitarian regime to a democracy. There has always been a mandatory intermediate authoritarian period.

[Tselms] I admit that in my consciousness "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" regimes are synonymous....

[Migranyan] Let me briefly review them. Without this I cannot explain my position. In totalitarian regimes the boundary between the political and the non-political disappears is the spheres of life (linguistics, for example, becomes political). Absolutely all of life's activities in society are regulated. Agreement and like thinking are demanded in everything. At all levels power is shaped along closed channels. The authoritarian regime, although it too concentrates all power in a few hands, does permit a demarcation and even polarization of forces and interests. Here, certain elements of democracy are not excluded—elections, the parliamentary struggle. True, all of this is strictly regulated.

In an authoritarian regime society is stratified and different interests are carved out. And when the time comes when the bearers of those interests are ready to fall on each other and bite each other's throats, the "strong hand" does not permit it. So conditions are constantly being created for the harmonization of interests, and, this means, for democratic reforms. No one has yet succeeded in leaping over this historical stage.

[Klyamkin] If we lay claim to parallelism in economic and political reforms this means that we do not know (or want to know) about world experience. Or we lay claim to a special role in history, to some exclusivity. It is well known whither such claims have led.

[Tselms] Notwithstanding, is it correct to compare us to the "traditional society"? For we are effecting perestroyka in the age of the scientific and technical revolution. General literacy among the population also distinguishes us from the "traditional societies." It is possible to name other qualities that prove the presence of special conditions in the transition.

[Klyamkin] Agreed, there are pluses. But there are also significant minuses. None of the countries we have named made the transition with total destruction of the market, with a totally statist economy. And today we are beginning a movement, say, toward the market with the help of a state that has been historically affirmed by utterly destroying the market. We would also like the party, which proclaimed that is it guided by a cause that stands above money, to start now to introduce the market with enthusiasm....

No one, even the countries of the socialist world, has started its transition from this point. In Hungary, for example, they did not have our kind of collectivization. In China they also protected the peasantry. There they did not succeed in extirpating all the roots. Here, we have lived for three generations with the idea that our form of ownership always and in all things is superior to private ownership. Any sense of enterprise was preserved in what was an illegal economy. In short, we are starting from zero.

[Migranyan] This, I repeat, is precisely why we do not have a civic state, even in embryo, and why I was against the Congress in general. For, apart from illusions of democracy, it really has nothing real to offer. Objectively I could not, and not at all because of the "intrigues of the apparatus." For illusions are a dangerous thing. They engender disillusionment and lead ultimately to the destabilization of society, which we have already observed, and alas will observe more.

To the point, the Congress makes sense only on one condition, namely, if it is recognized that the country is in crisis, the economy in ruins, the social situation catastrophic, and interethnic relations at an impasse...

[Tselms] But it was precisely the Congress that recognized...

[Migranyan] I have not completed my thought. Proceeding from this recognition, the Congress should, in my opinion, hand a mandate to the president on the basis of special, extraordinary powers. And give him the opportunity to form a Committee of National Salvation, while, it is understood, suspending the action of all other institutions of power. Here it is easy to accuse me of having a partiality for dictators. Yes, at this moment I advocate dictatorship and a dictator. But the best dictator is personified in so-called "collective leadership."

Of course, the head of that committee must present a realistic program of salvation and his plenipotentiary term must be limited.

[Tselms] "Extraordinary measures," "special powers".... Such words send a shudder through me. For once a dictator has become dictator he will spit on all our programs and restrictions.

[Klyamkin] I think that in principle, for the Congress this kind of outcome would not occur. Neither the apparatus nor the democrats resort to that. For the apparatchiks to vote for a dictator would be to vote for the end of their power. For democrats to support a dictator would be a betrayal of their own principles and an act against their own voters.

[Migranyan] And so I say that in general it was not worth convening the Congress. It would have been much better if the power of our leader had been reinforced through the apparatus. As was done, for example, in Hungary with Janos Kadar and in China with Deng Xiaoping.

The depth of the national crisis in countries like China, Poland, and Hungary offered an opportunity to form a sufficiently reformist group which, when it came to power, was able to move society along the path of modernization without resorting to any kind of parallel power bases.

I think that everything depends on the degree of awareness by the top leadership of the depth of the crisis in which society finds itself. This will also be the first impulse—a sense of self-preservation.

The apparatus route is obviously preferable. But we have set out on the path of destabilization, when everything is destabilized, from the highest echelon to the lowest structure. This is the unique thing about our situation, and it frightens me. Even our first steps have turned out to be unpredictable. But in the countries that we have mentioned the next dozen, even the next twenty steps were calculated.

The masses are bursting into politics with their own interests, but the mechanism essential for this and capable of digesting it and harmonizing it does not exist.

Of course, another path is possible, and let me say immediately that I fear it less: conservative forces will over time interrupt the process of perestroyka and lead everything into a channel of stagnation. It is bad, there is no doubt about it, but it is better than an uncontrolled debauch of passions. However, we must navigate between Scylla and Charybdis if we take the path of democratic dictatorship, strange as this word combination may sound. Many at the Congress made this naive appeal: "Mikhail Sergeyevich, leave your post in the party. Become a 'child of perestroyka.'" But this proposal is disaster. Both for Gorbachev himself, and for perestroyka, because instead of consolidating the power of the leader-reformer he would lose it completely.

[Klyamkin] Yes. Brezhnev exercised quite enough power to maintain the status quo, in other words stagnation. But a reformer, of course, needs much more, for he faces dislocation and destabilization, both from above and below. The upper stratum, on which the reformer depends, has no interest in carrying out radical reforms because it is guided by its own corporate interests. True, the most realistic and patriotic section of this stratum will gradually begin to recognize that represents the national interests and will close ranks with the reformer. This is how the reformist nucleus is created. But the process will continue, and it is already becoming obvious that something there is becoming twisted, altered, inadequately colored. At this moment the leader-reformer needs an additional measure of power.

How can he get it? Today the apparatus route is hardly possible. Under conditions in which the country has already been stirred up, and glasnost has appeared, the apparatus is on guard. It is vigilant. But time is pressing. A chasm looms. And the manipulations of the apparatus can go on for years.

And so, one possibility remains: obtain additional power from the people. That is, in this case democratization is needed not in order to to carry out reform but to strengthen the power of the leader.

This is why I make bold to challenge the thesis that it was not necessary to convene the Congress. It was! And not in order to give the leader extraordinary powers. First, this is dangerous. Second, as I have already said, none of the deputies would agree to that. Nevertheless, at the Congress Gorbachev did receive a mandate to be the representative of the people. And the creation of a second structure of power increased his power and his opportunity for political maneuver. And this means for carrying out reforms. However, the legislative organ—the Supreme Soviet—is made up in a special way. And this makes it possible, when needed, to oppose the apparatus structures. And the situation is supported. Corporate interests start to burst at the seams. An urgent need arises to shift responsibility (or part of it) onto society, onto a new structure, while still retaining power. It may be little enough, but it is still quite a lot.

[Migranyan] Nevertheless, I still hold my opinion: rather than increasing the power of the reformer the Congress served to increase destabilization.

[Tselms] I would like to return to your initial thought: first of all, economic reform, then political, then democracy. For we have already tried this more than once. Both Khrushchev and Kosygin tried to reform the economy without changing anything in the political system. And indeed the first years of our perestroyka have shown that the economic reform is not moving ahead. Its is being blocked by the archaic political system. That is the first thing. The second is this: I have already posed this question but received no answer: what reformer who becomes a dictator will want to continue with a reform that limits his power?

[Klyamkin] Neither Khrushchev nor Kosygin tried to put fundamental economic changes into effect. Neither of them entertained the idea of a multiple-level economy or diversity of forms. And as it turned out, their power for effecting reform was very little. But I agree that the old political structure is hampering the reform. And it must be dismantled. (This dismantling is going on alas in the secondary sectors). However, the purpose of this dismantling, and this must be recognized, should be not to develop democracy but strengthening the power of the leader-reformer. As we have already said repeatedly, democratization in no way promotes reforms. Say that the reformer advocates introduction of the market. Can he do this by relying on the masses? Of course not! Some 80 percent of the population will not accept it. For the market means stratification and differentiation at the level of incomes. It is necessary to work a great deal in order to live well.

[Migranyan] The market is a constant struggle, the opportunity not only to grow rich but also to be utterly ruined.

[Klyamkin] This is why in the programs of leaders who are supported by the masses (like Yeltsin, for example) the word "market" is uttered through clenched teeth. But the main thing is to eliminate the fourth department and share all blessing fairly...

[Migranyan] When the masses are involved in finding solutions to serious questions they do so partly to their own detriment, relying rather on populist sentiments than on serious ideas. And so a reformer cannot count on the masses for success.

[Klyamkin] With respect to the usurpation of power, this scenario cannot be excluded. Both Louis Bonaparte and Hitler came to power through the will of the people—in elections—and then started to do anything they liked with the voters... Nevertheless, today it is possible to talk about the existence of certain guarantees against this. First, they are incorporated in the very technology of present-day production. You cannot use fear to make people work well. The level of technology requires from the worker some internal motivation. External "nightstick" control becomes absolutely ineffective.

[Migranyan] And, of course, a guarantee is included in the very fact of the existence of present-day world society. The echelon of top leaders must always take into account the position occupied by a country in the system of world links, and what its geopolitical interests are. And as time goes on this becomes more so. And so a politician who heads even a totalitarian government is forced to operate on a countrywide scale, and to maintain its status. When the resources to do this become short the politician starts to think about what should be changed. And so "new thinking" arises. Incidentally, in totalitarian regimes a gap exists between the world outlook of the leaders and that of any other rank. These, the latter, are most often incapable of sensing or understanding the challenges of the world. And so they are more conservative. And conflict grows between the "top" and the "bottom."

It is not happenstance that our reform is taking place from the top downward.

[Klyamkin] Brezhnev built his entire foreign policy on military parity. While it was successful nothing inside the country could change. But after Brezhnev's death it became clear that in terms of accuracy the euromissiles were better than ours. And this accuracy was for us unattainable. Then Andropov became the leader by jumping the queue, as it were (Chernenko was really next in line). He was promoted because he was capable of moving at least a little away from Brezhnev's hopeless policy. True, the withdrawal was only halfway. We are still incapable of accepting the "zero option." Nevertheless, the change in thinking started, and this leads to domestic reforms.

[Migranyan] All of history affirms this scheme. Russia's defeat, for example, in the Crimean War and the threat to its status led to modernization. We suffered our first defeat at the hands of Napoleon, and under Alexander I we had Speranskiy and Chartoryskiy. But once Napoleon had been dealt with, came the recoil. If we win with the old means then the position is consolidated; there is no need to change anything.

[Tselms] If we admit that you are right and that the road to democracy does lie exclusively through authoritarianism, what will the democrats do in such a situation? Support unlimited power for the leader? But that would be the betrayal of their own principles and ideals....

[Klyamkin] It is a serious problem. What would I do in such circumstances were I a person with democratic convictions? Merge with the regime? But I would not want to do this. I would not want to merge with any dictator, even if he had become dictator as such for the good of democracy. I would want to have the right to defend my own "democratic opinion." Criticism of the leader from the left would urge him on to more decisive thinking and actions. Moreover, where there are two flanks—left and right—the leader has more room for maneuver.

[Migranyan] I would like to express the following thought: the main mistake of the "democratic minority" at the Congress is that its spokesmen have not distanced themselves from Gorbachev. By doing this they have rendered Gorbachev a great service—they have helped him to acquire more independence.

[Tselms] Your logic is irrefutable. But many of your postulates seem to be extremely weak. Let us hope that you have the opportunity to express "democratic opinions" under the conditions of authoritarianism. And of course, there is the response to the "authoritarian path being the only one to democracy." But I shall not deprive your opponents of the satisfaction of expressing themselves on this. I have no doubt that opponents will find something. But my task as an interviewer is not so much to argue with you as to try to elucidate your position. Thank you for your candidness!

Trial of Former Uzbek Official Outlined

PM30081351 89 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 6

[S. Mostovshchikov report under the rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA": "Khudayberdiyev Trial in Progress"]

[Text] N. Khudayberdiyev, former chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, whose trial has started in the USSR Supreme Court, has completely repudiated the testimony he gave during the investigation.

In accordance with the bill of indictment ratified by A. Katusev, USSR deputy USSR prosecutor general, the former Uzbek premier is charged with receiving seven bribes totaling R25,000 and giving Churbanov bribes worth R50,000.

The accused did not deny these facts until the last moment. Moreover, he was a witness in the Churbanov trial, where he once again confirmed the handing over of a large sum of money to the former high-ranking official. Churbanov himself also stated that Khudayberdiyev bribed him. According to the testimony of the former first deputy minister of internal affairs, in the afternoon of 18 October 1982, approximately, Khudayberdiyev gave him a bundle of papers containing money during a walk in the grounds of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee residence, in one of the alleyways in the garden. Later, Churbanov, in his own words, counted

it and assured himself that the bundle contained R50,000, mostly in R100 notes.

However, at one time Khudayberdiyev described differently to the investigators the circumstances in which the bribe was handed over. As he asserted, the R50,000 was in a box containing a coffee service, which he brought to Churbanov's room in the evening.

Now the former premier is denying both the very fact of the bribe altogether, and the receiving of sums of money from other people.

The court now has to establish the truth. The hearing is taking place in open court session presided by S. Savkin, member of the USSR Supreme Court. The people's assessors are L. Savelyev and K. Amosov, and the public prosecutor is V. Levitskiy, prosecutor from an administration of the USSR Prosecutor's Office. Khudayberdiyev is being defended by G. Reznik, member of the Moscow Collegium of Attorneys. Obviously, the court may need Yu. Churbanov's testimony.

The health of the accused, who is 61, is causing concern, as it was reported to us at the USSR Supreme Court. At a recent interrogation it was established that he had high blood pressure—220 over 115. A team of doctors is in constant attendance in the Supreme Court while it is in session.

Readers Give Opinions on Interethnic Relations

18300779 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Aug 89 First Edition p 1

[Article made up of a number of readers' letters and unsigned editorial comment under the headline "Readers About " and the rubric "Toward the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text]**On 17 August newspapers published a draft platform of the CPSU "Nationalities Policy of the Party Under Present Conditions" which is proposed for discussion at the coming plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on interethnic relations.**

Many letters are printed in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Naturally, readers sometimes look differently on the problems of aggravation in interethnic relations. Some have arguable ideas. But the concern in unanimous: how to stop the dangerous course of events, how to eliminate social deformations.

The draft platform proposes a general political conception of the nationalities policy of the CPSU. One can already find and decide on concrete problems. Letters to the editor show that no matter how complex the interethnic frictions, we are in a position to remove the deformations and develop our federation in harmony. Today we acquaint the readers with a portion of this mail.

Two Years Have Passed

My Army service is ending. I return home soon. It seems I should only rejoice. But I frequently have troubling thoughts. I shall not give my home address, there is a reason for it. I shall only say that I am an Azeri by nationality and a native of those places where there are now interethnic clashes. When I left for the Army, I saw no signs of the impending misfortune. There simply were no reasons for my countrymen, Armenians and Azeris, to engage in hostilities. I believe the whole affair is the work of extremists, who with rumors and provocative actions have heated the situation up to the limit.

Listen to me. Those criminal elements who inflame interethnic discord must be severely punished. Animosities will injure our land more painfully than natural disasters.
[Signed] Private E. Babakhanov, Urals Military District

There is a Proposal...

We understand that responses do not yet fully reflect public opinion. But we can already appreciate people's attitude toward the reconstruction of nationality policies of the party.

Colonel V. Lyapko, deputy chief of the political section of the higher combined-arms command college in Alma-Ata: The ultimate purpose of harmonization of interethnic relations, as stated in the draft, must be when citizens of the USSR feel at home in any part of the land. But further elaboration is required. I, personally, had doubts about the introduction of republic citizenship. It may lead to difficulties in decision-making in many important USSR-wide problems, particularly in defense.

Regarding national languages, there is much talk, but material support for their development is not increasing. Even in the capital of Kazakhstan it is difficult to find courses to study languages of peoples who inhabit the republic. Surely, it is time that students at military schools (in particular ours) learn these languages. Such an approach will facilitate developing a culture of interethnic relations among future officers.

Major A. Ramazanov (Kiev Military District):
I dislike several recommendations of the draft. For instance, in the section "On the ideal-theoretical aspect of the nationalities question" it states: "It is impermissible that seeds of interethnic discord, thrown into the midst of society recently, be allowed to grow in the near future." But these seeds have been collecting for decades. Now that we are dealing with their "qualitative transformation," they sprouted. With these growths we must deal seriously, and the theory must not be allowed to mislead us.

Telegram Received

Tallinn, 17 August. The republic council of veterans of war, reserve officers, and soldiers-internationalists supports the draft platform of the CPSU. We have, of

course, concrete proposals, especially dealing with nonnative inhabitants of Soviet republics. They must fully protect persons from local tyranny. The discriminatory law dealing with Russian-speaking workers, in particular, passed in Estonia, led many labor collectives to strike. Our council supported them. Many veterans joined the strike committee.

This is our opinion: In the Soviet republics one must move toward the elimination of any restrictions on national minorities.
[Signed] In the name of the council Major General, retired, N. Aksinin and Colonel, retired, N. Solovey

One Cannot Remain Silent

This is not the first time I write you. In the past I faulted the newspaper for not dealing openly with the problem of Kurds abroad. I was told that the problem of Kurds is an internal problem of the countries where they live. Now it becomes apparent that questions of legal and social protection of my people in the USSR need also be asked. This is no longer an internal matter of the republics of Transcaucasus and Central Asia, where most Kurds have settled.

There are 30,000 kurds in Tbilisi alone. In Georgia, according to my information, there is a radio program in my native language once a week. Program length is 15 minutes.

It is also known that in some regions the Kurds have already assimilated themselves into the local populations. I believe that on this problem we can no longer remain silent.
[Signed] S. Kochon

From the editors. In the draft platform of the central committee of the CPSU for the plenum on interethnic relations, it is noted that unavoidably all measures must be taken to solve the problems of peoples who were resettled from their permanent homelands in the years of Stalinist repressions. That was also the fate of the Kurds. The letter of Comrade Kochon is another confirmation of the necessity of examining these questions at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Rovno Oblast Committee First Secretary Elected

PM3008150589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Second Edition p 2

[PRAVDA correspondent M. Odinets report: "Plenum Held"]

[Text] A Rovno Oblast Party Committee [obkom] Plenum has been held to examine an organizational question. Three candidacies were proposed for the post of obkom first secretary: V. Lutsenko, second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party obkom; P. Prishchepa, chairman of the oblast executive committee; and N. Tkachuk, obkom secretary. The candidacies were discussed beforehand at party meetings, rayon party commitee plenums, sessions of the organizational-party and cadre work commissions, and at an enlarged session of the obkom party bureau. P. Prishchepa was elected first secretary of Rovno Party Obkom by a majority vote.

Excesses of 'Independent' Press Criticized

PM3008093189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Aug 89 Second Edition p 2

[Yuriy Zhukov article: "Freedom of Speech or Total License? On Some Problems in the Independent Press"]

[Text] Journalists of the older generation are now watching with great interest and deep understanding the rapid development of a new phenomenon created by the atmosphere of glasnost. I have in mind the genuine revival of the independent press. One automatically recalls the twenties when higher educational establishments for journalists didn't exist and the majority of us joined newspapers straight from the ranks of the workers' and rural correspondent movement, the editorial offices of wall newspapers, the "Sinyaya bluza" trade union agitation collectives, and afterward from the first large-circulation plant and rural press publications.

That was the time when freedom of speech was in full swing and the independent press played a highly important role in our society's life. Those of us who took part in it were roused by the concern for the earliest possible restoration of the country's economy, which had been devastated by the civil war. We were excited by Lenin's idea about the building of socialism. We were inspired by the creative activity of the party which rallied the people to struggle for the implementation of that idea.

Unfortunately, as the stultifying effect of Stalin's dictatorship subsequently intensified, the independent press, like the mass media in general, began rapidly to fall into decay, was subjected to a rigid censorship and, having lost its vital soul, acquired a formal character.

Now the independent press has revived. Of course, it would be premature to claim that it has already fully regained those qualities which it lost during the Stalin era—the heavy burden of the old stereotypes recently recalled in the highly topical resolution of the Moscow Party City Committee bureau is still taking its toll. Nevertheless, we are witnessing a wholesome revival of freedom of speech supporting the search for constructive solutions to urgent economic and social problems.

A new phenomenon was the rapid development of the independent press of the informal organizations. Many of these publications, issued by groups which actively support perestroyka, have been urging their supporters to carry out concrete deeds and advocating the unification of all society's forces in the struggle for the solution of urgent political and economic tasks.

But alongside these examples there are others—certain independent publications are engaged not in concrete deeds and support for perestroyka but...in the persistent propagation of anticommunist and anti-Soviet views.

Furthermore, this propaganda often acquires an aggressive and, to be blunt, provocative character.

There was a time when anti-Soviet propaganda was regarded as a criminal offense. But the concept of anti-Soviet propaganda was interpreted too freely by the opponents of glasnost and the relevant article of the criminal code was sometimes used to settle scores with people who held different views. This loophole has now been closed to the anti-perestroyka forces—the discredited article of the law has been rescinded. Now only "calls for the violent overthrow or replacement of the Soviet state and social system" are punishable under the law adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 31 July.

But in front of me I have, for instance, issue No 14 of the newspaper SVOBODNOYE SLOVO, which I bought for R1.5 at the Moscow State University. It opens with a caricature: M.S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, aiming a revolver at the reader while behind his back there is the inscription "Perestroyka." This is an appeal addressed to "all antifascists in our country." It says:

"The beginning or rather the resumption of fascist terror in the country...."

Or take issue No 16 of the same newspaper bought in the same place. It contains a new "appeal" addressed this time to USSR People's Deputies:

"Be ready for an uncompromising struggle and open confrontation with the high priests and apologists of the criminal (!) state power. You can and must reject the existing constitution; demand elections to a constituent assembly on a multiparty basis; proclaim the need for the disintegration of the empire" (this means the USSR—Yu.Zh.)

Meanwhile, when the Congress of People's Deputies ended that same newspaper, the congress was reviled for not following that instruction. It stated that "in its present form the congress is no use at all" and it called the deputies "slaves cringing before the leader and his satraps."

You will say: Are such wild publications by these misguided pseudopoliticians to be taken seriously? Probably not. But there is a counterquestion here: Can one ignore the indisputable fact that such publications, with print runs sometimes exceeding 10,000 copies, are constantly multiplying and that the antistate articles printed by them are immediately transmitted to the USSR by hostile foreign radio stations?

And it is no coincidence that the publishers of such newspapers and journals enjoy overt material support from the West, without which they would not be able to engage in their publishing activity at all—after all, they do not work or receive pay in the USSR. Therefore, essentially their publications are foreign publications published on USSR territory without official permission.

Here is a very telling quote from THE NEW YORK TIMES:

"In the apartment of former political prisoner Lev Timofeyev in southwest Moscow there is a Toshiba-1000 computer and a Kodak Diconix printer. Timofeyev uses this to produce the unofficial (putting it mildly!—Yu. Zh.) journal 'REFERENDUM.' 'If only we could get a laser printer,' Timofeyev remarks wistfully"....

Here is what another "independent publisher," Grigoryants, wrote about his generous foreign patrons in the April issue of his journal published under the stolen title "GLASNOST":

"The journal is reprinted by various groups: It is reprinted in full in Russian in Paris as a supplement to RUSSKAYA MYSL (circulation 20,000), in English in New York, and individual issues are published in French and German (in Berne), and in Spanish, Polish, Armenian, Bulgarian, and other languages. In addition, the GLASNOST editorial office issues a daily newspaper in Paris for specialists (!) (GLASNOST AU QUOTIDIEN) with a print run of 1,000 copies, supplies Russian-language radio stations (abroad) and one French station with roundups, reviews, and other documents, and supplies several television companies with video reports."

I have before me another publication with equally wide ranging international ties: It is called the "PRESS BULLETIN OF THE INDEPENDENT (?) SIBERIAN NEWS AGENCY," which is published in the Baltic with a print run of 10,000 copies and is delivered by plane to Novosibirsk where this "agency" acts simultaneously as the "correspondents' center" of Radio Liberty, the U.S. anti-Soviet station. On the cover of this weekly bulletin it says:

"The SIBNA press bulletin is published in Novosibirsk in Russian, in Munich in German, and in Paris in French and English. SIBNA's information is used in transmissions by the BBC's Russian Service and by Voice of America and Radio Liberty. The times of the Radio Liberty broadcasts entitled 'The Fate of Siberia' which this 'correspondents center' prepares are given elsewhere."

Here is an example of the "information" which this apology for a "news agency" distributed in the USSR and abroad—in issue No 13 dated 2 July, it cites for example an appeal from some anti-Sovietist in Irkutsk "not to believe a single word" from the USSR leadership.

No wonder, therefore, that those foreign mass media which are unfriendly toward us willingly make use of such publications!

When you get to know such publications you can't help noticing that their actions are obviously coordinated—dozens of these "informal" publications presenting a united front waging one campaign after another as though to a coordinated plan. Just what campaigns are they?

First and most important—**these are systematic and malicious attacks on our party and its leadership.** On the face of it, for example, SVOBODNOYE SLOVO (the organ of the rabid anti-Soviet "Democratic Union"), OBSHCHINA (the organ of the anarchosyndicalists, the

admirers of "old Makhno" [leader of counterrevolutionary anarchist movement in Ukraine during Civil War]), GRAZHDANSKOYE DOSTOINSTVO (the organ of the so-called "moderate opposition"), RAZBEG (the publication of the "society of Marxists" (?), published in Volgodonsk), and others seem to adhere to various political positions but all simultaneously speak against the CPSU and its leadership.

This campaign is connected with the demand for a **change in the state system in our country.** GLASNOST states that it is guided by the "absolute confidence that socialist experiments should have been stopped a long time ago"....

In this connection **really blasphemous attacks on Lenin have intensified.** I simply cannot bring myself to quote or even paraphrase the hooligan outbursts against the founder of our socialist state. There is nothing more despicable than, for example the pornographic "verses" about Lenin by the shameless "poet" V. Yaremenko which appear with his photograph in issue No 15 of the journal DEMOKRATICHESKAYA OPPOZITSIYA, published in Leningrad. And this character is one of the journal's leaders!

Recently publications of this sort have sharply intensified their **provocative actions in the sphere of interethnic relations** in their desire to turn public opinion against our state system and its basic ideological tenets. SVOBODNOYE SLOVO, for instance, recently published an appeal from the well known Novodvorskaya addressed to the 17-18 June congress of the Sejm of the Lithuanian Sajudis demanding that a campaign of "civil disobedience" begin against the authorities.

This speaker stated among other things: **Only an open challenge and open disobedience to the country's authorities will lead to the downfall of the system."** And she concluded: **"When we return here we will be backed by the Lithuanian people who will have risen up (!) against despotism."**

The question is: After that what is the value of the clumsy attempts by "informal" association members of this sort to shirk responsibility for such provocative statements by giving assurances that they are "not calling for violent actions" but are merely expressing their "opinions" in the framework of democracy and glasnost?

I hope that when the new law on the press is being elaborated the question of the procedure governing the publication of the independent press will be worked out in detail. Clear principles must be defined which would prevent any restriction of the freedom of speech, on the one hand, and would prevent it from being used for the overthrow of the state system on the other, especially with foreign material support.

The law enforcement organs are entitled, of course, to demand that publishers provide information on the financing of their activity and the source of the resources for the publication of their newspapers or journals. They are entitled to answers to questions which at first glance seem technical but which have political significance: Questions such as where the paper is obtained for these publications (it is no secret that often it is simply stolen!) and why in many instances they unlawfully use the duplicating equipment of state organizations and even state printing presses and so forth to print them. In brief, everything contrary to our laws must be prevented.

But the main thing in the atmosphere of glasnost is to struggle against our political opponents—there is no other name for them!—using methods characteristic of glasnost. However, we sometimes eschew a polemic with them out of simple disgust and in so doing leave the field free for them in the battle for people's minds.

The campaign which these publications have now launched for the rehabilitation of Tsar Nicholas the Bloody and the members of his family and their elevation to the ranks of the holy martyrs, for example, may seem absurd. But I agree entirely with the recent article in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA by An. Makarov, who expressed understandable alarm at the fact that this campaign may confuse many people with a poor knowledge of history.

Yet in the "independent" publications there is an ever rising muddy tide of drivel to the effect that the "Bolshevik barbarians brutally murdered the last Russian emperor," that in so doing the "evil communist regime experimented with genocide for the first time," and that thus the remains of Nicholas II and the members of his family should be buried in the "historic tomb of the Tsars—the cathedral of Peter and Paul in St. Petersburg."

I cannot understand why we do not oppose such items with the historical truth about the bloody Tsar whom even the most diehard monarchists abandoned in 1917? And there are tens and hundreds of questions of that kind!

I think that we should show the political complexion of the publishers and editors of publications which link up with the independent press for purposes totally unrelated to the struggle for the development of democracy and glasnost. Who are these people? How do they live? What is their political creed?

People say that to pay attention to this crowd flatters them too much, why enhance their reputation? I flatly disagree with that facile approach, which excuses mental laxity and the inability to defend our ideological values.

Yes, perestroyka has now given the right to freedom of speech and the right to differing views. Yes, everyone now has the right to express his ideas, even if they are contrary to ours. But that does not mean in the least that we can treat good and evil with indifference. Lenin taught us otherwise.

When putting forward the idea of the party-mindedness of the press as a fundamental principle he considered the firmness and clarity of its political line and intransigence toward manifestations of opportunism and the party's

ideological opponents as essential. Remember his stance in the famous "Statement of the ISKRA editorial board" back at the beginning of this century—August 1900:

"...We do not intend our organ to become a mere repository of differing views. On the contrary, we shall lead it in a strictly defined direction. That direction may be expressed by the word Marxism and we need hardly add that we stand for the consistent development of the ideas of Marx and Engels...." (Works, volume 4, pages 354-360).

We shall be faithful to Lenin's behest, we shall be firm in the defense of Lenin's ideas, and we shall be implacable toward the intrigues of those who would like to divert us from the Leninist path!

Article Highlights Perestroyka's Positive Aspects

PM2908095189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Aug 89 Second Edition p 2

[Boris Oleynik article under the rubric "People's Deputy Forum": "Reading the Tea Leaves"]

[Excerpts] Kiev—As it was, it shall be. Or maybe, to put it somewhat more simply: It has always been so... As far as mankind recalls, during a change (rather than reshuffle) of sociopolitical formations, during a substantial breakdown of ingrained stereotypes and a general revolutionary reorganization of social structures (that is closest of all to our current model) general enthusiasm reigned in the reformists' camp, while hope of a most speedy deliverance, which often reached the point of euphoria, reigned in the people yearning for renewal—the hope that you would wake up in morning and the longed-for new world would be outside. [passage omitted].

Yes, our society is experiencing drastic times. Many projects have indeed failed. It has reached the point where there are fewer commodities in the stores than under the lean years of stagnation. Some cooperatives have become a refuge for inveterate speculators and declasse elements. Moreover, soap, washing powder, matches, and now even school primers have joined the ranks of articles in short supply.

The saddest thing is that, as many scientists' current articles illustrate, it transpires that they knew from historical parallels that during radical changes of structure such as our perestroyka the people must be prepared for the state of the public organism to deteriorate. Why then did the current deterioration take us by surprise?

People say that creative vision is equivalent to foresight. Politics is also creative work. Consequently, it should forecast the future. But scientists must in turn furnish politicians with the forecasts and thus protect us "faint hearts" from panic.

It was precisely the theoreticians who were among the first to press the panic button. It began with hints in some articles saying that the wrong path had been chosen, that maybe it was not worth "beginning" at all, and questioning whether it was worth it. But whereas speculators and demagogues, who are constantly involved in rallies, are accustomed to swapping their obsequious allegiance to Gorbachev when expedient for equally zealous criticism, that does not suit serious scientists at all.

To my very deep astonishment, it was among certain philosophers that a kind of occultism, particularly limited fortune-telling, vague allusions to a future Armageddon, and moreover rumors and half-questions began to arise: Is a coup like October 1964 possible in our country and so on and so forth. This was precisely what Doctor of Philosophy N. Mikhaylov discussed in an article "intriguingly" headlined "Is October 1964 Possible Today," which I read recently in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA.

What, is that really possible right now, comrades? Have we really achieved nothing in these 4 years either in the material or spiritual sense? What about glasnost? What about universal democratization? What about the whole package of ethnic and interethnic problems, which have not only been raised most acutely for the first time in more than 60 years but are already being resolved? What about the steady advance toward a rule-of-law society—despite its shortcomings? What about the pluralism of opinions which is guaranteed by that selfsame glasnost? What about the successes of our state and people's diplomacy in disarmament and strengthening confidence in a peaceful future? What about the elections using a new—albeit at present extremely imperfect but nonetheless democratic—model? What about the first congress of newly elected people's deputies itself, which was held in a world where people debated everything or virtually everything more freely and easily? What about the laws adopted at the Supreme Soviet which were approved by our multiethnic public?..

Do these really not represent the convincingly real achievements of perestroyka? Do they do not guarantee the irreversibility of renewal and the firm, mighty, restrictive barrier to backlashes to secret "palace coups"? The fact that some people may very much like to breathe fully the icy "ozone of October 1964" is another matter. But whether this happens or not depends on no one but us ourselves, who have taken control of the Army and law-enforcement bodies via our deputies' committees and commissions.

So is it not better to build a new socialist home worthy of Soviet man with our own hands and by our own efforts by improving the mechanism of people's power and overcoming our weariness and disappointment in the face of our initial—occasionally cruel—failures rather than becoming fortune-tellers and hysterical women from bazaars nasally foretelling the end of the world? In short, to act!

Otherwise it does indeed look at though some people "are doing the donkey work" while others are "are dawdling." Some people work till they drop while others pose as lookouts urging people on, saying "Come on, come on!"

I am by no means complacent if only because I was born and live in the Ukraine, which has experienced the whole gamut of tragedies: the almost universal repressions, the famine of 1933 and 1945, the occupation, complete collapse, and false accusations of nationalism with the consequences which that entails. Moreover, I have serious complaints to make against the center and the head of state personally regarding their indecisiveness, above all in unraveling interethnic knots. I am more than convinced that 18 months ago the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh could have been resolved more calmly and not so painfully. The situation there now has deteriorated to the limit. More precisely, there is every sign of virtual civil war.

At the same time I by no means consider the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to be an impasse. But to ensure that it does not indeed become such, the center, the head of state, and in this case, the CPSU Central Committee general secretary must, in my opinion, urge the top people in both republics to come to the negotiating table without excessive equivocation and meet one another halfway as Communists invested with the peoples' trust for the sake of their peoples' future. Otherwise doubts regarding their party-minded convictions may creep in—in me personally.

It is only by pooling all healthy forces in society that one can, I am convinced, resolve both nationalities and all our other most complex problems. Of course, it is not so hard to provide people with detached advice but that is only part of the matter because the voters, who have entrusted us with mandates as people's deputies, expect real and full-blooded action from us; that is, personal, enterprising, and public participation in perestroyka rather than advice and expansive talk on the "topic of the day."

We were not elected for the role of mourners and beggars at the church seeking "alms"; we were sent to parliament to use all our energy to renew and improve the life of Soviet people.

At least that is how I personally see the mission of people's deputy, not as a superintendent but as a worker for perestroyka. And I not only believe in the irreversibility of perestroyka but will also do everything in my power to ensure that this belief is embodied in constructive action to the extent of my modest powers and capabilities.

Rumored Invitations to Chernobyl Victims Denied

PM2908095989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[Own correspondent M. Odinets report under the rubric "Rumors Versus Reliable Information": "No One Is Waiting Across the Ocean"]

[Text] Kiev, 23 Aug—A telephone call from Zhitomir was received at the PRAVDA correspondent's office in Kiev: "Is it true that Canada and the United States have agreed to accept inhabitants of territories in Zhitomir and Kiev Oblasts contaminated by radionuclides as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station?" Then people rang again and again: "Will people really receive assistance on arrival overseas?"

We got in touch with the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs. Deputy Minister V. Durdinets told us that all these reports are totally unfounded. However, it appears that the rumors have already crossed the ocean and arrived in Canada. Commenting on radio listeners' questions to this effect, a local radio station broadcasting in Russian has categorically rejected them. What is more, "Radio Canada" journalists told the authors of these questions from our country: "Canada is not made of elastic. These are your problems, it is up to you to solve them."

Ukrainian radio reported today that a staffer of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow has also categorically denied that victims of the accident at the nuclear power station on the Pripyat have been invited to come and live across the ocean.

In this context I would like to report that an authoritative commission headed by V. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has visited Chernobyl, Pripyat, Slavutich, and Narodichi for several days in order to study the situation which has taken shape after the accident in a number of areas of the Ukrainian Polesye. No specific decisions have as yet been adopted. Members of the commission have asked for time to draw up a detailed and effective program. In accordance with a government resolution, the inhabitants of 12 villages in Narodichskiy Rayon will be resettled in other parts of the republic.

IZVESTIYA Responds to Readers' Criticism

PM3008102389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Review by Yuriy Orlik, IZVESTIYA editor responsible for the letters department, under the rubric "Reading the Mail": "The Things IZVESTIYA Is Criticized for"]

[Excerpt] The words of the title indicate that this review is not concerned with all the complimentary letters sent to our newspaper (and they run into the hundreds). But that is the only thing it is not concerned with. Yes, when subscription is at its height, it is usual to say what the editorial office has done. We will break with tradition and ask what it has not done. Especially as some readers

of fairly high rank are convinced that the mass media are the only "no-go area" left as far as criticism is concerned.

The Newspaper and the Soviets

When assessing the performance of our newspaper, many readers focus their attention on the period when the Congress of USSR People's Deputies was in progress. The Congress set the standard: for the frankness with which the most serious problems of our social sphere were discussed, for its uncompromising criticism, and for the diversity of political views expressed. It is the general belief that the stenographic report of the Congress was the best material of the year.

"But now that the Congress is over, there is virtually nothing of interest in the press, IZVESTIYA included," D. Smolnikov from Dimitrovgrad in Ulyanovsk Oblast believes. "If you only read the newspapers you get the impression that life has come to a halt. But that is not the case at all. The country is still seething with passions. We need reviews providing an in-depth analysis of the Congress results and showing how the Congress decisions link up with life. And what do people's deputies have to say? Surely they have not all gone off for the parliamentary recess?"

The Congress, which proclaimed the supremacy of soviet authority, has reinforced the belief in people's minds that IZVESTIYA must have a special role to play within the system of publications. "Surely there is not really any great difference between you and PRAVDA, TRUD, and SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA when it comes to establishing and defending the principles of people's power?" N. Timoshenko from Sverdlovsk, an engineer with the "Turbomotornyy Zavod" Production Association, asked us. "Even the work of the Supreme Soviet, its chambers, and its committees has been given offensively scant coverage. And what about your parliamentary correspondents—are they just understudies for TASS?" "Every newspaper should have its own image. What is yours exactly?" Ye. Drobyazko, an electrical fitter from Chernigov, asked us. A. Boyko, a fitter and CPSU member from Pavlodar, worded his complaint against the newspaper more sharply: "As is well known, the trade unions, which count themselves as protectors of the working people's interests, were on the opposite side of the barricades to the miners during the mining strike. Are you not afraid that you will find yourself in the same position? At the moment I cannot see the official organ of the soviets waging a consistent, principled struggle to make the soviets full master of the situation at local level." "The people's interest in the Congress of Soviets is an interest in the soviets themselves, which are their hope. The newspaper must regularly print interviews with deputies—after all, there are more than 2,000 of them and they all have their own ideas." These lines come from a letter from V. Kondratenko in Komsomolskiy Settlement, Sovetskiy Rayon, Tyumen Oblast.

Readers believe that the entire spectrum of political and social forces working in the country should be represented in the newspaper without any exceptions—not only when covering the work of the Soviet parliament but also when discussing any serious problem, program, or platform. If the editorial board does not share certain views and opinions, it can make its own position clear in an editorial article or commentary.

Interethnic Relations

Readers reject popular propaganda cliches passed off as an analysis of events and seemingly loading all the blame for the exacerbation of ethnic conflicts solely on the difficult Stalinist legacy or "hooligan elements in a state of drug-induced intoxication." They demand that journalists get to the very heart of events and "do not protect us from the truth." "Reports on conflict situations in the national republics, on the attitudes of the sides involved, and on the factors which led to the exacerbation of relations are obscure, confusing, and even offensive by virtue of the lack of faith the newspaper has in its readers," is the opinion of M. Vinogradov from Kishinev. "You are forced to try to pick up the BBC in order to find out what is really going on. You get the impression that the BBC has its own special correspondents there, at the hot spots, and that IZVESTIYA does not. The events in Tbilisi and Abkhazia and what is happening here in our own republic are all vaguely hinted at. Or is there some taboo on these subjects?" "The central press, IZVESTIYA included, largely glosses over events and contradictions in interethnic relations. My faith in your newspaper has been shaken," A. Chukarev, a teacher from Izhevsk, said. Or take another opinion. "In my opinion, you are overdramatizing the situation and presenting the surge of national awareness, kept down by years of authoritarian regime, as a 'mutiny.' The imperial way of thinking is firmly established in us. Surely the formation of independent, sovereign republics, defense of the federation's treaty foundations, and the struggle against departmental diktat in order to live as one thinks fit rather than as Moscow does will not lead to the disintegration of the country? You should make a better job of defending restructuring against conservatives and the 'old guard.'" These lines are taken from a letter from V. Stroganov in Klaypeda.

One could agree with the appeal by the writer of this letter if recent experience had not confirmed us in the belief that democracy and glasnost do not only need to be protected against attacks from the right. Extremist attacks pose no less danger to society. Each has its own aspect. In particular, one cannot fail to see that the increased potential for tension in interethnic relations could lead to discharges of enormous destructive strength. "Extremism is dangerous not so much because of its immediate consequences as because of its long-term consequences: It paves the way to Bonapartism," V. Kulchitskiy, a candidate of sciences from Vladivostok, observed.

International Life

While noting that the new thinking is beginning to be felt on IZVESTIYA's international pages, readers also believe that journalists' references to the fact that "they are prevented from speaking the full truth by diplomatic considerations are nothing more than an admission of the inadequate level of their own proficiency." (S. Kovrov, Novgorod). "S. Kondrashov and A. Bovin should not be afraid of 'complicating relations.'" (V. Semcheno, Karaganda). Readers are not satisfied with the way in which IZVESTIYA covered recent events in China. "I still have not been able to find an answer to my question of whether we agree that violence can be used to safeguard order," N. Kishchenko from Kiev wrote. "Was the newspaper so cautious in its assessment of the events because the use of military force is not ruled out in the event of the already complicated situation in some of our regions becoming more complicated?" It also has not escaped readers' attention that, when writing for other publications and speaking on television, IZVESTIYA political observers have fewer inhibitions.

Readers reproach our correspondents for failing to foresee and predict the development of the political situation. "I have not forgotten what our press said of 'Solidarity' in previous years," G. Taratuta from Taganrog observed. "Not a great deal of time has passed since then and already the leaders of the opposition—once interned—are being invited to the roundtable and have won a majority in the Sejm, and it is quite possible that the Walesa team will form a government."

Having consulted with staffers in IZVESTIYA's international departments, we could probably absolve ourselves of some of these complaints. We could point to the fact, for example, that our objective coverage of the events in Poland has recently been commented on by "Solidarity" leaders themselves. But it is, after all, not a question of justification. It is a question of ensuring that foreign information is not colored by departmental interests or, even worse, by "our internal" interests, with people saying that the situation in the country is tense enough anyway. [passage omitted].

Military Historian Notes Causes of World War II

LD3008143989 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1248 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 30 Aug (TASS)—World War II could have been prevented, Colonel General Dmitriy Volkogonov, head of the Institute for Military History, told a TASS correspondent in an interview. In his view, this did not happen because both Western countries and the Soviet Union did not show enough flexibility in the matter of creating a collective security system in Europe. As an example of such an unconstructive approach, he gave the tripartite talks conducted between the USSR, Britain, and France in Moscow on 12-21 August 1939. At those talks, the Western powers tried, in fact, to direct the German aggression eastward and, with this purpose, dragged the adoption of concrete decision out in every possible way.

On the other hand, Professor Dmitriy Volkogonov thinks that attempts to set up a system of collective security failed, to a great degree, because of the policy of Stalin's leadership, too. Thus, the Comintern—the international organization of communists—as early as in 1928 reaffirmed its stake on a world revolution. On the eve of the war it was completely under Stalin's control, being, in essence, an ideological body of his power. The Soviet historian sees as quite natural the fear that many Western politicians felt at the mere thought of a possible export of revolution into their countries. As yet another negative aspect of Stalin's political thinking, Dmitriy Volkogonov names the rejection of social-democracy which in the then Soviet policy was identified with fascism. In his view, that circumstance contributed to the international isolation of the USSR.

On the problems of the nonaggression pact between the USSR and Germany of 23 August 1939, Dmitriy Volkogonov expressed the conviction that the secret protocols to this document did indeed exist. These accords are in clear contravention of the principles of socialist morality, the aims of Leninst policy, and international law, he stressed. In the view of the Soviet historian, the question of denouncement of these treaties, the need for which many people speak today, automatically ceased to arise on 22 June 1941, when Hitler attacked the USSR. "History is not a film; you cannot rewind it, just as you cannot 'cancel out' the last dreadful war or resurrect the millions who died," he said.

Dmitriy Volkogonov does not see the Soviet-German accords of 1939 as the main factor which set off the start of World War II. He referred to the "Weiss" operations plan for the capture of Poland, which was approved in Berlin as early as April 1939. At the same time, the Soviet historian thinks the signing of the secret protocols did, to some extent, untie Hitler's hands, which enabled combat actions to start against Poland without threatening the intervention of the USSR.

The main lesson of World War II is that war has to be combatted even before it has started, Dmitriy Volkogonov said. "A third world war cannot be permitted, because it would be the last war for mankind," he stressed. "The new political thinking calls upon us to do that."

Economic

Goskomstat Official on Compiling Price Index

PM3008142589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 1

[F. Ivanov interview with N. Ivanov, chief of the USSR State Committee for Statistics Finance and Prices Statistics Administration: "There Will Be a Real Price Index"—date and place unspecified; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Inflation, rising prices, the erosion of inexpensive goods.... These words have ceased to be abstract concepts: Every one of us is feeling their impact on our purse. How fast are these processes moving and what is the current price index? These questions are to be answered by the new research program begun by the USSR State Committee for Statistics.

"I must say," N. Ivanov, chief of the USSR State Committee for Statistics Finance and Prices Statistics Administration, said, "that we have calculated price indexes in the past. Unfortunately, this research failed to take full account of changes in price formation and so, in effect, served to underpin the slogan of stable prices in the Soviet Union.

"The situation radically changed when the government was required to supply real data on the growth of prices in our country and the level of inflation. A USSR Council of Ministers resolution adopted at the beginning of this year instructed us to develop methods for researching these processes and to publish the official price indexes next year. We have had to rapidly study accumulated international experience, as many countries have been conducting this kind of research for decades. This spring we published a textbook of methods for gathering and processing information connected with indexing in conjunction with the USSR State Planning Committee [Gosplan], the USSR Ministry of Finance, the USSR State Committee on Prices, the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, the USSR State Bank, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), and the USSR Academy of Sciences."

[F. Ivanov] What specific form will this research take?

[N. Ivanov] We are currently establishing a nationwide network of so-called registration specialists, who will ascertain the prices of basic types of goods and services in every region. At present their staff will be some 300-400 people. With their assistance we will be able to draw up summary tables, which we will use to determine the rise or fall in prices for various types of goods; only then will we calculate a general price index.

[F. Ivanov] Surely this work cannot be done by only a few hundred people? After all, tens of thousands of goods are produced across the country and there are also a fair number of services.

[N. Ivanov] Unfortunately the system we have at present is far from ideal. In the United States, for example, thousands of state employees are responsible for this work and special centers have been established for processing incoming information. All this makes it possible not only to publish weekly price indexes but also to conduct serious research. We, on the other hand, will have at best two permanent registrators in every oblast center or republic capital. They will have to maintain contacts with dozens of commercial, cultural, and consumer services establishments, analyzing prices for approximately 700 groups of goods and 200 groups of services. What is more, they will not have either a personal car or a computer at their disposal. It is very hard to find this kind of specialist, as we need top professionals with all the skills of the commodity expert, economist, technologist, and statistician. No academic establishment in the country trains this kind of specialist and so we will have to train them ourselves for the present at our own institute for improving qualifications. But I hope that many of these problems will soon be able to be resolved.

[F. Ivanov] When will the first results of the research be published?

[N. Ivanov] We must produce price indexes for various groups of goods and services for 1989 sometime in the first 6 months of next year. However, the USSR State Committee for Statistics has made experimental calculations of retail prices for consumer goods this summer and determined a price index for the last quarter of 1988. It stands at 102.3, which means that over the year the prices for these goods rose by 2.3 percent.

[F. Ivanov] Just how objective is this data? After all, the press often quotes considerably higher figures.

[N. Ivanov] It is certainly true that many scientists writing on this subject have given different figures, but each of them has used his own methods of calculation, known only to himself. Our own research is based solely on prices in the state trade network, but the price indexing for the whole of 1989 will also incorporate cooperative and market trade.

[F. Ivanov] ...What about the black market?

[N. Ivanov] No, it will not include that at present, unfortunately. Research of the shadow economy is very complex and its methods are still in the developmental stages; no country in the world can boast that its research is totally objective.

[F. Ivanov] What is the practical application of your research?

[N. Ivanov] In many countries official price indexes are taken into account when collective contracts are being drawn up between trade unions and enterprise managements. Growth in the wages of workers and employees depends directly on this. I think we will also have to follow this path. What is more, objective data on the

increase in prices for various goods and services will help scientists and economic specialists to determine the course of these processes and decide what needs to be done to slow them down. In this sense, the significance of our research program is very great.

Agricultural

Foreign Currency Pay for Grain Explained

18240232 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 17 Aug 89 p 2

[Report on interview with M.L. Timoshishin, first deputy chairman of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Foodstuffs and Procurement, by TASS correspondents A. Ignatyev and G. Krivets, special to SELSKAYA ZHIZN, date and place not specified: "Hard Currency for Grain"]

[Text] Never before has director of the Batumskiy State Farm in Belozerskiy Rayon of Kherson Oblast V. Trishchanovich had to wonder how to dispose of the harvest. The fact that they have thought and have made decisions for him has not been the only reason. After all, there has been only one way out: You've got the grain—sell it to the state.

Now, in a new environment for economic operations, the director may dispose of above-the-plan grain at his discretion and calculate what is more advantageous for him. There is a lot for the director to consider.

At Batumskiy, they harvested overall 62.2 quintals of grain [per hectare]. This is almost 24 quintals above the average annual yield in the 11th 5-year plan. The secret of this success is not only in the favorable weather conditions. For many other farms, the weather was the same, but the harvest was different.

Due to the skillful implementation of leasing, they threshed 12,397 tons of grain at Batumskiy. Half of it was sent to the elevator. This is almost 1.5 times the state order. Grain growers were not wronged either: They received 3 tons of grain each. The amount needed was stored in the farm funds. However, there is surplus grain. There is no such thing as surplus grain, though.

Valentin Vasilyevich reflects: "Of course, this grain is not surplus, and we need it badly. It is good that the grain field has lived up to our expectations. However, there are quite a few problems in other sectors. The losses of harvest in vegetable growing are still high. They could be avoided if we had a modern processing plant. However, where are we to get good equipment for a canning shop? It can be purchased abroad, for hard currency. This is why we want to take advantage of the opportunities given us by the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers and sell additionally another 2,000 to 2,500 tons of strong and valuable wheat."

How is this to be actually done?

TASS [Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union] correspondents approached M.L. Timoshishin, first deputy chairman of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Foodstuffs and Procurement, with this question.

Mikhail Lukich said: "At present, procedures for the transfer of hard currency to the control of kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] pursuant to the resolution are being developed, and will soon be communicated to the farms interested in this. We can say the following on a preliminary basis. The farms notify the grain-procuring enterprises in writing, ahead of time, that they will sell for hard currency hard, strong, and valuable strains of wheat, peas, lupine, sunflower seed, soybeans, rape, and mustard, and accordingly make notes to that effect on the accompanying documents during the delivery of the above products to the grain-procuring enterprises.

"For example, a farm delivered 500 tons of hard, strong, and valuable wheat with the notation on accompanying documents 'to be paid for in hard currency.'

"In the process, the average level of grain sales by the farm on the whole in the 11th 5-year plan is determined to be 1,000 tons, and actually 1,150 tons in reported weight was sold. The average annual level of grain production in the 11th 5-year plan was also attained.

"In this case, the grain-procuring enterprise issues to the farm a corresponding certificate with regard to 150 tons of hard, strong, and valuable wheat for the right to be issued currency, and pays for 350 tons through the procedures in effect at the procurement prices and bonuses to them denominated in Soviet rubles.

"The grain-procuring enterprise transfers to the account of the 'Eksportkhleb' the cost of 150 tons of hard, strong, and valuable wheat indicating the farm-supplier. In turn, the 'Eksportkhleb,' on the basis of the documents received on the effected settlement for the wheat subject to payment in hard currency, gives instructions to the Bank for Foreign Economic Relations to transfer the hard currency to the currency account of the supplier farm, which is opened at the local branch of the bank.

"Similar settlements are effected with regard to pulse and oil-bearing crops."

[Ignatyev, Krivets] For what purposes can the hard-currency funds received by farms be spent?

[Timoshishin] The resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers does not establish any restrictions in this regard. Consequently, the farms are going to make decisions on spending the hard-currency funds generated on their own, proceeding from their priority needs.

In order to ensure the necessary purchases abroad for the hard currency deposited in the currency accounts of farms, the latter may approach for assistance relevant foreign trade organizations of the Ministry of Foreign

Economic Relations, which will provide for ensuring purchases in the foreign market on the terms most advantageous for them.

[A. Ignatyev, G. Krivets] Mikhail Lukich, why was adopting this resolution necessary?

[Timoshishin] The gross grain harvest has not exceeded the level of the 10th 5-year plan during the past 3 years. The marketability of grain has declined; in 1988, it amounted to merely 31.5 percent. Last year, the area under grains declined by 13 million hectares, compared to the average annual level of the 10th 5-year plan, while yields increased by merely 1 quintal per hectare. Grain procurement declined from 77.9 million tons in 1986 to 60.2 million tons last year.

The situation in building up state wheat reserves continues to remain unsatisfactory. Last year, the shortfall in supplies compared to the state order amounted to 14.2 million tons, or 29 percent of the state order, and a drop in procurement compared to the 1987 level was allowed to occur.

It is known that the production and supply to the populace of a wide array of baked and macaroni goods is associated with wheat, the quality of which meets the requirements for strong, hard, and valuable wheat strains. For many years, the grain-milling industry has been working in the environment of an acute shortage of wheat produced domestically. Only one-third of the needs of the macaroni industry for special flower is met.

Measures taken in order to stimulate the production and procurement of grain have not brought the results expected. In the last 3 years, more than 30 percent of the farms have failed to fulfill the plans and contractual obligations every year.

The attained level of procurement prices for grain is creating a situation when the farms are not interested in selling it to the state. Due to this, providing incentives for increases in the production and procurement of grains is becoming very important.

Agricultural Developments for 25-29 Aug Reported

LD3108044789

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 25-29 August, unless otherwise indicated. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parenthesis at the end of each item.

25 August

The situation in the grain fields of Omsk Oblast is causing concern. Although the grain has ripened, only a little more than a quarter of the acreage has been threshed. This is almost 300,000 hectares less than at this time last year. The problem is mainly organizational and technical shortcomings. Harvesting of oil-producing crops, especially flax, mustard, and false flax, has been unjustifiably slow in Omsk's Pri-Irtyshye. (0400)

Harvesters in Altay Kray are harvesting their 2 millionth hectare of grain. Collective farms have fulfilled the state plan for delivery of rye and winter crops. Peas have been harvested without losses. All efforts are now being concentrated on harvesting the spring wheat. (0900)

Agricultural workers in Chelyabinsk oblast in the southern Urals find themselves in a difficult situation today as they strive to bring in what remains of the crops that survived the sun. Enormous damage has been done to the farms. Feed procurement is taking place amid great difficulties. The people are now taking measures to supplement farm resources. Of the 130,000 hectares of grain crops which burned, 100,000 have been resown already. Rape and feed crops are now turning those fields green. (2230)

26 August

Sowing of winter grain has begun in Kirghizia. The winter crops are expected to yield up to 50 quintals per hectare. (0204)

27 August

Widespread sowing of winter crops has begun on farms in Belgorod Oblast. Leasing and contracting units have undertaken cultivation of over 4 million hectares. Farmers of Belgorod have given preference in sowing to promising varieties of winter wheat and winter rye. (0600)

Over 450,000 tonnes of grain crops have been stored by agricultural workers in Yaroslavl Oblast. (1300)

28 August

Sowing of winter grain crops has begun in Volgograd Oblast. Harvesting, which was delayed by torrential rains, continues. (0204)

The more than 20,000 vehicles of the Altay Kray harvester pool are in the fields harvesting the spring wheat. More than 80 percent of the crop is of strong, firm, valuable varieties. (1300)

29 August

Collective and state farms in Tambov Oblast have delivered almost 700,000 tonnes of grain to the granaries, 75 percent of the state order. This harvest has taken place under difficult conditions, but the agricultural workers have used every available hour. Machine operators have now switched over to the harvesting of millet. In this area this crop occupies 85,000 hectares. (0204)

The sugar-beet harvest began today in Krasnodar Kray. This crop will be harvested from about 200,000 hectares of land. (0204)

Volgograd Oblast grain growers have sold their 2 millionth tonne of grain to the state. Many farms in the oblast are now sowing winter crops. (0900)

Three of the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan—Tselinograd, Kustanay, and Kokchetav—have cleared grain crops on nearly half their acreage. The fast rate is a result of the severe drought. In many farms however, leasing units and brigades did achieve reasonable results. (1100)

Scientific

Deputy Minister on Satellite Phone Links

PM3008134189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Yu. Zubarev, deputy minister of communications, by own correspondent I. Demchenko under the rubric "Problems and Arguments": "'Energiya' and the Wait for Telephones. Will Space Technology Help Solve the Communications Problem?"—date and place unspecified; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] As is well known, the "Energiya-Buran" space system was launched at the end of last year. A powerful launcher capable of placing up to a 100-tonne payload in orbit had appeared. The unprecedented potential of "Energiya" has not yet found an application in the national economy. This potential could be utilized by the USSR Ministry of Communications.

In particular, the possibility of bringing extensive telephone communications to the country is being pinned on this rocket. After all, the number of people with phones in our country today is entirely comparable with the number of car-owners. Our correspondent asked Yu. Zubarev, deputy minister of communications, to discuss the prospects offered by the new rocket in the sphere of space-based communications.

[Demchenko] Yuriy Borisovich, as far as I am aware rocket launches are currently financed out of the state budget. But we are reaching the point where the market is becoming the main regulator of economic relations. Clearly, space programs will be no exception. Will the expenditure on the utilization of "Energiya" be recouped?

[Zubarev] For us this is the main question. Starting from the next 5-year plan, the USSR Ministry of Communications itself will pay for the each communications satellite launch. For us too it is not yet obvious that the advantages of the new rocket will be equal to the expenditure on it. "Energiya" has flown just once, consequently it is still hard to estimate the expenditure on its series utilization.

I recall that a waveguide line of communications was once developed. It had a huge throughput capacity at relatively low cost. Where was the line to be installed? Between Moscow and Leningrad, of course. But when the sums were done it turned out that the traffic between the two cities would be meager compared with the capabilities of the waveguide. The capital expenditure on the line has not been recouped during its operation.

I do not want to draw an analogy with "Energiya." I hope that its great potential will be required, particularly by our sector. Specialists are looking for ways to use the rocket effectively. Their conclusions should be ready by the second quarter of next year.

[Demchenko] The problem, clearly, is that we are having to adapt an existing rocket to the needs of the sector. I think that many "civilian" participants in conversion, having become customers for output from defense sector enterprises, are encountering the same kind of difficulties.

[Zubarev] And these difficulties are sometimes very serious. For instance, "Energiya" is really a very powerful rocket, but it is designed to place a spacecraft in a 300-km orbit around the earth. Communications satellites orbit at 36,000 km. This means that "Energiya" will need another power unit [blok] to "boost" our equipment to the necessary altitude. But the actual satellite will weigh just 17-18 tonnes rather than 100 tonnes. The useful payload is correspondingly halved.

Admittedly, even this capacity considerably exceeds the capabilities of current satellites. According to preliminary calculations, each satellite launched by "Energiya" will make it possible to increase tenfold the number of space-based telephone communications channels. Large antennas could be fitted to the satellites, which would have a positive impact on communications quality.

Such a satellite—or, as it is sometimes called, a space platform—opens up wide-ranging prospects for TV broadcasting. Currently we broadcast two channels via satellite, and we could also transmit local television. People would only need a small device to be able to receive 10 channels from a space-based retransmitter.

[Demchenko] Let's not forget that two tasks are set during conversion: to curb the arms race and to organize production of products that are in short supply. We have a shortage of telephone communications. And if a heavy satellite will make it possible to increase the number of lines tenfold, perhaps it would be an idea to solve this problem with its help?

[Zubarev] Unfortunately, the potential of even a heavy satellite is quite limited in this respect. One space platform could provide around 100,000 communications channels. After that, it's simply a question of arithmetic. We currently have more than 15 million people in our country waiting for phones to be installed. And we cannot increase the number of satellites ad infinitum. The point is that a spacecraft is only stationary with regard to the earth's surface in one orbit. This orbit is used by communications people worldwide, and space in it is also at a premium. So we should not count just yet on getting out of the telephone crisis exclusively by using the "Energiya" rocket.

At the same time, we will be solving the problem with ground-based equipment: We are laying more modern communications cables and building new automatic telephone exchanges. We will be commissioning 12.5

million communications lines in the current 5-year plan, and we plan to make a jump to 22 million lines in the next 5-year plan. This should ease the pressure to some extent. By the year 2000 I hope that almost every urban family and one in every two rural families will have a telephone.

[Demchenko] It is no secret that a strategy for the further utilization of "Energiya-Buran" was not worked out during the development of this space system. You are probably among the first people who wanted to look at all the pros and cons of the project from the outset and then give a final response. And yet I would like you to be more definite: Are you happy about the emergence of "Energiya" or is it a burden to you?

[Zubarev] Of course we're happy. But everything has to be calculated properly. We will not incur losses through our use of equipment—that will predetermine our final response.

'Aktivny' Project Preparations Being Completed

LD3008133189 Moscow TASS in English 0930 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 30 TASS—A group of specialists from the Space Research Institute have arrived at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in northern Russia to complete preparations for the launch of a space system to implement the international project "Aktivny".

Plesetsk is the Soviet third cosmodrome (after Baykonur and Kapustin Yar). It has been in operation since 1960 and has launched many "Cosmos" and "Molniya" communications satellites as well as other applied spacecraft.

A soviet satellite and a 50 kilogram sub-satellite manufactured by Czechoslovakia will be launched from Plesetsk late this September as part of the "Aktivnny" project. The aim of the programme is to investigate electromagnetic wave propagation in the Earth's magetosphere, as well as the waves' interaction with energetic charged particles of radiation belts.

Along with Soviet colleagues, the project was prepared by researchers from Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. Information from the spacecraft will be received by ground stations in the USSR as well as Brazil, New Zealand, the United States, Japan and Finland. Some 30 geophysical stations will participate in the experiment.

Valentin Shevchenko, project scientific supervisor, said that a plasma wave laboratory will be established in space. A magnetic aerial 20 meters in diameter will be unfolded on the main spacecraft. Such aerial will operate in space for the first time. Experts believe that the experiment's results will be of great importance for resolving urgent problems of space communications and earthquake forecasting.

Experts To Decide Fate of Nuclear Station

LD2908173889 Moscow TASS in English 1654 GMT 29 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 29 TASS—A group of independent expertise of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to decide the destiny of a nuclear heat supply station (NHSS) whose construction was started in Gorkiy, the Volga area. The group includes experts from the USA, Great Britain, Spain, France, Canada, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland and is headed by Michael Hayden of the USA. The group of experts is now concluding its second visit to the USSR, TASS learned from the centre of public information on nuclear energy. The 16 qualified experts on the group are now at the station's site. Prior to the trip to Gorkiy, the specialists familiarised themselves in detail with design and construction documents at Moscow organisations.

The experts' conclusions will depend on many factors—the correctness of the choice of the building site, quality of work, observance of all hygienic standards, the impact of the future station on the environment. The opinion of people of Gorkiy will be taken into consideration. Experts of IAEA are to meet the press and public of the city on Wednesday. Everyone will be able to state his or her opinion on the problem. Following the debate the experts will make the final decision.

Military

Marshal Kazakov Dies, Honored by Leaders

Leaders Sign Obituary

PM3008151589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Aug 89 Second Edition p 6

[Obituary of Marshal of Artillery K.P. Kazakov]

[Excerpts] Marshal of Artillery Konstantin Petrovich Kazakov, a prominent Soviet military leader, active participant in the Great Patriotic War, and member of the CPSU since 1920, died 25 August after a long and serious illness. A true son of the Soviet people, who devoted his life to selflessly serving the motherland and strengthening its defense capability, has died.

K.P. Kazakov was born 18 November 1902 in the city of Tula to a working class family. [passage omitted].

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, V.I. Vorotnikov, L.N. Zaykov, Ye.K. Ligachev, V.A. Medvedev, V.P. Nikonov, N.I. Ryzhkov, N.N. Slyunkov, V.M. Chebrikov, E.A. Shevardnadze, V.V. Shcherbitskiy, A.N. Yakovlev, A.P. Biryukova, A.V. Vlasov, A.I. Lukyanov, Yu.D. Maslyukov, G.P. Razumovskiy, Yu.F. Solovyev, N.V. Talyzin, D.T. Yazov, O.D. Baklanov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, A.D. Lizichev, A.S. Pavlov, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, A.N. Yefimov, V.N. Chernavin, N.K. Sorokin, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov,

D.S. Sukhorukov, Yu.A. Yashin, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, S.K. Kurkotkin, N.V. Ogarkov, V.I. Petrov, S.L. Sokolov, I.G. Pavlovskiy, I.N. Shkadov, M.D. Popkov, A.V. Betekhtin, D.A. Grinkevich, V.M. Mikhalkin, Ye.V. Boychuk.

Yazov Attends Lying-in-State

LD3008152889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 30 Aug 89

[Text] Today soldiers of the USSR Armed Forces and working people of the capital have been seeing off on his final journey Artillery Marshal Konstantin Petrovich Kazakov, outstanding Soviet military commander, active participant in the Great Patriotic War, and member of the CPSU since 1920. The Red Banner Hall of the Central Soviet Army House, where the coffin with the body of the deceased is lying, is decked out in mourning. Numerous wreaths lie around the base. The guard of honor includes Comrade Ya-ov, the USSR deputy defense ministers, and military commanders. Soldiers of the capital's garrison, students of military academies, and working people of Moscow are saying farewell to Artillery Marshal Kazakov.

Military History Journal Marks Jubilee

PM3008151189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Aug 89 First Edition p 2

[Unnamed TASS correspondent report: "For the Sake of Historical Truth"]

[Text] August 29 marks the 50th anniversary of the first issue of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, the organ of the USSR Defense Ministry. Set up in 1939 by decision of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee, it was intended to cover the history of military art and our country's military history over all the many centuries of its existence.

"Articles in the comparatively recent past," this TASS correspondent was told by Major General V.I. Filatov, chief editor of the journal, "were mainly based on works of military history published during the time of the personality cult and stagnation, when censorship and arbitrary decisions restricted a truthful depiction of certain events in Russian and Soviet military history. The journal is now resolutely restructuring its work.

"Above all, we are giving priority to publishing documents or authentic information under the rubrics 'Declassified,' 'In Search of the Truth,' 'From Defense Ministry Archives,' and others. We strive to ensure that the material is topical and an effective weapon in the hands of the propaganda aktiv in combating distortions of genuine history. The editorial mailbag shows how awkward the leaders of various kinds of 'alliances' and extremists from a number of movements—particularly in the Baltic—feel when the journal publishes documents that refute their anti-Soviet fabrications about certain events of 1939-1941, for instance....

"Circulation has quadrupled over the past few months and has passed the 120,000 mark."